Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1995

Rhetoricizing Habermas: The Restoration of Legitimacy as a
Theme in the 1992 Televised Presidential Debates.
Kevin Travis Jones
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Jones, Kevin Travis, "Rhetoricizing Habermas: The Restoration of Legitimacy as a Theme in the 1992
Televised Presidential Debates." (1995). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 6112.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/6112

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be
from any type o f computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality o f the
copy submitted.

Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality

illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted.

Also, if

unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced
form at the back o f the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy.

Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white

photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to
order.

A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

RHETORICIZING HABERMAS:
THE RESTORATION OF
LEGITIMACY AS A THEME IN THE
1992 TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Speech Communication

by
Kevin Travis Jones
B.A., Biola University, 1981
M . A . , California State University, Fullerton,
December, 1995

1987

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: 9618302

UMI Microform 9618302
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I have to acknowledge, first and foremost, my high
school guidance counselor, Mrs. Graham, who,

after looking

at my low SAT scores said "Well, you really don't look like
college material Kevin.

Why don't you learn a good trade,

get a job, get married and have a happy life!"
Graham:

Dear Mrs.

"Go to hell."

I next need to thank those people, who unlike Mrs.
Graham, believed in my potential.

Thank you to Dr. Gladys

Alex, my Junior College English teacher whose enthusiasm
and energy got me excited about learning.

Dr. Alex

believed enough in me to look me in the eyes and say "You
have the potential to be anything you want, Kevin,
teacher, go for it!"

Dr. Alex, I made it!

even a

Thank you!

I

need to acknowledge my undergraduate advisor, Dr. Todd
Lewis, who not only introduced me to the world of
Forensics,

but who also never gave up on me and always

encouraged me to be all that I could be.

And I must

acknowledge a very special thank you to the late Dr. Wayne
Brockriede, my Master of Arts advisor.

Thank you Wayne,

for teaching me how to think, and then to believe in my
thoughts.

If I can be one-tenth the person and professor

in my career that you were,

I will consider myself very

successful.
My greatest acknowledgement and thank you must go to
Dr. Andrew King.

You went well above and beyond the call

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of duty of a graduate advisor and sacrificed your summer of
95 to make sure that I got this dissertation done.
you for all of your work,

time,

effort,

Thank

support, patience,

and for not becoming irritated with me as I arrived on your
office doorstep literally every day with more for you to
read.

You always made me feel important to you and that

alone kept me going during this long summer more than you
will ever know.

I will never be able to thank you enough

for all of your help.

I hope to develop the same passion

for our discipline which you possess.
Thank you to my wife, Dr. Carrie Peirce-Jones.

You

sacrificed your life in many ways so that this degree could
become a reality.

This dissertation and my entire degree

could not have been accomplished without you.

Thank you

for your love and support.
Thank you also goes to my family and friends who have
nursed me through this project.

I dedicate this

dissertation to my sister, Julie Ann Johnson.

In our

youth, she got the braces and I got the college education.
She ended up with the family and a beautiful stable home.
I ended up criss-crossing this country several times.
Believe me, Julie,

there have been many days in my life

when I would gladly trade places with you!

I dedicate this

dissertation to you and all of the other women in this
world who have had just as much,

if not more, potential to

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

achieve great things, but cultural constraints would not
permit it.
I wish to acknowledge the support and help from all of
my committee members.

Thank you Dr. Cecil Eubanks for

always steering me in the right direction.
patient and helpful all summer long.

You were very

Thank you Dr. Ken

Zagacki and Dr. Harold Mixon for your input, suggestions,
and help.

I could not have accomplished this manuscript

without your help.
I need to acknowledge the support of the
administration of Asbury College,

the constant E-MAIL words

of encouragement from Dr. Ed Lamoureux,

and all the other

people who kept saying "write, man, write!!!"

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...........................................

ii

A B S T R A C T ..................................................... vi
CHAPTER
1

THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IN THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL O R D E R ...................... 1
I n t r o d u c t i o n ................................... 1
Rise Of D e b a t e s ................................ 3
Legitimacy C r i s i s .............................
4
Study Q u e s t i o n ................................. 13
The 1992 Presidential E l e c t i o n ............... 16
The 1992 Televised Presidential D e b a t e s
19
Debates And The Political P r o c e s s ........... 21
Study S i g n i f i c a n c e ............................
26
Study O u t l i n e .................................. 27
C o n c l u s i o n ....................................... 29

2

REVIEW O F L I T E R A T U R E ...........................
I n t r o d u c t i o n ...................................
Physical D e l i v e r y ..............................
Effects Of Television C o v e r a g e ...............
Debates Not True D e b a t e s ......................
Content Analysis Stu d i e s ......................
Issues A n d Images In Presidential
Campaigns And Televised Presidential
D e b a t e s ........................................
C o n c l u s i o n ......................................

30
30
31
39
45
49

52
63

3

TELEVISED DEBATES AND
PRESIDENTIAL C A M P A I G N S ......................... 64
I n t r o d u c t i o n ................................... 64
Televised Debates Difficult To S t u d y ........ 65
Debates E x p e c t e d ............................... 68
Impact Of Debates Upon E l e ctions ............. 72
Debate Effects On Voting B e h a v i o r ...........
82
Effects of Media Commentary On D e b a t e s ...... 92
Debates Negative Effects Upon Political
C a m p a i g n s ...................................... 98
Debate B e n e f i t s ................................ 105
C o n c l u s i o n ...................................... 107

4

HABERMAS AND LEGITIMACY T O P O I ..................109
I n t r o d u c t i o n.................................... 109
Origins Of Legitimacy C r i s i s ..................109
Rhetoric And Legitimacy C r i s i s ............... Ill
Ideal Speech S i t uation........................ 114
D e b a t e ........................................... 116
Method:
Rhetoricizing H a b e r m a s.............. 117
v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Topoi Of Legi t i m a c y ........................118
Method Of A n a l y s i s ............................. 119
C o n c l u s i o n ...................................... 120
5

LEGITIMACY CRISIS RHETORIC IN THE 1992
TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL D E B A T E S ............... 121
I n t r oduction.................................... 121
The Communication Ecology Of The D e b a t e s .... 121
Analysis:
The D e b a t e s ......................... 126
D i s c u s s i o n ...................................... 177
C o n c l u s i o n ...................................... 183

6.... C O N C L U S I O N ....................................... 184
In t r oduction .................................... 184
Review Of S t u d y ................................. 185
Study R e s u l t s ................................... 186
Study P e d a g o g y .................................. 188
Future R e s e a r c h ................................. 190
R E F E R E N C E S ................................................... 193
V I T A .......................................................... 208

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT
During the past twenty years, scholars have posited
the emergence of a legitimacy crisis in the American
political system.

Symptoms of the crisis were low voter

turn out and a culture of withdrawal,

cynicism,

alienation,

and a widespread perception of institutional incompetence
and indifference.

At the very least,

the widespread mood

of apathy and decline have been seized upon by various
candidates seeking political office,

in particular the

presidency, who routinely engage in discourse targeting
legitimacy restoration.

This discourse echoed the general

theme of the Jeffersonian Myth.
Jefferson in its old Roman roots,

This myth, which predates
targets the citizen as

the primary source of political power and moral authority.
W orking from H a b e r m a s ’ writings regarding legitimacy
crises and his ideal speech situation,

this study developed

three legitimacy topoi which were used as a critical method
for understanding candidate discourse.

These topoi were

used to explore the discourse of the 1992 televised
presidential debates.

The debates were selected because of

their economy of statements and voter impact,

and because

legitimacy had become a central theme of the 1992
elections.
The study found that the third party candidate
indicted the legitimacy of the system and argued for
restoration far more than the other two candidates.

vii
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The

incumbent used legitimacy appeals the least.

The exhaling

Democratic challenger affirmed and vilified the legitimacy
of the government showing that rhetorical strategy and
logic do not always coincide.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IN THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation deals with two subjects that have
become increasingly related in scholarly literature:
public debate and political legitimacy.

In recent years

political communication scholars as ideologically diverse
as Kathleen Jamieson and J. Michael Hogan have lamented the
death of genuine civic discourse.

According to these

scholars citizen deliberation has been replaced by media
coverage of spin doctors and campaign managers.

Extended

argument and exposition has been replaced by advertising
slogans,

images, and sound bites.

public opinion.

Further,

Polling has replaced

they argue that commentary by

journalists has preempted public discussion.

Finally,

they

conclude that the vast bulk of citizenry have been shut out
of meaningful participation in the political process.

The

dominance of mediated communication and the intersection of
politics, marketing and advertising has threatened the
legitimacy of the American political system, whose mandate
to act rests upon the perception of the participation of
the people and the expression of their will.
Since many scholars see the threat to political
legitimacy as a communication problem, they seek answers in
terms of improved communication.

Their solutions are

diverse, but they usually feature some means of directly

1
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involving citizenry in discussion or presenting the
candidates in ways that subvert mediated formats and
minimize the selective power of mass advertising and
marketing.

Hence it is no surprise that several of these

same scholars should endorse some form of presidential
debate as a vehicle for restoring political legitimacy.
Despite heavy broadcast mediation political debating
remains closer to the old ideals of civic discourse than
any of the newer formats;

it features rationality,

extended argument, and open competition before an audience
that appears to act in judgement.
This dissertation wishes to explore the connection
between political legitimacy and debate in an even more
organic way.

It is a common place that presidential

candidates are also knowledgeable about and sensitive to
the perception of a crisis in political legitimacy.

As

early as 1976 the restoration of legitimacy became a major
theme in President Carter's town meetings and "spontaneous
visits" outside Washington.

Carter professed to enjoy

getting away from the experts of the capital in order to
draw w i sdom and virtue from the people.

Accordingly,

dissertation proposes to study the attempts to restore
legitimacy by analyzing the communication behavior of
candidates within presidential debates.
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this

RISE OF DEBATES
In 1960, the first televised presidential debate took
place between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon.
Sixteen years would pass before the American electorate
would witness televised presidential debates again.
1976, however,

televised presidential debates have become a

regular part of the presidential election process.
U.S.

Since

The

electorate has witnessed televised debates between

presidential hopefuls in 1976, 1980,
recently in 1992.

1984, 1988, and most

While each series of debates has

differed in number*,

format^, participants,

and content,

one consistent fact regarding televised presidential
debates has emerged - they are an expected part of the
election process.

As early as 1986, with few televised

debates having yet taken place, Auer

(1986) stated that

"the public has grown to expect candidates
in debates"

(p. 216).

. . .

to engage

Six years later Friedenberg (1994)

wrote of the developing presidential debate tradition:
"Debates have become an expected feature of our
presidential elections"

(p. 239).

Jamieson and Birdsell

(1988) noted that debates are more then just "expected" and

*The total number of televised debates in each
election have ranged from 4 debates in 1960, 3 in 1976,
only 1 debate in 1980, 2 in 1984, 2 in 1988, and 3 in 1992.
Formats have ranged through the years from a single
moderator, to a panel of journalists asking questions, to a
town hall meeting with citizens asking "anything goes"
questions.
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have come to play a major role in election campaigns:
"Debate" has become a buzzword for serious
politics . . . when debates are announced,
movement in the polls slows, in anticipation,
the electorate suspends its willingness to be
swayed by ads and news.
(p. 5-6)
Further, Jamieson and Birdsell contend that the increase in
debate popularity and the documented effect on voters
demonstrates that they have become the single most
significant event of the presidential campaign.
LEGITIMACY CRISIS
Crisis Emerges
At least since Watergate, political leaders have been
developing a legitimacy rhetoric, replete with vilification
and warnings.

On July 15, 1979, President Jimmy Carter

delivered a dramatic television Jeremiad to the American
people on the subject of the energy crisis.

After a brief

technical exposition, he expanded the scope of his topic
and drew attention to "a subject even more serious than
energy or inflation.
democracy."

. .a fundamental threat to American

That threat, he said, was a "crisis of

confidence that strikes at the very heart and soul and
spirit of our national will."

He pointed to a growing

disrespect for government and emphasized that "the gap
between our citizens and our government has never been so
wide"

(Lipset & Schneider,

1987, p. 13).

In his address,

President Carter referred to a legitimacy crisis in the
American political system which had been growing for the
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past twenty years.

Lane (1965) explained that between the

mid 1930's and 1965, with the growing prosperity and an
increase in the proportion of the population that had
completed high school or had gone on to college, more and
more Americans said they liked their society and believed
its political system was honest, effective,
However, between 1965 and 1980, Watergate,

and responsive.
the deep

division over Vietnam that ended in ignominious defeat,
constant scandals,

the

the perception of governmental

incompetence on the one hand and intrusive governmental
intervention on the other,

the decline of real wages,

the end of the social contract,
confidence in the state.

and

led to a crisis of

However, while they assigned

material cause to the decline of legitimacy, ordinary
Americans defined the symptoms of decline and the solutions
to the problem in terms of exclusivity and of closed
communication behavior.

Lipset and Schneider (1987)

identified the rise in discontent through a series of
extensive interviews and questions.

The authors noted that

from 1964 to 1970, the percentage of Americans who felt
that "the government is pretty much run by a few big
interests looking out for themselves rather than for the
benefit of all the people"
(p. 16).

increased from 29 to 50 percent

Support for the comment "people like me don't

have any say about what the government does" rose from 36
percent in 1970 to 45 percent in 1978 (p. 16).

When asked
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6
the question "over the years, how much attention do you
feel the government pays to what the people think when it
decided to do something?" those citizens who responded "A
good deal of the time" declined from 32 percent in 1964 to
11 percent in 1974, and those responding "Not much"
increased from 24 percent in 1964 to 28 percent in 1974 (p.
24).

The authors reported that in the fall of 1980, the

highest level of mistrust appeared with an average of 67
percent —

that is two out of every three Americans —

who

distrusted the government (p. 18).
Yankelovich (1977) provided similar data and arguments
regarding the distrust of the government by the public.
Yankelovich explained:
We have seen a steady rise of mistrust in
our national institutions.
Trust in government
declined dramatically from almost 80 percent
in the late 1 9 5 0 's to about 33 percent in 1976.
More than 80 percent of voters say they do not
trust those in positions of leadership as much
as they used to.
In the mid-60's a one-third
minority reported feeling isolated and distant
from the political process; by the mid 1970's
a two-thirds majority felt what they thought
"really doesn't count."
Approximately three
out of five people feel the government suffers
from a concentration of too much power in too
few hands, and fewer than one out of five feel
that congressional leaders can be believed.
(P- 2-3)
Voter Discontent
One index of discontent is silence;
withdrawal.
powerlessness

another index is

Evidence of the voters feelings of
is documented by their absence from the
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ballot box.

From 1958 to 1992, voter turnout at the polls

had steadily declined with only 50 percent of Americans of
voting age casting a vote in the 1988 presidential election
(Pear 1992, B4).

Dionne (1991) opined that the distrust of

government is so severe that Americans have grown to "hate
politics":
Over the past three decades, the faith of the
American people in their democratic institutions
has declined, and Americans have begun to doubt
their ability to improve the world through
politics.
Americans view politics with boredom
and detachment.
For most of us, politics is
increasingly abstract, a spectator sport barely
worth watching.
Election campaigns generate
less excitement than ever . . . Voters doubt
that elections give them any real control over
what the government does, and half of them
don't bother to cast ballots, (p. 10)
The political system is viewed as causing more strife and
divisiveness then it solves.

Dionne (1991) stated:

Americans hate politics as it is now practiced
because we have lost all sense of the public good.
Over the last thirty years, politics has stopped
being a deliberative process through which people
resolved disputes, found remedies and moved forward,
(p. 332)
Rising voter discontent over the past three decades has
been caused by the belief that American political
institutions are less competent then formerly believed.
Voters believe that the government is not providing
services with the resources it consumes.

However, as

incidents such as the increase in crime and
the country,

violence in

the unstable economy, and the growing number

of corrupt politicians increase, voters no longer believe
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that the political institution is looking out for their
good and making their lives better.

The public wants a

political system that is committed to the public good.
Dionne (1991) explained:

"In the 1990's Americans are

seeking a politics that restores a sense of public
enterprise and mutual obligation"

(p. 334).

Finally,

the

unique American faith in problem solving seems abated.
Many no longer believe questions of race, poverty, and
social order will ever be "solved" or even meliorated.
The decline in public confidence of the government,
combined with voter apathy at the ballot box, has led many
scholars to argue that the American political system is
facing a legitimacy crisis of substantial proportions.
Lipset and Schneider (1987) argued that the crisis exists
as a result of a damaged system.

The authors contend:

Implicit in the decline of public confidence is a
potential crisis of legitimacy.
Severe critics of
the American system believe that the decline in
public support for government is a manifestation of
a much deeper loss of institutional legitimacy that
has resulted from basic flaws in the structure of
our society, (p. 375)
The major thinker who coined the phrase, Jurgen Habermas
(1973a), has argued that the United States government is
merely suffering from the common disease of the West, a
crisis of legitimacy.

Earlier than most intellectuals,

Habermas linked the fragmentation of popular culture with
the seizure of governance by professional elites
(marketing,

advertising,

law, etc.) and the rise of mass
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communication as the triple pillars of the assault on
legitimacy.
Dye (1990) noted that "legitimacy is a belief that a
system of decision making is
'just,'

'right,1 or

'proper,1 or

and therefore, one is morally obligated to accept

its decisions"

(p. 3).

Thus,

if more and more American

citizens see the political "system" of the United States as
being uninterested in what the people think and that most
politicians are self-serving, then they no longer believe
the system is "right" or "just."

Habermas

(1984) explained

that a "crisis suggests the notion of an objective power
depriving a subject of part of his normal sovereignty"
134).

His diagnosis of the American case follows:

U.S. public views the government —

(p.

The

in conjunction with

media consultants and political professionals —
depriving them of their normal sovereignty —

as

a democratic

system designed to be controlled by the people —

resulting

in a legitimacy crisis for the American political system.
Jeffersonian Myth
Much of our sense of what is right and good
(legitimate)

is embodied in our cultural myths.

myths act as morals exemplars,

Those

embodying communed order in

a form that is coherent and dramatic.

Thus,

this crisis

can be understood in terms of the folk myth that undergirds
the principles upon which the Constitution of the United
States was drafted.

The American public believes that they

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

elect representatives to office who will serve as agents of
the community.

The welfare and moral ethos of the people

is supposed to guide their decisions and may be withdrawn
periodically.

Lipset and Schneider (1987)

source of this mandate:

identified the

"The great majority of Americans

still adhere to views that can be traced to the Founding
Fathers and to events surrounding the creation of the
Republic"

(p. 5).

Because of the extensive role of Thomas

Jefferson in the framing of the Declaration of
Independence,

the myth of the Democratic process of

representation by the people is often referred to as
"Jeffersonian ideology."

Thomas Jefferson's Agrarian myth

articulated the ideal political process.
discuss local problems,

Citizen farmers

frame them through their

spokesperson who takes them to Congress for further
deliberation and action.

The citizen originates and

initiates while government reacts and serves.

Koch

(1976)

noted that Jeffersonian ideology is based upon "the
principle that ultimate power, decision,
belong to the people"

(p. 43).

and control should

A nd it is the hallmark of

democracy that all power not ultimately located in or
delegated by the people is illegitimate.

Peterson (1976)

further explained:
Its primary purpose [Democratic governance]
was to secure individuals in their natural
rights and thereby to liberate them for action
in society . . . Government should be absorbed
into society, becoming truly self-government.
(P. 20)
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Since the Constitution was framed,

the Jeffersonian

myth has created the expectation of a social contract
between the people and the elected officials that the will
of the people should dictate the public agenda.
decades,

In recent

the public no longer believes that "their will"

generates political action or that politicians even feel
accountable to their needs. Consequently,
challenged,

the social contract broken,

the myth has been

and with it the

weakening of institutional legitimacy.
Voters no longer feel assured that the government is
an extension of their will, but they have become a resource
base of an unaccountable government.

However,

despite this

perception of a reversal of roles, the public still clings
to a restoration of the myth.

The original system remains

the norm, yet despite its gold standard stature it is
simply being ignored by corrupt and power hungry
politicians.

Lipset and Schneider (1987) explained:

"Americans still believe in the legitimacy and vitality of
the American system.

What bothers the public is the

apparent growth of concentrations of power and the cynical,
self-interested abuse of power by government officials"
409).

(p.

The power of the political system has corrupted the

elected officials and made them an elite group of
"insiders" who claim to know what the people need.
(1984) noted:

Kateb

"In the background of the legitimacy crisis

is the theory of democratic elitism"

(p. 185).

Elected
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officials become the elite, the insiders, who believe that
democracy is best when many do not participate and the true
democrats are the few upon whom democracy rests.
Ironically,

voter apathy at the ballot box feeds the

elitist theory.

It also reduces the perception of

legitimacy by reducing voter participation.
Political Rationality
The legitimacy crisis presents an exigence for any
potential elected official,

and especially for the

presidential hopeful who must gain the trust of the
American public.

Candidates must achieve political

legitimacy to pacify voter discontent.

Political

legitimacy is achieved when the candidate can establish a
relationship with the electorate which demonstrates a
commitment to the Jeffersonian myth.
explained:

Barker

(1990)

"Political legitimacy is defined as an

historically observable set of justified relationships
rather than a normatively awarded status"

(p. 29).

The

candidate must eschew the image of elitism and create the
image of an amicable relationship.
opined,

As Barker

(1990) has

"The conduct of government cannot be separated,

though it may be distinguished,
governed.

Legitimate government is a relationship between

state and subjects"
achieved,

from that of those who are

(p. 2).

Political legitimacy is

therefore, when the candidate can convince the

electorate that he/she is one of the people and will uphold
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the social contract of the Jeffersonian myth.

Candidates

must also possess a working knowledge of the political
system into which they wish to be elected.

The candidate

must possess the expert knowledge of the political elite,
but must be able to convey that knowledge to the general
public without appearing to be a member of the elite.

That

is, the candidate must attempt to educate and empower the
public and he/she must elucidate terms of accountability
(i.e. at what point will a goal be achieved or a need
addressed?).

The candidate must develop what I will call a

discourse of "political rationality."

I derive this term

from previous research in which former politicians'
abilities to communicate "expert" scientific information to
the lay electorate has been referred to as "technical
rationality3."

This study of televised debates examines

the merger of two similar principles —
expert, with the lay electorate.
rationality"

is appropriate.

the political

Thus the term "political

Political rationality

attempts to express the communication norms of the
Jeffersonian myth, thereby attempting to restore political
legitimacy for the candidate.
STUDY QUESTION
The subject of legitimacy predates Habermas.

Like so

many enduring concepts it was pioneered by the great

3See Farrell & Goodnight (1981), Fisher (1984), Gross
(1984), McGee & Martin (1983), and Zagacki & King (1989).
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sociologist Max Weber*.

Despite its long history, however,

it appears to have assumed a special importance today.
Although scholars like Kenneth Cmiel

(1990) assert that

political legitimacy has been declining through the rise of
scientific elites and the populist attack on citizenship
for more than 100 years,

and while Richard Davis

(1994)

lays the blame on the media as recent destroyers of civic
discourse,

there is a growing scholarly consensus that

political legitimacy (its apparent decline and its possible
restoration)

is a central issue of our time because it is

probably a result of a vast congeries of causes and related
as much to urbanization and economics as to perceived
failure of political behavior.
I will argue in this dissertation that legitimacy,
long a significant theme in American politics,
central importance in the 1992 election.

achieved

So constant were

messages concerning the loss of institutional legitimacy
and promises of its restoration that legitimacy could be
said to be the "representative anecdote" of the campaign.
In Kenneth Burke's (1945) typology,

the promise of

perceived legitimacy repeated in many contexts would form a
"text" or an admonitory representative anecdote5.

This

*See Weber, M. (1946).
Politics as a vocation. (A
speech delivered at Munich University in 1918) In H. Gerth
(Trans), From Max Weber:
Essays in s o c i o l o g y . New York:
Oxford University Press.
pp. 127-156.

CA:

5See Burke, K. (1945).Grammar of m o t i v e s . Berkeley,
University of California Press.
pp. 319-326.
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admonitory text would give us a warning and a call to
return government accountability to the will of the people.
. Accordingly,

this dissertation has taken as its

central task the study of the rhetorical construction of
legitimacy among the three principle candidates:
(George Bush), Challenger
Perot).

Incumbent

(Bill Clinton) and Outsider (Ross

The campaign created a hermeneutic struggle over

the saliency and substance of the time.

Further,

a careful

study of competing messages will tell much about the
rhetorical skill of the candidates and, beyond that, the
ways in which a dominant text affected the presentation of
presidential image and the format and stylization of
presidential issues.
I will argue the most economical way of studying the
campaign text is through the televised presidential
debates, a format seen by Kathleen Jamieson and James
Birdsell as a vehicle through which civic discourse,
legitimacy, might be increased.

having

The debates provide a

unique opportunity to compare the legitimacy of rhetorical
construction strategies of each candidate in a single
forum.

The debates also represent a direct clash of

messages and ideas.

The candidates are forced in the

debates to define issues and give their fullest exposition
of their positions.

The debates also provide the most

coherent look at the rival images of the candidates as well
as insight into how direct conflict defines the candidates'
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images.

Finally,

the debates allow for the distillation of

each candidate's basic defining messages.
THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Unique Campaign
The 1992 presidential campaign warrants examination
because of the significant impact which the election had
upon the American political process.

Unique campaign

events and fluid polls encouraged rhetorical experiments in
abundance in the 1992 election.

First, an Independent

candidate, Ross Perot, who claimed that he was running for
the presidency only because he had been placed on the
ballot by the American people, dropped out of the race in
July, and returned to the race in October, just one month
prior to the election.

While his actions would normally be

considered political suicide, Perot was still able to
collect 19 percent of the popular vote.
In addition to the Perot factor, the electorate
appeared both confused and disillusioned by their options.
Prysby and Scavo

(1993) explained this disillusionment:

Public opinion polls conducted in June [of 1992]
showed that none of the candidates was a clear
favorite.
Each of the three [candidates] had
between one-fourth and one-third of the electorate
preferring him, depending on the poll.
At least
one poll had Perot first and Clinton third while
another poll had Clinton first and Bush last.
(P- 4)
Past Voting Trends
A prevailing scholarly portrait of the American voter
is that he/she is poorly informed and apathetic.

In

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17
addition, voters are said to feel shut out of
participation.

As in earlier elections,

voter turn out looked grim.

the prognosis for

According to Sundquist

(1987)

the prior patterns of voter apathy could be accounted for
in this way:
About 38 percent of American citizens are
"core" or regular voters for major national
and state office;
another 17 percent or so
are marginals who come to the polls only when
stimulated by the dramas of presidential
campaign politics;
and 45 percent are more
or less habitual nonvoters, (p. 98)
Jamieson and Birdsell

(1988) expressed similar concern

regarding voter apathy trends in former elections:
The United States hovers near the bottom when
its voter turnout is compared to that of other
developed countries . . . In 1984, for example,
44.8 percent of the citizens of voting age
opted to let others decide whether Mondale or
Reagan would inhabit the White House in 1985.
(P- 178)
Pear (1992) noted that

50 percent of the electorate stayed

away from the election

booth in 1988 (p. B4). But 1992

to be different.

was

The legitimacy crisis became a central

theme of campaign discourse, and perhaps because of this,
the long term decline was reversed.
1992 Voter Turnout
Given the dissatisfaction of candidate choice by the
electorate as early as June, combined with the history of
low voter turn out, a prediction might have seemed
justified that the 1992 presidential election would draw
few voters to the ballot box.

The exact opposite took
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place.

As Pear (1992) observed,

"55 percent of the voting

age population cast a presidential ballot" ending a 30 year
decline in presidential election voter turn out (p. B4).
An election which appeared headed for disaster at the
ballot box, attracted voters quite successfully.
The large voter turn out placed Bill Clinton in the
White House.

Clinton won 43 percent of the popular vote to

Bush's 38 percent and Perot's 19 percent

(New York T i m e s .

November 5, 1992, p. B4).

While Clinton "won" the

election, Prysby and Scavo

(1993) argued that his victory

was slightly tainted when compared to the 1988 election
where Dukakis lost the election but still carried 46
percent of the popular vote.

Political pundits are quick

to cite the presence of Ross Perot as the reason for the
low victory percentage.
challenge this argument.

Post election polls, however,
A general election exit poll

conducted on November 3, 1992 by Voter Research and S u rveys
indicated that the Perot voters would have split evenly
between Clinton and Bush if Perot had not been in the race.
Prysby and Scavo (1993) noted that if the vote for Clinton
and Bush was recalculated as a percentage of the two-party
vote

(i.e. exclude the Perot vote) Clinton received 53

percent of the two party vote to Bush's 47 percent6.

The

6The authors note, however, that the electoral college
vote count was more decisive.
Clinton captured 370 of the
538 electoral college votes.
Bush w on the remaining 168
votes, as Perot failed to carry a single state, (p. 9)
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presence of Ross Perot in the election did not necessarily
place Clinton in the White House as many political critics
claimed.
The 1992 presidential election contained some of the
most unique variables in U.S. presidential election
history.

The American voter went from dissatisfied with

their choices,

to engaging in the largest voter turn out in

30 years for a presidential election.

Of the many

variables involved in this unique election,

the televised

presidential debates served as one of the most important
influences in the entire election.
THE 1992 TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
Influence Upon Voters
The 1992 televised debates had a significant impact
upon the campaign efforts by each candidate.

CBS election

coverage on November 3, 1992 reported that of all the
possible influences on voters decisions,
debates were the most important element.
Sandell, Mattley, Evarts,

Langel,

the presidential
Researchers

and Ziyati

with the findings in the CBS report.

(1993) agreed

In their study of the

impact of the 1992 debates upon the electorate,

the authors

reported that when asked what influenced their decision in
selecting a candidate,

the most often cited response by

voters was the economy (the central focus of all three
debates) with the second most mentioned influence being the
actual debates

(p. 16-17).
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The influence of the 1992 debates upon the overall
election is quite noteworthy since the 1960 debates are the
only, other series of televised presidential debates to
receive similar recognition.

While the full extent and

exact role the 1960 debates played in the election are
subject to dispute, Windt

(1994) has claimed that "the

belief that without the debates Kennedy could not have won
has been firmly established"

(p. 1).

Neither the 1976,

1980, 1984, nor the 1988 televised presidential debates
have attracted similar notoriety.
Large Numbers of Voters Who Watched Debates
The 1992 televised presidential debates also received
a great deal of attention from the electorate.

According

to Carmody (1992), there was a significant increase in
debate viewers over past televised debates:

the first 1992

debate was viewed by 81 million people and the second
debate increased to 93 million viewers.

This was a

substantial increase over the 1988 debates where only 74
million viewers watched the first debate, dropping d o w n . to
72 million viewers for the second debate (p. Dl, D3).
The viewers of the 1992 debates watched with a
specific agenda.

Since television had brought the election

into their homes and had made the candidates more personal,
the members of the electorate turned to personal character
traits as the overriding criteria for candidate selection.
Sandell et.al.

(1993) noted that when asked what they were
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looking for in a candidate, voters leading response was
personal qualities or attributes (p. 18).

Winkler and

Black (1993) explained that the most frequently mentioned
reasons for determining winners

...

of the [first]

October 11 presidential debate were confidence,
honesty and trustworthiness (p. 84).

presence,

All of the mentioned

criteria are personal character qualities and attributes.
Russakoff and Morin (1992) argued the increased emphasis
upon candidate character and personal attributes by the
electorate when they provided one viewer's response to the
debates as "I'd like a deep feeling in my heart that I
could trust somebody - that the person I vote for,
do good for this country"

(p. Al).

they'll

The electorate was

clearly looking for a candidate who was a human being first
and a politician second.

They wanted a president who would

give them an "image of themselves."

The centrality of the

debates as a source of influence and the voter concern with
trust argue for the importance this sample of discourse is
as an object of analysis.

First, they were the single most

important source of voter information.

Second,

they

contained appeals about the restoration of trust for an
audience dispelled to seek out trust.
DEBATES AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Candidate Image
Candidate image has become the most powerful influence
in presidential elections for two reasons:

1) public
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involvement in the election process,
role of the media.

and 2) the g'rowing

Prior to 1832, members of the Electoral

College were selected by members of Congress or elected
through a state district plan.

Since 1832, however,

all

members of the Electoral College have been elected by
popular vote

(McClure 1905).

As a result,

the Electoral

College has become more reflective of the popular vote and
has gradually changed the character of presidential
campaigns.

Since the president is elected by both the

Electoral College and the popular vote, candidates must pay
close attention to the desires of the people.
In addition to the influence of public involvement in
the election process,

the importance of candidate image has

been affected by the growing role of the media.

Media

involvement in early presidential elections was limited to
newspapers and periodicals.

Campaign rhetoric was often

printed in newspapers and debated by surrogates.
Presidential candidates seldom debated an opponent
publicly,

and were rarely seen by large numbers of people.

The candidates

platform and ideas were widely discussed

without the candidate ever having met most of the general
public.

His communication behavior and personal style

remained largely unknown.

However,

electronic media altered that focus.

the introduction of the
Campaign speeches

over the radio brought a human voice and glimpses of his
personality to the minds of each listener.

As television
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usage increased in political campaigns,

a candidate's

physical characteristics affected the candidate's image for
the public.

When presidential debates made their way onto

the television screen,

candidate image quickly overshadowed

even the most important campaign issues.

Televised debates

brought each presidential candidate directly into the homes
of the electorate.

Even the most politically uninformed

person was now able to evaluate and assess each candidate
on the one thing that most individuals felt confident in
assessing, personality.

Lanoue and Schrott

(1991)

ex p l a i n e d :
In reality, [televised debate] viewers are
far more likely to use debates to gain insight
into each candidate's personality and character.
A superior 'personal' presentation appears to
be more important to voters than accumulation
of issue-oriented debating points, (p. 96)
Thus the old indices of issues and personal style were
reversed, a candidate's personality became an important
basis upon which the electorate determined whether or not
an individual was presidential material.

Jamieson (1987)

argued that as a result of this media-driven shift in voter
priorities,

the image of the candidate has become the

litmus test for most voters.

The author explained:

"Speaker image becomes central to the assessment of viewer
response.

So central in fact that one can say the

candidate image is the issue in the campaign, the one and
only criterion every American voter feels qualified to
apply"

(p. 74).

Consequently,

as Ansolabehere, Behr, and
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Iyengar

(1993) have argued,

"a politicians'

ability to

govern is increasingly intertwined with his or her public
image"

(p. 125)

Candidate Personality
What are the constituents of the newly important
image?

As voters evaluate candidates based upon image,

personality traits such as honesty, warmth,

and caring

become central criteria for candidate selection.
(1984) discovered that "the communication of
feelings'

Leo

'warm

is three to four times more powerful than

traditional candidate preference criteria such as party
identification or issues"

(p. 37).

"feelings" dictate decisions.

The electorates'

Keeter

(1987) explained:

"Citizens may be forced to 'vote by feeling'

because they

feel they lack adequate information in an atomized
political system and the search for
search for

'trust'"

(p. 356).

'truth' becomes a

Scholars see this focus on

emotion and personality as signs of the pathology of
discourse.

If no attempt is made to educate the voter, the

voter will not participate in a meaningful way.
are other problems with image politics.
can be

And there

Candidate "trust"

quickly violated as the electorate discovers that

political campaigns and political governance can be two
different issues.

What candidates say, or the image they

portrayed to gain the trust of the electorate, can often be
abandoned by candidates out of necessity to function within
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the political system to which they were elected.

As a

result, voters develop a distrust for the entire American
political process,
system.

something very vital to the democratic

Finally, excessively mediated communication will

continue to keep them out of the process and even of
expressing their alienation.
Viewers Opinions Of Winners And Losers
The results of the debates indicated that no single
candidate was able to persuade the electorate that they
were the consistent winner of all three debates.

Table 1

shows the discrepancy in whom viewers determined to be the
winner of each debate (Hahn 1994 pp.

194-207).

TABLE 1
Debate 1

Debate 2

Debate 3

Clinton

30%

58%

28%

Bush

16%

16%

28%

Perot

47%

15%

37%

Perot was clearly perceived to be the winner of the first
debate.

Clinton, however, made a substantial jump in the

polls to win the second debate.

Bush was able to use the

third debate to improve upon his rating from the first two
debates.

However, Bush still scored poorly in all three

debates.

If any conclusions can be drawn from the debate

results,

it is that Bush performed poorly in all three

debates.
It is not, however, the purpose of this dissertation
to determine the "winner" of the debates in any traditional
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sense.

The debates are a particularly ideal format for

studying legitimacy appeals.

First,

the campaign is

comprehensive and offers a comparison of all three
candidates across all major issues.

Second,

the campaign

offers a distillation of the messages and hence of the
primary legitimation strategies of the candidates.

Third,

the debate not only features explicit attempts at the
restoration of legitimacy but the implicit appeals - those
that are embedded in the exposition of issues, analysis of
solutions,

and the refutation of counter proposals by the

ca n d i d a t e s .
STUDY SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of the results of a study of this
nature are numerous.

First, a better understanding of the

contemporary meaning and experience of political legitimacy
can be determined.

Second,

the status of the clash between

expert and Jeffersonian dialogue can be determined.

Third,

the outcome of this struggle has important consequences for
our political system and our image of America as a polity.
Fourth,

as a result of the validation and support of the

methodological criteria used in the study,

critics are

provided with additional tools for assessing future
televised debates.

With a wider and much stronger

repertoire of critical filters to use, researchers can
better isolate and critique those variables unique to their
specific study.

The larger selection of filters will
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result in better and more complete studies of televised
debates.

As a result of better studies, a better

understanding of the phenomenon of presidential elections
will transpire.
Fifth, political pundits and consultants will have an
increased knowledge base to work from when preparing future
political candidates.

Prior knowledge of what constitutes

an effective debate in the minds of the electorate will
allow campaign strategists to prepare candidates for those
debates.
The final benefit of a study of this nature is that
voters can become more critical and informed decision
makers while engaging in the political process.

The

inoculation of the electorate regarding candidate
strategies allows for greater listener discernment when
watching televised debates.

Increased knowledge in

potential candidate tricks or event manipulation will allow
the voter to have a better informed, much more intelligent
assessment of the debate as well as the overall election
process.
STUDY OUTLINE
Chapter one of this study has provided an overview of
the current legitimacy crisis in the American political
system.

The use of "political rationality" as an ideal

type of discourse reflecting

Jeffersonian political

ideology was described and argued to constitute a set of
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discourse categories through which the 1992 televised
debates could be evaluated.

The significance of the study

was also argued.
Chapter two will explain the larger rhetorical form in
which the appeals are elucidated.

It will acquaint the

reader with the rhetorical form in which the legitimacy
appeals are embedded.

Accordingly it will present a

general overview of relevant scholarly literature regarding
televised presidential debates.

The literature which will

be reviewed will include research regarding physical
delivery,

the effects of television coverage on debates,

arguments that debates are not true debates, content
analysis of several debates, and the formation of issues
and images in televised debates.
Chapter three will provide a much more detailed
examination of how televised debates function in
presidential election campaigns and how their enactment is
related to legitimacy.

The expected nature of debates,

impact of debates upon elections,

the

the effects of televised

debates upon voters, the effects of journalist's comments
on perceived debate outcome,

the negative effects of

debates upon political campaigns,

and the overall effects

of debates on elections will be reviewed.
Chapter four will outline a critical filter for this
study based upon Habermas's theory of legitimacy crisis and
its application to rhetoric.

A set of legitimacy topoi,
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derived from Habermas'

ideal speech situation, will be

introduced and explained.
Chapter five will provide an analysis of the attempts
at political rationality by the candidates in the 1992
televised presidential debates in order to restore
legitimacy.
Chapter six will evaluate the rhetorical constructs of
legitimacy and determine its effects upon the 1992 election
and its legacy for subsequent political elections.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter,

I have proposed a study of political

rationality in the 1992 televised presidential debates.
This proposal was precipitated by an explanation of the
significant influence which the 1992 televised debates had
upon the 1992 presidential election.

A brief

outline/summary of each of the five chapters were presented
to provide a brief theoretical overview of the study.
Finally,

several future benefits and contributions to

political communication research resulting from this study
were provided to identify the potential significance for a
study of this nature.

In the next chapter,

I will review

relevant literature regarding televised presidential
debates.

From this review, a framework for the study of

televised presidential debates will be established.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION
. As I noted in Chapter One, some scholars see the mere
staging of debates as a step toward the restoration of
legitimacy.

Thus,

it is important to situate this form in

contemporary political discourse as an established genre
before going on to analyze legitimacy appeals embedded in
particular specimens of discourse.

Further, before

examining the 1992 televised presidential debates
perspective),

the role of televised debates in all

presidential elections
attention.

(a micro

(a macro perspective) warrants

An understanding of the macro research, will

provide the foundation for the proposed micro study.
Chapter two will review literature pertaining to televised
debates as a genre.

Chapter three will examine the effects

debates have had upon past presidential elections.
Since 1960, televised presidential debates have
attracted the attention of communication researchers from a
wide variety of areas.

In this review of literature,

the

areas of research have been categorized according to the
following divisions:

Physical Delivery, Role of Television

Coverage, The Debates as "Debates", Content Analysis,
Image-Issue formation.

and

The research in each of the

categories will be reviewed and interpreted with regards to
their overall contribution to the understanding of

30
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televised presidential debates.
predominately technical.

The studies are

That is, they are concerned with

matters such as speaker effectiveness or audience
retention.

However, some studies are concerned with

philosophical matters of governance.

All in all,

the

literature provides a firm foundation for the present
study, one that lies at the intersection of rhetorical
practice and civic ideology.
PHYSICAL DELIVERY
Beginning with the 1960 televised presidential debates
between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon, communication
scholars paid close attention to the effect of physical
delivery particularly as it related to dimensions of
competence and trust.

Powell

(1968) noted that Kennedy

spent a great deal of time working on his delivery skills
prior to the debate,

taking voice and speaking lessons to

learn diaphragmatic breathing (p. 59).
debater

A skilled college

(Nixon 1978 p. 150) Nixon prepared for the debates

to a lesser extent.
attention.

Speaking styles also received

The works of Highlander & Watkins

(1962)

represents an example of this research:
Nixon was more controlled in his style and
delivery.
Speaking at a slower rate than
his opponent, Nixon did not strive
deliberately for figurative style where
Kennedy did.
Nixon was sincere and
straightforward, but not very inspiring.
Nixon spoke more directly to the cameras and
thus had more eye-to-eye contact with the
audience than did Kennedy.
The men revealed
their most observable and commented upon
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differences in the area of style and delivery.
Nixon was much more traditional in his manner
of presentation, and both his style and
delivery were smoother than Kennedy's.
Kennedy's style and delivery, however,
effectively reinforced the image of vitality
he presented, (pp. 46-47)
Tiemens

(1978) stated that "the

'image' of Kennedy,

projected by the medium [T.V.], was more influential in
gaining him votes than what he said about the issues"
362).

(p.

Thus, despite Nixon's attempt to be sincere and

straightforward, Kennedy was able to convey a more
youthful, vibrant image which may have assisted him in
winning the overall election.

Everyone knows the anecdote

about Marshall McLuhan sensing that Nixon had lost because
television had allowed the people to "see" the hunger for
the office.

In Jeffersonian ideology, the candidate should

not hunger for the office, but be "called" to it.

In

Weber's terms, Nixon damaged his political legitimacy by
displaying his careerism and personal ambition.
The debate over candidate delivery style and image
have prompted some researchers to argue that the debates
may actually do very little to promote a candidates
position on a particular issue or inform the public about
campaign concerns.

According to Kraus (1962) the debates

appeared to display more showmanship than statesmanship.
H e concluded that "The results of the televised debate
[Nixon/Kennedy] showed that voters were more interested in
how the candidates looked than what they said"

(p. 232).
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The emphasis upon physical delivery and appearance have
lead other researchers to suggest that Nixon's alleged loss
to Kennedy in the first televised debate was attributed to
Nixon having a "five o'clock shadow"

(Tiemens 1978, p.

362) .
Whether or not a single physical feature or delivery
style allowed Kennedy to win any or all of the televised
debates between the two candidates and place him in the
White House is uncertain.

What is more certain, however,

is that the 1960 televised debates set a precedent for
separating image and issue, a breech that has been healed
since then.

Analysts separated the candidates'

their issues.

Nimmo

image from

(1970) declared that "They [1960

debates] were not arguments on issues, but confrontations
of images

. . . what the candidates say is less significant

than how they look.

Style, not content, prevails"

(p.

159).
After reviewing the 1960,

1976, and 1980 televised

debates, Martel (1983) maintained that even something as
simple as a candidate's smile "is important in
communicating confidence, control, and friendliness and
that smiles

. . . contributed to Kennedy's success against

Nixon in 1960"(p.

83).

delivery and content.

A dichotomy developed between
While critics indicted the 1960

debates for initiating the emphasis upon delivery over
content in a presidential campaign, candidates subsequently
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echoed the same criticism.

Richard Nixon's

(1978)

complaint is characteristic:
I doubt that they [televised debates] can
ever serve a responsible role in defining the
issues of a Presidential campaign.
Because
of the nature of the medium [of television]
there will inevitably be a greater premium
on showmanship than on statesmanship, (p. 221)
The 1980 televised debates between President Jimmy
Carter and Ronald Reagan evoked similar criticism regarding
the candidates'

physical delivery as did the 1960 debates.

Upon examination of content,

delivery,

perceptions of the candidates,

the voters

and the eventual outcome of

the election, Berquist and Golden (1981) drew a Mcluhanesq
conclusion:
The [1980] presidential debates were electronic
media events in which a speaker's delivery,
appearance, and overall manner — as filtered
through the television screen — proved to be more
important than substance, (p. 132)
Researchers have routinely reported the predominance of
ethos and pathos over logic.

Martel

(1983) argued that

Reagan's smile in the debates "communicated confidence,
control,

and friendliness and played a large role in

Reagan's strong performances over Carter"

(p. 83).

Studies evaluating the importance of kinesics,
gestures and oral style have continually reinforced
previous assumptions concerning the importance of physical
delivery in the debates.

In the 1984 debates, the

nonverbal communication of emotions and feelings played a
decisive role in audience response.

Shields and MacDowell
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(1987) examined the display of emotions,
behavior,

or emotional

in a political debate and concluded that affect

is a key ingredient in the success or failure of a
political candidate.
& Englis

Masters, Sullivan, Lanzetta, McHugo,

(1986) examined the role of a political leader's

facial displays as determinants in rallying public support.
They argued that a political leader's ability to display
facial emotions of warmth, sincerity, caring, and kindness
were crucial to that candidate's success.
In the 1984 televised presidential debates, Ronald
Reagan appeared far more successful than Walter Mondale in
communicating the appropriate emotions.

Masters, Sullivan,

Feola, and McHugo (1987) noted that "Mondale was
ineffective in communicating warm, reassuring reactions
through his facial displays during the debates"
Sullivan and Masters

(1988) extended Masters,

(p. 121).

et. al.

argument by claiming that "Mondale's displays of warmth and
reassurance produced less favorable reactions in [debate]
viewers than did those of Reagan"

(p. 345).

Additional studies have elaborated upon the role of
physical delivery by Mondale and Reagan in the 1984
televised debates as a means of communicating emotions and
feelings to elicit a particular response from debate
viewers.
Powell

Researchers Patterson, Churchill, Burger, and

(1992) reported that debate viewers who claimed that

Mondale lost the debates argued that Mondale was less
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expressive

[emotionally] and less physically attractive.

The study also claimed that Reagan possessed the greatest
advantage in terms of communicating the proper emotions
nonverbally.

The authors further argued that the nonverbal

cues administered by the candidates contributed more
significantly to viewers interpretation of who won or lost
the debates.

Reagan emerged as the most successful

candidate in conveying warm feelings through nonverbal cues
and was more often declared the winner of the debates.
Leo (1984) interviewed subjects after they had watched
the debates and found that the communication of "warm
feelings" w as three to four times more powerful than
traditional candidate preference criteria such as party
identification or issues.
Husson,

Additionally, Researchers

Stephen, Harrison, and Fehr (1988)

attempted to

discover what major issues acted as preferences when
selecting a candidate.

The authors discovered that the

candidate's interpersonal communication skills predicted
candidate preference after observing the debates.

Reagan

was able to nonverbally communicate a more positive
interpersonal image and was preferred by most subjects as
the winner of the debate.

Finally, Jamieson (1988) argued

that Reagan's victory on election day was closely tied to
his televised debate victories.

In the debates, Jamieson

noted that R e a g a n 's speaking style communicated important
relational messages concerning trust, affection,

and
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similarity.

Later scholars, however, have tended to

conflate image and ideological positions, noting that the
personality of a candidate is a better predictor of action
than issues which are fleeting.

Bruce Gronbeck and Ted

Windt have been zealous in exploding the issue/image
dichotomy.
The 1988 televised presidential debates generated
little research in terms of the physical delivery of the
candidates.

However, the research which was conducted

centered upon each candidate's ability to use his delivery
skills to portray himself as a "likeable" person.

Oft-Rose

(1989) stated that "It is easy to say that likability was
important to the voters in the 1988 debates"

(p. 197).

The

author further claimed that likability was situational and
fluctuating.

It was a "thin" perception, based on observed

communication behavior:
Although Dukakis seemed more at ease during
the first debate, it was Bush who appealed
most to the audience in the second debate
through the use of active and natural body
movement and gestures, and a style of delivery
that was enthusiastic and calm. (p. 197)
Stengel (1988), writing in Time magazine, also noted Bush's
ability to use his nonverbal skills to create a "likeable"
persona by debate viewers.

His view reflected the popular

conception that the ersatz and the real are one and the
same in a carefully orchestrated campaign:

"Although most

watchers of the first presidential debate said the debate
was a draw or gave the slight edge to Dukakis,

it should be
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noted that Bush was rated more likeable by the same voters
who gave the win to Dukakis,
Pfau and Kang's

(p. 20)

(1991) study of relational messages in

the 1988 debates produced similar data regarding candidate
likability.

The authors found that the candidate's smile

played a large role in whether or not the candidate was
liked by the debate observer.

Most subjects preferred

Bush's smile and therefore found him more likeable.

These

same subjects claimed that Bush had won the debate they
observed.
Finally, d a y m a n
debates,

(1992) discovered that in the 1988

the candidate who possessed the ability to

generate the most applause was usually determined the
winner of the debate.

Further, the candidate who could

generate the most applause turned out to be the most
likeable candidate.
To date, no research has been generated from the 1992
televised presidential debates regarding physical delivery.
The studies regarding the effect of physical delivery on
the outcome of televised presidential debates have ranged
from Richard Nixon's "five o'clock shadow" to George Bush's
smile.

Whatever the specific physical component under

examination,

there is consensus among researchers that

televised debates have increased the importance of a
candidate's ability to "appear" to be the better candidate
in order to win an election.
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EFFECTS OF TELEVISION COVERAGE
At first, the 1960 televised presidential debates were
welcomed as a way of allowing the entire nation to watch
candidates clash over election issues side by side.
However,

as post 1960 debate research began to indicate,

the television medium also introduced an increased
awareness of delivery and appearance of the candidates by
the viewing and voting public.

This new awareness led

political pundits and researchers to fear that televised
debates might hurt American presidential campaigns more
than help them.
The 1976 televised debates generated a great deal of
research regarding the overall effect of television as a
medium upon the debates.

After examining the editing

choices made by the television director of shot-by-shot
decisions in the 1976 debates between Gerald Ford and Jimmy
Carter, researchers Messaris, Eckman,

and Gumpert

(1979)

argued that "the televised versions of the three debates
presented an image of direct, explicit conflict whi c h was
an exaggeration of the state of affairs of the live event"
(p. 359).

The authors contended that the editor's

decisions regarding camera angles appeared to be made with
the specific intent of creating a more entertaining show
for television viewers.

Thus debates made matters of

degree seem like deep divisions, not a healthy expression
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of systematic legitimacy, and a condition that depended on
commonly respected public virtue.
Tiemens

(1978) argued that not only did the camera

angles and shots fabricate tension and conflict but that
the pictorial treatment of the candidates

[which candidate

had more "positive" angles and eye contact]
Carter.

tended to favor

Consequently, due to the visual composition,

camera angle, and screen placement, Gerald Ford was unable
to maintain as much eye contact with the cameras as Carter.
The importance of maintaining constant and consistent eye
contact with the television camera was established by Davis
(1978).

Upon surveying subjects who had watched the

debates, Davis found that the candidate whom the viewer
believed maintained the most eye contact with the camera
(and thus the television viewing audience) was also the
candidate w h o m the viewers declared to be the winner of the
debate.
While the use of television as a medium was accused of
creating conflict which did not exist in the 1976 debates,
television w a s criticized for the opposite effect in the
1980 presidential debates between President Jimmy Carter
and Ronald Reagan.

After conducting an extensive visual

analysis of the Carter-Reagan debate, Tiemens, Hellwig,
Kipper, and Phillips

(1985) argued that "the restrictions

upon the event itself and the television medium through
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which it was transmitted contributed very little toward
establishing any confrontational results"

(p. 42).

The role of television in the debates however, was
credited with providing Reagan an edge in the debate and
therefore the election.

Blankenship, Fine, and Davis

(1983) argued that television camera angles, shots, and the
debate commentators all favored Reagan.

The authors

reported that various medium effects such as camera angles
portrayed Reagan in a more positive light.

The study

cataloged numerous examples during Reagan's speeches.
Carter was usually missing from view.

However, during

Carter's speeches, Reagan could be seen on the television
screen in the background, sometimes in cinematic reaction
shots.

This visual edge allowed Reagan more "air time" as

well as the opportunity to respond nonverbally to Carter's
statements in a way with which Carter was not provided.
The authors contended that this type of media manipulation
made Reagan the central focus of the debate and ultimately
of the election.
In the 1984 televised debates between Walter Mondale
and Ronald Reagan, Morello (1988a) examined the visual
syntax of the debates as a factor in the perception of
clash.
studies.

His findings were similar to those of the 1980
Television angles and visuals used in the debate

cxearly favored Reagan over Mondale,

again placing the

central focus of the debate, and the election, upon Reagan.
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Morello also noted that the visual structuring of the
debates made Reagan appear to have more "clash" in his
responses, when Mondale was the candidate who actually
expressed more verbal conflict and ideological differences
(p. 286).
In the 1988 televised debates between George Bush and
Michael Dukakis, television angles and shots were found to
have other unexpected consequences.

Television shot

sequences were found to fabricate debate content wh i c h did
not exist.

Morello (1992) examined the visual structuring

of arguments in the debates and found that the certain
television shot sequences were employed by the camera
directors in order to "visualize" the clash transpiring in
the debate.

Upon concluding his study, Morello argued that

television camera angles misrepresented the incidences of
verbal clash in the debate, gave preference to ad hominem
attacks as a verbal cue to cut to a reaction shot of the
other candidate, and offered opportunities for nonverbal
refutation of opposing arguments unfairly for one candidate
over another.
The various studies conducted concerning the role of
television upon the effect and outcome of presidential
debates has drawn much criticism from communication
researchers.

Given their historic bias toward logic,

evidence and issues, and their relative innocence about
non-verbal behavior, this is not surprising.

Traditional
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rhetors, Berquist and Golden (1981),
of televised presidential debates.

were typical critics
Noting the increase in

the importance of delivery over content in the debates
[reviewed earlier in this chapter]
unsparing:

the authors were

"Presidential debates are electronic media

events in which a speaker's delivery, appearance, and
overall manner —
—

as filtered through the television screen

proved to be more important than substance"

(p. 132).

Berquist and Golden concluded their essay by arguing that
"television and the media have contaminated presidential
debates"

(p. 137).

Morello (1988b) examined the visual structuring of the
1976 and 1984 televised presidential debates and argued
that "the shot pacing was substantially quicker in 1984"
and appeared to change at critical junctures in the debate
(p. 242).

From his research, Morello argued that something

as simple as shot pacing contaminated the presidential
debates because
the changes potentially interfered with the
comprehension of verbal content of the debates,
undermined the political purpose of the
encounters, and promoted unequal visual
treatment of the candidates, (p. 243)
Jamieson (1987) expressed additional concern regarding
the potential damaging effect which television can bring to
a presidential debate.

Since television clearly places a

greater emphasis upon delivery over substance, Jamieson
opined that "voters can be seriously misled by the
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nonverbal communication on which television dotes and
toward which viewers involuntarily gravitate"

(p. 32).

Pfau and Kang (1991) echoed Jamieson's concerns in
their study on the impact of relational messages in
televised debates by noting that television shaped what was
being communicated to viewers.

Since television was able

to control variables such as viewers access to facial cues
—

which actually had the ability to influence viewers

perceptions of who won the debate —

the authors criticized

television for creating a new "eloquence of style" required
of all presidential hopefuls
In recent years,

(p. 117).

critics have continued to level

criticism regarding the negative effects which television
has brought to presidential debates.

Hellwig, Pfau,

and

Brydon (1992) have contended that the visual component of
television communication continues to dwarf the verbal
dimension.

Their study denigrates televised presidential

debates as nothing more than looks and image, a dumb show
lacking significant content.
Finally, researchers Donsbach, Brosius, and
Mattenklott

(1993) identified differences between observing

a speech in person versus observing a debate or speech on
television.

The author's argued that the differences are

so vast that television drastically effects the viewing of
political activities such as debates and creates an
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entirely new medium which candidates must prepare for and
cater to.
Presidential debates were originally created to inform
voters regarding candidates positions on crucial issues
effecting the nation.

Prior to 1960 that objective was

probably accomplished quite often.

However, with the

introduction of the television camera in the 1960 debates,
presidential debates were redefined and became more public
spectacle and entertainment then a political dialogue.
DEBATES NOT TRUE DEBATES
Due to the redefining nature of television,

televised

presidential debates have been criticized by debate
researchers as lacking the characteristics of a true
"debate."

Time constraints, debate moderators, and

television producers'

desire to provide "entertainment"

have created a "format" for the debates which does not
allow for any real debating.

Halberstam (1981) noted that

Richard Salant, vice-chairman of the Board at NBC, had
candidly remarked:

"Because of the format of television,

we go [with a debate format] with attacks and
counterattacks.

And because we go with them, that usually

means we get them"
debate format,

(p. 8).

Due to the industry guided

televised presidential debates have become

regarded as being anything but debates.
supported this criticism:
them anything but a debate"

Auer

(1981)

"The formats of the debates make
(p. 21).
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Highlander and Watkins

(1962) noted that the debate

formats used in the 1960 debates for the sake of television
placed severe limitations upon the candidates as debaters.
Jamieson and Birdsell

(1988) not only echoed this criticism

but provided specific examples of how the format hindered
each candidate.

In summary,

the authors noted:

The question-and-answer format [often used in
televised debates to involve special guest
panelists or audience members] is not conducive
to substantive debate.
The structure places
irreconcilable demands on the candidates.
(P- 165)
Jamieson and Birdsell argued that Richard Nixon,

having had

extensive intercollegiate debate experience, was a much
better and a more skilled debater than Kennedy.
Consequently, Nixon approached the 1960 debates as debates
and tried to act like a debater and lost as a would-be
president.
As the inaugural televised presidential debates,

the

1960 debates between K ennedy and Nixon have often been
referred to as "The Great Debates"
after examining the structure,
the 1960 debates, Kerr
Debates'

were neither

(Krauss 1962).

However,

format, and presentation of

(1961) argued:
'great' nor

"The 1960

'debates'"

'Great

(p. 9)7.

author claimed that the debates were superficial,

The

that they

substituted personality for serious examination of issues,
and that the format forced candidates to shift rapidly from

7See also Seipmann (1962) for similar arguments.
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one question to another without providing them an
opportunity to state fully their perspective.

At the time,

the author also suggested that future televised debates
develop a format which would allow candidates to confront
one another more directly.

Auer (1962) went so far as to

call the 1960 debates the "Counterfeit Debates" and titled
his critical essay by that title.

Reiterating the numerous

criticisms regarding the contamination of political debates
by television, Highlander and Watkins
"The

'Great Debates'

(1962) complained:

of 1960 were better television shows

than they were well developed and significant discussions
of vital issues [affecting the presidency] between
candidates"

(p. 48).

Unfortunately,

calls for a better "debating" format in

future debates went unheeded in the next televised debates,
in 1976.

Once again,

television production dictated the

format and the debates were heavily criticized.
review of the 1976 Carter-Ford debates,

Salant

In his
(1979)

argued "The 1976 debates were not debates any more than the
Kennedy-Nixon

'events'

in 1960 were debates.

They [1976

debates] were nothing more than joint interviews"
Bitzer and Rueter
journalists,

(p. 175).

(1980) claimed that the use of panelists,

and moderators in the 1976 debates created a

format which suffocated productive inquiry and created
nothing more than an interview e n v i r o n m e n t .
with the lack of any real discussion,

Frustrated

the authors borrowed
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Auer's 1962 term and titled their book Carter vs. Ford:
The "Counterfeit" Debates of 1 9 7 6 .
Hellweg, Kipper,

and Phillips

Meanwhile, Tiemens,

(1985) concluded:

The degree and intensity of confrontation
[in the debate] was unquestionably minor . . .
there is no question that lack of confrontation
in the debate was attributed in part to the
format.
The Carter-Reagan debate was highly
structured, giving no opportunity for direct
confrontation, (pp. 40-41)
To support their criticisms,

the authors provided the

following example of what happened in the 1980 debate to
prevent a real debate from taking place:
The restrictive nature of the format was
clearly illustrated when Reagan addressed a
question to Carter:
"I would like to ask the
President why it is inflationary to let the
people keep more of their money and spend it
the way they'd like, and it isn't inflationary
to let them take that money and spend it the
way he wants?"
At this point, the moderator,
Howard K. Smith, interrupted with "I wish that
question need not be rhetorical, but it must
be, because we've run out of time on that.
Now, the third question . . . " (p. 41).
In a similar study examining the absence of opportunities
for Carter and Reagan to engage in direct clash and
confrontation, Rowland (1986) argued that the structure and
format of the 1980 debates prevented the event from being a
debate.
The controversy over debate format became a central
issue in the 1992 presidential campaign.

Gersh (1993)

reported that two months before the election, Bush and
Clinton had not yet agreed to a format for a debate (p.
18).

Since the candidates could not reach an agreement on

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49
a format in a timely fashion, the first scheduled debate
was forced to be cancelled.
Confrontation is fundamental to debate.
ideologies and personalities,

Contrasting

traditional elements of true

debate, can only be revealed through the exercise of
confrontation between participants.
fairness in representation,

Due to the need for

the role of moderators,

the

presentation of questions from guest panelists and audience
members, time constraints,

and other format constraints,

televised presidential debates have become anything but
debates.

To researchers,

televised presidential debates

become nothing more than what Ranney (1979) referred to as
"televised joint appearances"

(p. vii), or what Drucker

(1989) called "electronic public space"

(p. 7).

CONTENT ANALYSIS STUDIES
Researchers have attempted to evaluate the contents of
televised presidential debates to assess possible
rhetorical styles or patterns.

This type of scholarship

has proven problematic in that no two debates have ever
been the same.

The six presidential campaigns which have

included televised debates have always involved different
opponents and each campaign has addressed different issues.
In the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates,

Samovar (1962)

argued that the c a n d i d a t e s ' statements during the debates
consisted largely of ambiguous and unequivocal passages.
The candidates merely reinforced previously known positions
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on particular issues.
debate,

When new issues were raised in the

the candidates responded with ambiguous or vague

answers which allowed them to avoid taking a public
position on a new issue.

In a follow-up study, Samovar

(1965) reiterated the presence of ambiguity on significant
topics to an extent that threatened the perception of clear
differences between candidates.
Rowland (1986) challenged the conventional wisdom
regarding the content of the 1980 Carter-Reagan debate.

He

noted that the 1980 debate had been criticized by
commentators who believed that Reagan's style defeated
C a r t e r ’s substance in the debate.

Formerly,

critics had

accused the media of catering to Reagan's "on camera" style
and strengths in order to cover up for his poor substance.
However,

after an extensive analysis of the text, Rowland

concluded that Reagan, not Carter, won the debate on the
issues.
Other researchers have examined the content of
televised debates and have provided a wide variety of data.
Mortensen

(1968) noted that content analysis of several

debates revealed sharp differences between political
telecasts which simply employ a rally format and those in
which the candidate faces a panel of questioners.

This

finding reinforces previously reviewed research regarding
the contaminating effects which the televised debate
formats have upon the actual debate.
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Pfau and K e n s k i 's (1990) study across several debates
revealed a large number of "attack messages."

Candidates

spent a considerable part of the debate attacking their
opponent rather than providing concrete answers to
questions directed at them or clarifying positions on
various issues.

The authors noted that "these

'attack

messages' were negative in focus and were designed to call
attention to an opponent's weakness"

(p. 25).

Murphy (1992) argued that it is very difficult to
isolate any particular rhetorical style or content as
indigenous to any single debate.

Thus in order to

understand the full political and rhetorical significance
of any presidential debate,

the contest must be studied

within the rhetorical context created by previous campaign
discourse.

Murphy explained that "the arguments candidates

use may reflect underlying traditions of discourse,
populism or progressivism,
disputes"

such as

that influence ongoing social

(p. 228).

Jackson-Beeck and Meadows

(1979) provided some of the

most successful research regarding the study and/or
analysis of presidential debate content.

After examining

the contents of the 1960 and 1976 televised presidential
debates,

the authors developed a fourfold scheme for

classifying communication content including both verbal and
nonverbal dimensions.
criteria:

The scheme consists of the following

Speech content 1. Includes manipulated verbal
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messages;

2. Sometimes entails unintentional message

transmission;

3. reflects unconscious use of speech;

4. May occur nonverbally (pp. 324-325).

and

Using this method,

the four types of communication content could be analyzed
one-by-one or in combinations to arrive at a more extended
treatment of debate content data.
ISSUES AND IMAGES IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
AND TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
Candidate issue positions and image formation serve as
the best determinants of electorate decision making in a
presidential election.

As Joslyn (1984) explained:

"numerous studies have found issue positions and candidate
images to be two equally important predictors of voting
behavior"

(p. 36).

Weiss

(1981) argued that in political

debates "issues and images are a practical fact overlooked
and . . . they intertwine in all manner of convolutions and
mutually affect one another in countless ways"

(p. 22).

Weiss named this mutual relationship as the "issue-image
interface."
Issues
Issues in a presidential campaign are identified by
the electorate on two levels.

For many voters, the first

level of Issue assessment involves party affiliation and
perceived incumbent success.

Researchers Edwards

Jacoby (1990), Kenski

Lodge & Hamill (1986),

(1992),

(1990), and Squire & Smith

(1990),
Sears

(1988) argued that while

[political] party identification has declined since the
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mid-sixties,
making.

it is still a potent factor in voter decision

Party members tend to absorb party positions on

various issues.

Kenski, Walkosz,

and Reichert (1993) noted

that "partisanship is not only important in campaigns, but
later in the White House itself"

(p. 8).

If the Republican

Party has taken a particular position on an economic issue,
then the electorate from that party will generally
subscribe to a similar position.

However, when the

Republican candidate is elected into office,

that candidate

will be expected to fulfill the party's promise.

In the

next presidential election the incumbent's ability to
identify with issue fulfillment will become a major factor
in the incumbent's re-election.

Elliot (1989) explained:

Voters make voting decisions on the basis of
a general assessment of the party performance
of the party in power.
If, on a set of salient
issues, the assessment is positive, voters
will tend to support that party.
If the
assessment is negative, they will support the
opposition, (p. 8)
To this argument Wattenberg (1991) added:
For presidential incumbents it is not issues
per se but rather voter perception about
presidential performance on issues that is
the single most important voter consideration.
Perceptions of a president's policies may be
the primary basis upon which voters decide
whether they approve of his performance, (p. 141)
In a televised presidential debate where an incumbent is
involved,

an effective attack by a challenger would be to

address the performance of the incumbent regarding party
goals.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54
Aft e r decision making based upon partisanship,

the

next level of issue consideration for the electorate
involves specific types of issues.

Stokes and Dilulio

(1993) noted:
The two kinds of issues that matter in
presidential elections are position issues
and valence issues.
A position issue is one
on which the rival parties or candidates reach
out for the support of the electorate by
taking different positions on a policy question
that divides the electorate.
Valence issues
are issues in which voters distinguish parties
and candidates not by their real or perceived
difference in position on policy questions
but by the degree to which they are linked in
the voters' minds with conditions, goals, or
symbols that are almost universally approved
or disapproved by the electorate.
(pp. 6-7)
Abort i o n or Health Care is a prime example of a position
issue.

The electorate will identify with a candidate who

has taken a position on abortion which is consistent with
the party's position on abortion.

The electorate m ay have

already identified with a particular party because of that
party's position on the issue.

The candidate will be

expected to support that position and will thus gain the
support of like-minded voters.
The economy would be an example of a valence issue.
challenger would have an opportunity to link poor economic
conditions with the incumbent's performance in office,
while bei n g somewhat vague about potential and painful
policy remedies.
In the 1992 election,

it would be the electorate's

dissatisfaction with the economy which the Democrats were
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able to blame upon the Bush administration and the
Republican party's handling of the economy for the past
twelve y e a r s .
Issues are very important to voters.

However,

the

importance of certain issues has varied from election to
election and from study to study.
(1989)

argued that domestic

Conover and Feldman

[economic, race,

and foreign affair issues were key factors.

social issues]
However,

researchers Jacoby (1990), Kinder, Adams, & Gronke
Kenski

(1989),

(1992) and Lockerbie (1989) all identified various

socioeconomic issues as key considerations in the voting
booth.
While every presidential campaign has addressed
specific issues,

the introduction of televised debates has

made issue consideration more prominent in voters'
decisions.

Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) explained:

debate increases the likelihood that a candidate will take
a specific stand on an issue, and will specify the ways in
which goals would be reached"

(p. 128).

With a challenger

able to cross examine and press another candidate on a
particular issue on television in front of millions of
viewers, candidate commitment to issues is heightened
allowing for increased voter knowledge.
becomes more informed,

As the electorate

candidate issue position becomes

much more important in the election.
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(1989)

identified the various issues affecting

voting behavior in presidential elections involving
televised debates from 1976 to 1988 (pp. 38-116).

Table 1

identifies Elliot's findings:
TABLE 1
Year

Issue

1976

Inflation, Crime, Unemployment

1980

Inflation,

1984

Budget Deficit, Unemployment, Fear of War

1988

Budget Deficit, Trade Deficit, Economy

Iran, Unemployment, Defense

In the 1992 presidential election, Bush focused upon his
foreign policy exploits during the previous four years,
while Clinton and Perot both focused upon the economy.

The

electorate cared little about foreign affairs and were more
concerned about issues such as how to pay their medical
bills.

The issue of the economy had appeared in every

presidential campaign since 1976, yet as Hahn (1994) noted
"Bush stated 5 times in the first debate [alone] that the
economy was

'not that bad'"

(p. 191).

Hahn also explained

that Bush's emphasis on foreign policy made him appear as
if he did not care about the general electorate,
both Clinton and Perot targeted.

something

The economy became a

central issue in the 1992 election and Bush's apparent
insensitivity towards it contributed to his demise.
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Images
In addition to campaign issues, candidate image plays
an equally,
making.

if not more,

important role in voter decision

Barber (1985) explained:

issues, but for people"
similar position:

(p. 139).

"voters don't vote for
Windt

(1994) stated a

"it should be remembered that in any

presidential campaign the central issue is leadership

. . .

People vote for a person, not a set of policy statements"
(p. 7).

Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) also noted:

"when

asked what they liked and disliked about presidential
contenders

. . . the American public reported that they

liked such personal traits as warmth, honesty, or
intelligence"

(p. 140).

The qualities described are the

traits of a good human being but not necessarily the traits
of a good politician.

A candidate's image must convey him

as being a quality human being who is able to do the job.
Ansolabehere, Behr, & Iyengar (1993) added that "the
politician's ability to govern is increasingly intertwined
with his

. . . public image"

(p. 125).

The President of

the United States is the highest position in this country
and has generally fostered a great deal of respect.

Past

Presidents were held in high regard and assumed to possess
integrity.

However, events in the past fifty years such as

the Watergate scandal have created a cloud of suspicion to
hang over the Oval office.

The electorate has become

concerned with the type of person they are placing into
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that office.

Quite often when assessing character, voters

have little to rely upon other than their gut feelings.
Keeter (1987)

identified the potential struggle which this

conundrum can create for the electorate by noting that
"citizens may be forced to

'vote by f e e l i n g 1 because they

feel they lack adequate information in an atomized
political system . . . [and] the search for
a search for

'trust'"

'truth' becomes

(p. 356).

Televised presidential debates provide the forum
through which many voters can develop their "gut feeling"
about a candidate.

Keeter

(1987) explained:

provides the candidate as a person"
politician.

"television

(p. 345) rather than a

How the candidate acts and responds under

pressure can reveal numerous "signals" to the electorate as
to the type of person the candidate i s .
(1991)

Lanoue and Schrott

explained:

Viewers are far more likely to use debates to gain
insight into each candidate's personality and
character . . . A superior "personal" presentation
appears to be more important to voters than
accumulation of issue-oriented debating "points."
(P. 96)
The use of televised debates by the electorate to
evaluate a candidate's image is easily identified.

After

examining the 1980 televised debates between Ronald Reagan
and Jimmy Carter, Martel

(1983) contended that "Reagan's

television personality was so warm and humane that Carter
could not make his anti-Reagan charges believable"

(p. 49).

Leon (1993) noted that in the 1992 televised debates "the
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analysis of each c a n d i d a t e ’s character [by the electorate
in the debates] showed that Bush could not do what a
president was supposed to do as well as the other
candidates"

(p. 100).

Several researchers have concurred that personal
traits are the most important [criteria] in the decisions
ft
made by voters . Voters watch and assess candidates and
attempt to determine what type of person the candidates
are.

The specific character qualities and traits which are

important vary from voter to voter.

However, numerous

studies have found that voters organize their thoughts into
broad categories of schema9.

Wattenberg (1991) has

assessed the studies regarding voter schema and noted that
"personality evaluations of presidential candidates has
clustered on the factors of competence,

integrity,

reliability, charisma, and personal attributes"
Trent and Friedenberg (1991)

(p. 8)

identified several image

strategies that can be employed in a political debate in
order to foster the schema identified by Wattenberg.

The

authors identified three crucial strategies:

8See Conover & Feldman (1989), Downs, Raid, & Ragan
(1990), Fiske (1982), Gopoian (1982), Graber (1987), Graber
(1992), Kinder (1978), Kinder (1986), Kinder, Peters,
Abelson, & Fiske (1980), Miller, Wattenberg, & Malanchuk
(1986), and Sullivan & Masters (1988).
9See Kinder (1978), Kinder
Ableson, & Fiske (1980), Lau &
(1986), Milburn (1991), Miller
& Malanchuk (1986), and Squire

(1986), Kinder, Peters,
Sears (1986), Lodge & Hamill
(1990), Miller, Wattenberg,
& Smith (1988).
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The principle image strategies that can be
utilized in political debating include
development of a leadership style, personi
fication, and identification.
Political
figures can develop an activist leadership
style or a passive leadership style.
The
activist is just that.
In a debate, activists
consistently refer to their actions, their
initiatives, their effect on events.
Passive
leaders are cautious.
They do not speak of
their initiatives, but rather portray themselves
as reacting to events.
In personification,
the candidate attempts to play a definite role
determined by his campaign platforms. In
identification, debaters [candidates] attempt
to symbolize what they believe are the principle
aspirations of their audience and play to those
aspirations, (pp. 226-227)
Through these strategies, presidential candidates can
address the personality schema deemed most valuable by the
electorate and establish their desired image.

The

candidate who can convey the right image and persuade the
electorate to respond to that image will have the greatest
chance of winning the election.
Issues Are Images And Images Are Issues
While Weiss

(1981) argued that the relationship

between image and issue was an "interface,"

other

researchers see the connection between the two variables as
much more than that.
one and the same.

The candidates images and issues are

Jamieson (1987) explained:

speaker image becomes central to the assessment
of viewer response.
So central in fact that
one can say the candidate image is the issue
in the campaign, the one and only criterion
every American voter feels qualified to apply.
(P. 74)
If a member of the electorate does not feel they can trust
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a candidate based upon the image they have observed, any
position the candidate takes on any issue will become
suspect.

Even if the voter agrees with the candidates

position,

the image will tarnish the issue and inhibit the

decision at the ballot box.
Hinck (1993) views presidential debates as a chance
for candidates to enact character dramatically.

In so

doing, however, the enacted "character" becomes the
"argument" in the debate.

Hinck explained that "in a

political debate, an audience deliberates about the
qualities of the candidates, not their programs"
as a result,

character and argument are related.

(p. 4) and
The

candidate's perceived character creates the candidate's
potential presidential ethos.

Based upon a candidate's

potential ethos, voters will agree or disagree with whether
or not a candidate's position upon a specific issue is
valid or can be trusted.

The "issue," in and by itself,

not enough to carry a presidential campaign.
joined with the right image.
blend together so much,

Therefore,

is

It must be

image and issue

that the two become one.

Friedenberg (1994) opined that candidates contribute
to the elimination of the boundaries between images and
issues.

The author explained:

"candidates frequently

respond to issues in ways designed to advance one or more
of the [numerous]

image related goals that characterize

contemporary political debates"

(p. 244).

When addressing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62
an issue, a candidate m a y process their answer in such a
way as to manipulate the presentation of a particular
image.

As a result, each variable is intricately related.

Issue-Image Summary
Despite the role of image in a presidential campaign,
not everyone believes issues are insignificant.

While

voters may feel far more comfortable assessing a
candidate's image,

issue acquisition does transpire.

Debates force candidates to take public stands on specific
issues and explain ways in which they want to accomplish
their goals while in office.

Jamieson and Birdsell

(1988)

noted that debates allow candidates to address and specify
issues in much more detail than regular campaign speeches
or advertisements.

Debates also allow candidates to become

clearly associated with a specific stand on a specific
issue.

Barber (1985) not e d the value of this type of

public exposure and association because "character theories
recognize that voters don't vote for issues but for people,
and in many cases, for people who espouse certain stands on
[specific]

issues"

(p. 139).

Finally, Chaffee

(1978)

summarized a number of studies

and found that "viewers do indeed acquire political
information from watching televised presidential debates
and that viewing debates did have substantial benefits for
voters concerning campaign issues"

(p. 346).
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CONCLUSION
This review of literature has examined the research
conducted by communication researchers on televised
presidential debates.

The research was found to involve

the study of the physical delivery by the candidates in a
debate,
debates,

the effect of television as a medium upon the
televised presidential debates as true debates

with regard to format and structure, the analysis of the
content of various debates, and the role of image-issue
formation in televised debates.
It also revealed a number of features with
implications for the maintenance of legitimacy.

The

perception of enhanced conflict and issue polarity —
have a single feature —

to

has implications for the

traditional roles of the citizen and the concept of a
larger public good that are troubling.

However, many

aspects of debate are clearly amenable to a Jeffersonian
norm of legitimacy,

enhanced information, direct

(if

mediated) address to all the people, and questions by
citizen-surrogates.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 3
TELEVISED DEBATES AND PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
INTRODUCTION
Televised presidential debates have had controversial
effects upon presidential elections.

Every presidential

campaign has a communication trajectory.

It begins with

face to face appeals to local constituencies and local
supporters.

Later it seeks to address a set of dispersed

core constituencies during the early presidential
primaries.

Those candidates still standing at the end of

the primaries produce messages that increase in volume and
range as they attempt to address the concerns of a major
political party.

If the party nominates the campaigner as

its candidate there is further escalation of message making
as ever more diverse constituencies are addressed in an
ever greater variety of formats.
six years

Within the past thirty

(largely in the past twenty) the presidential

debate has become the central event in the campaign wherein
both or several (1980, 1992) candidates struggle for the
minds and hearts of the total electorate.
Over the past thirty five years,
debate has evolved as a genre;
its own norms of performance,
set of viewer expectations.

the presidential

it has begun to establish
its own format, and its own

Despite its relative coherence

and stability as a discourse event,

the presidential debate

is neither a static nor unitary event.

Its formats have

64
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been altered from election to election;

candidates and

producers have experimented with it and its conventions
have been modified over the years

.

Thus, any study of a

particular debate or set of debates must take account of
the antecedent formats to obtain a deep understanding of
the event.

Further,

discourse event,

presidential debates are merely one

however major,

Accordingly,

in the total campaign.

this chapter will review the major

research of the past thirty five years on presidential
debates.

This review will attempt to detail scholarly

inquiry into the expectations that have developed about the
meaning of debates for voters,
larger campaign,

their function within the

their impact upon voting behavior,

and

their effect upon political discourse for good or ill.
Because scholars are divided in their assessments of these
matters,

I will attempt to detail those conclusions that

are both significant and consensual.

Do debates as debates

help to restore legitimacy to the election process?

The

evidence is mixed.
TELEVISED DEBATES DIFFICULT TO STUDY
Through the years,

televised presidential debates have

proven to be problematic to study.

Every debate has

contained its own unique set of variables which make it
difficult to identify a genre or consistent theme
throughout all of the debates.
several of the many

Patterson (1980)

identified

problems researchers confront:
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It is difficult to draw strong conclusions
about debates.
First, each debate is different.
It involves different candidates, different
offices, different issues, different audiences,
different press coverage, different formats,
and a host of other differences.
Hence to
talk about the specific effects of debates
is virtually impossible, for no two will be
identical, nor will their effects be identical.
Second, debate effects cannot be isolated from
the effects of all the other communication that
voters receive during the campaign.
Individuals
may be exposed to a dozen messages about the
candidates on the very day of the debate.
Finally, unlike laboratory experiments,
scientists cannot control political debates.
(P. 229)
Because of the constantly changing variables and numerous
information messages surrounding an election, scholars such
as Murphy (1992) have argued that a single debate cannot be
examined for its effect upon the overall election process.
Issues such as underlying traditions of discourse or
ongoing social disputes must be included in the assessment
of a debate.

As a result,

the debate becomes nothing more

than a single text within a larger context.
Perhaps the most problematic variable in studying
televised debates is the influence of television upon the
debating process.

Debates have been a part of the

political process in this country since the inception of
elections.

However,

the introduction of televised debates

has brought the candidates and the issues of the election
into the homes of the American voter.

This personalization

of presidential candidates has redefined how voters assess
and elect a president.

Elections are no longer left to the
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political insider.

The average voter, who may know very

little about actual political issues,

is now able to assess

a candidate based upon the one criteria they feel qualified
to critique —
(1987)
person"

their character and personality.

As Keeter

noted "television [presents] the candidate as a
(p. 345).

Recent research by Kenski

(1992) has

identified personal traits as the most important criteria
in decisions made by voters*®.
presidential debates,

By televising the

voters have a chance to sit in their

living rooms and watch a candidate and decide whether or
not they like him.
As candidate personality has begun to play a larger
role in voter decision making, voters have begun using
personality semantics to explain their voting decisions.
Leo (1984) noted that voters identified "the communication
of

'warm feelings'

as being three to four times more

powerful than traditional candidate preference criteria
such as party identification or issues"
and Birdsell (1988) added:

(p. 37).

Jamieson

"When asked what they liked

. about presidential contenders,

. .

approximately one-fourth

of the American public has reported such personal traits as

10Kenski cites studies such as Conover & Feldman
(1989), Downs, Raid, & Ragan (1990), Fiske (1982), Gopoian
(1982), Graber (1987), Graber (1992), Kinder (1978), Kinder
(1986), Kinder, Peters, Abelson, & Fiske (1980), Miller,
Wattenberg, & Malanchuk (1986), and Sullivan & Masters
(1988) to support his argument.
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warmth and honesty"

(p. 140).

Voters want a human being as

president, not a politician.
The personification of presidential candidates to
require the display of warmth and honesty has redefined the
American political process.

Historically, presidential

candidates have attempted to be "all things to all people."
They are often forced to withhold their personal belief or
opinion and favor the belief or opinion which will secure
votes.

Jamieson and Birdsell

(1988) noted this long held

political tradition:
Promising all things to all people is a long
lived tactic memorialized by Machiavelli, who
recommended that a Prince be a great "feigner
and dissembler."
The move has been recognized
by political theorists through the history of
campaigning.
Indeed, ambiguity may be the
mainstay of effective politics.
No man who
fully and frankly expressed his real
convictions, made manifest exactly the way he
felt and thought on public matters, could
possibly be elected to any considerable
office in the United States.
(p. 128)
However, with televised debates requiring the candidates to
bring "warmth and honesty"

into the homes of the

electorate, candidates must either be completely honest and
risk losing votes, or attempt to lie while appearing
truthful and risk being caught and labeled a charlatan.
The current trend appears to be that of requiring
candidates to be honest and be human.
DEBATES EXPECTED
After closely examining the 1960 televised
presidential debates,

Sidney Kraus

(1964) prophetically
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stated that "There is no doubt in this writer's mind that
debating on television by presidential candidates will
eventually become an integral part of political campaigns"
(p. 220).

It was sixteen years before the next set of

presidential debates appeared on television in 1976, but
Kraus predicted,

debates have not only been a part

as

ofevery

presidential election since 1976, but have even become
expected events in American politics.

Ritter and Hellweg

(1986) noted the increased frequency and importance of
debates:
Presidential candidates participated in more
televised debates in 1984 than occurred in the
entire 1980 presidential campaign.
Televised
debates have become more popular at all
electoral levels since the 1976 presidential
campaign.
(p. 1)
Televised presidential debates have become a mainstay
in American politics due to voter expectations and
candidate campaign strategy.

Friedenberg (1994) noted the

fruition of K r a u s ' 1964 prophecy when he stated the
"Debates have become an expected feature of our
presidential elections,

and the risks involved, in rejecting

debates has outgrown the risks involved in debating poorly"
(p.

239).

Not only have debates become expected but

are

believed to exercise a substantial effect on the

of the election.

Jamieson and Birdsell

they
course

(1988) believe that

debates now play the central role of the campaign:
"Debate" has become a buzzword for serious
politics . . . when debates are announced,
movement in the polls slows, in anticipation,
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the electorate suspends its willingness to
be swayed by ads and news. (p. 5-6)
The rise in popularity of televised debates,

however,

does not appear to be due to the role which the debates
play in the election process.

Berquist

(1994) argued that

televised debate popularity is due to the mentality of the
American voter.

The "mediated contest"

is a particularly

resonant form:
There continues to exist in America a remark
able mythology about presidential candidates
debating before a nationwide audience . . .
One of American television's legacies in the
game-show-sporting event mentality.
Viewers
are conditioned to expect a winner and a
loser.
As a result, millions of Americans
readily assume a presidential debate is a
sort of political game, which lends itself
to instant analysis and the awarding of a
decision, (pp. 35-36)
The televised debate format provides the "arena" where the
voter can watch their "gladiator" engage in combat and
emerge the victor.

This sporting mentality by the American

voter has forced presidential candidates to engage in a
televised event which may actually provide few benefits to
the overall election.

It may be that due to the "sporting

mentality" which the public brings to presidential debates,
public expectations have forced candidates to debate rather
than appear "weak" or be accused of having something to
hide by refusing to debate.

Auer

(1986) noted this

pressure upon candidates when he stated that
The public has grown to expect candidates for
major office to engage in debates.
By 1984
public expectations had grown so strong that
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some have argued that incumbent Ronald Reagan,
holding a commanding lead in the polls, never
t h e l e s s risked debating because he felt that
not to do so would create a greater problem
for him than any possi b l e error he might make
in debating, (p. 216)
Friedenberg (1990) echoed Auer's arguments about the power
of public expectation:
In recent years incumbents have come to fear
that their failure or obvious reluctance to
debate will be interpreted extremely negatively
by the public to mean that they are weak and
unable to defend their own positions and
policies.
(p. 216)
While the combination of public expectations and the
sporting mentality surrounding debates complicate the
decision to engage in debates,
important.

other issues are also

To illustrate the types of issues a candidate

and his advisors would need to study prior to engaging in a
debate, Friedenberg (1979) provided six questions wh i c h a
candidate must assess in determining whether or not to
engage in a debate:
First, is this likely to be a close debate?
Second, are advantages likely to accrue to me
if I debate?
Third, am I a good debater?
Fourth, are there only two major candidates
running for the office?
Fifth, do I have
control of all the important variables in
the debate situation?
A nd sixth, is the
field clear of incumbents?
(pp. 214-216)
Only the 1988 presidential election allowed candidates the
opportunity to positively answer all six of F r i e d e n b e r g 1s
questions.

The 1980, 1984,

and 1992 election failed to

provide the opportunity to address all six questions
positively by any of the candidates.
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Despite these difficulties,

candidates have routinely

elected to participate in presidential debates.
of course, potentially positive benefits.

There are,

The positive

impact which televised debates can provide for a candidate
will be reviewed in the next section of this chapter.
IMPACT OF DEBATES UPON ELECTIONS
Candidates Gain Exposure
While only one presidential election has b e e n argued
to have been directly affected by the televised debates,
political communication scholars have argued that debates
have an impact upon presidential elections in a number of
ways.

The initial impact of a televised debate for a

presidential candidate is exposure.

In a single setting, a

candidate can gain exposure to millions of voters in a way
which other media vehicles do not provide.
Patterson, Churchill, Burger,

Researchers

and Powell (1992 p. 232)

noted that televised debates provide numerous benefits not
only for the candidate who gains increased exposure, but
benefits are also provided for the electorate as well.
Voters have an opportunity to see the candidates side-byside and directly compare and contrast the candidates
opinions and v i e w p o i n t s .

The televised debate allows each

candidate an opportunity to expand and develop their
opinions on various issues in a way which campaign speeches
do not allow.

Jamieson and Birdsell (1988 p. 132) have
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noted the limitations of the stock campaign speech.

It is

formulated and superficial.
Large Numbers of Voters Watch the Debates
A televised debate, on the other hand, allows
candidates to address issues at greater length and gain
exposure to more potential voters then any other forum.
The need for increased exposure in a presidential election
is explained by Ritter and Hellweg (1986) who noted:
With the decline of party identification by
voters, candidates in presidential . . .
debates must appeal beyond the active members
of their own party.
Debates reach a national
audience that transcends party divisions.
In
short, presidential debates have emerged as a
national forum for political debates in the
United States, (p. 1)
The amount of exposure a candidate receives from a
televised debate is quite significant.

Since the first

televised debate in 1960 the number of viewers has steadily
increased.

Katz and Feldman (1962) noted that "over 60% of

the adult population —
individuals —
120).

an average of 77 million

watched the first Kennedy-Nixon debates"

(p.

Since the first debate was a novelty for American

politics,

the audience numbers declined slightly for the

last three debates.

Windt (1994) noted however,

numbers were still extremely significant.

that the

The author

explained that the second debate drew 61 million viewers,
the third debate 70 million viewers and the fourth debate
attracted 63 million viewers

(p. 20).

While debate

viewership has fluctuated over the years,

the number of
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viewers has increased steadily and represent a significant
number of votes.

Jamieson and Birdsell (1988)

identified

the amount of people who have watched the televised debates
over the years:
Where six out of ten watched in 1960, that
number became seven of ten in the first two
debates of 1976, dropping back to the 1960
average for the third Ford-Carter encounters.
More than 120 million viewers saw the 1980
Carter-Reagan debate.
But four years later,
the numbers were down.
In 1984 the general
election debates drew 85 million viewers.
(P. 120)
These figures indicate that for the 1960 televised debates,
90% of American households watched at least some of the
Nixon-Kennedy debates.

In the 1976 Ford-Carter debates the

figure was 83% of American households11.
Debates Do Not Influence Voter Decision
Although various arguments have been made regarding
the value of exposure from a televised presidential debate,
only one election,

the 1960 campaign, permitted analysts to

frame a cause-effect argument between the debates and the
outcome of the election.

The 1960 race for the presidency

was the closest margin of victory in U.S. history.
(1994)

Windt

explained that "the election was decided by only

of the popular vote —

.2%

a margin of about 11 2 , 0 0 0 out of

almost 69 million votes cast"

(p. 1).

White

(1961) and

^Statistics from With the whole nation watching:
Report of the twentieth century fund task force on
television presidential de b a t e s . Lexington, MA:
Lexington
Press, 1979, p. 42.
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others attributed Kennedy's narrow margin of victory to the
televised debates:
When the debate began, Nixon was generally
viewed as being the probable winner of the
election contest and Kennedy as fighting an
uphill battle;
When they [the debates] were
over, the positions of the two contestants
were reversed.
(pp. 290-291)
Chester (1969) provided statistics to support White's
claim.

Chester noted that "going into the first debate,

Gallup Polls reported Nixon with a 47 to 46 percent lead in
the polls.

But after [the debates] Kennedy took a lead of

49 to 46 percent"

(p. 295).

Windt

(1994) noted that even

Kennedy attributed his victory to the debates.

After the

election Kennedy stated the "It was TV more than anything
else that turned the tide"

(p. 1).

Lang (1987) echoed

these same sentiments when he argued that "a strong case
can be made that without the televised debates in 1960 . .
. Kennedy would not have been elected"

(p. 211).

Samovar

(1965) further supported this argument by stating that "the
Nixon-Kennedy debates were the really decisive factor in
the [1960] election"

(p. 211).

Windt summarized the

present consensus about the Kennedy-Nixon d e b a t e s :
In some campaigns, debates have had minimal
or no impact on the election.
For better or
worse, that was not true in 1960.
The belief
that without the debates Kennedy could not
have w on is fairly established" (p. 1 ).
The 1960 presidential race is the only election to
have been directly effected by televised debates.
many millions of voters watching televised debates,

With so
the
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question arises as to why only one debate out of six has
been influenced by an event which has become expected by
the voting public.

Lichtenstein (1982) analyzed the

audience demographics of several televised debates to
suggest a more refined concept of their role:
A substantial proportion of voters formed
opinions and made decisions about the election
prior to viewing the debates.
The debates
did not, therefore, generally alter or form
references but, rather, reinforced existing
predispositions and made voters more sure of
their choice.
Debates mainly reinforce both
the standing party allegiances and the candidate
preferences built up over many prior months of
campaigning, primary elections and convention.
(p. 298)
Six years later Jamieson and Birdsell

(1988) reached a

similar conclusion:
Debates do reinforce the dispositions of those
who have already decided how to vote.
In the
typical election, about two-thirds of the
electorate has decided its November vote by
the end of the party conventions" (p. 127).
Even though several million viewers watch televised
debates, the telecasts tend to only attract those voters
who are already involved in the campaign.

Those

individuals who could benefit the most from the debates are
least likely to watch.

Citizens who do not plan to vote in

the election, whether from apathy or mere lack of knowledge
regarding the issues, simply do not watch the debates.
Jamieson and Birdsell

(1988) explained that "debates give

more to the information rich than to the information poor.
The debates make the most sense to those already
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knowledgeable and the least to those most in need of
information"
Durall

(p. 173).

Researchers McLeod, Bybee, and

(1979) found that in the 1976 debates "those

initially most interested in politics spent more time
watching the debates"

(p. 487).

As a result,

televised

debates tend to have nominal impact upon the eventual
outcome of an election.
Debates Can Be Beneficial
Even though televised debates may not alter the
outcome of a presidential election, Trent and Friedenberg
(1991)

argued that "contemporary political debates are

extremely valuable"
process.

(p. 208) for the larger political

Televised debates are valuable because they

provide exposure for

each candidate,

force candidate

accountability, and do inform the voters regarding
significant issues surrounding the debate.
A presidential candidate is physically limited to the
number of cities he can visit,
hands he can shake.

speeches he can give, and

Therefore candidates often must rely

upon media coverage of their activities for exposure to
those voters not present at a particular rally.

However,

as Jamieson and Birdsell (1988) noted "television news
tells people little about the issues in a campaign"
125).

(p.

While the media may provide exposure for a

candidate,

that exposure is limited to sound bites and

video clips, none of which provide any substance regarding
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a candidate's platform.

Radio and television commercials

are limited mediums and do not permit candidates to fully
explain their positions on various issues.

Televised

debates provide a candidate with an extended period of time
to present their plans and programs.

Jamieson and Birdsell

(1988) explained that "the debates offer the longest, most
intense view of the candidates available to the electorate"
(p. 126).

From this increased exposure, voters are able to

gain some type of increased knowledge of the c a n d i d a t e s 1
positions.

Katz and Feldman (1962) noted that in the 1960

debates "voter exposure to the debate was associated with
learning about the issues and changing attitudes toward
political candidates"

(p. 89).

Even if a televised debate

will not earn a candidate needed votes,

it can provide much

needed exposure which can result in increased support from
constituents.
Televised debates also provide an opportunity for
voters to assess each candidate in terms of job
accountability.

Rosenberg and Elliot (1987) noted that

"the existing evidence points to possible debate
influences, particularly on variables that allow subjects
to directly compare candidates on factors related to job
performance"

(p. 57).

Jamieson and Birdsell

(1988)

extended this argument by stating that "debates provide
opportunity to underscore the criteria by which the
presidency will be assessed"

(p. 156).

Researchers Lang
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and Lang

(1962) argued that the 1960 televised debates

provided voters with the opportunity to assess the
candidates specifically for their "President like"
qualities.

The authors stated that "the 1960 presidential

debates provided information viewers used to evaluate the
candidates'

ability to perform in office,

their fitness for

political office, and their qualities as human beings"
330).

(p.

Voters have preconceived opinions of how a President

should speak and act.
candidates'

By observing presidential

behavior in televised debates, voters are

provided with an opportunity to assess each candidate to
see if they fulfill the expected criteria.

Berquist

(1994)

noted that voters may tune in to the debates, or at least
the first debate if there are several debates scheduled,

to

use the debate as a measuring stick for the candidates.
The author stated that "in the five sets of televised
presidential debates America has witnessed since 1960, most
observers view the first encounter as the acid test of a
candidate's fitness for high office"
Jamieson and Birdsell

(p. 39).

(1988) have also argued that

"debates heighten the candidate's responsibility to engage
the issues considered central by the other side"

(p. 131).

In debates candidates address questions viewed as central
by their opponents in an environment in which the
electorate can compare the answers.
are able,

Consequently,

debates

although they do not always do this, to produce a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80
clarity and specificity otherwise absent in campaign
discourse.

This rhetoric differs from typical campaign

discourse.

In a campaign speech candidates may tend to

attack and criticize their opponents.

However,

in a debate

with an opponent present and the threat of an instant
rebuttal imminent, candidates tend to focus their debate
discourse on case building and refutation.
Televised presidential debates serve perhaps their
greatest function in that they inform voters.

Even though

the "information rich" m ay comprise the majority of the
viewing audience, researchers Hellweg, Pfau, and Brydon
(1992)

argued that "debates are informative for the

electorate"

(p. 45).

Chaffee and Choe (1980) noted that

during the 1976 election "a study of Wisconsin voters found
that during the debates the percentage of viewers who could
not report candidate positions declined from 2 0 % to less
than 10%"

(p. 52).

Miller and MacKuen (1979) argued that

not only are debates informative, but they "are a source of
information for all classes,

educational levels, and races"

(p. 345) and that in the 1976 election "those individuals
who watched the debates exhibited a heightened political
awareness at exactly the time when political information is
crucial - shortly before an election"

(p. 346).

Researchers Lemert, Elliott, Nestvold, and Rarick
(1983) revealed that "watching a televised debate
increase respondents'

[voters]

. . . can

interest in, and knowledge
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about, the campaign"

(p. 155).

While not every voter can

attend a candidate's election rally, most voters do have
access to a television set and can become involved in the
election by watching the debates.

Wald and Lupfer (1978)

found that "the ability of viewers to comment sensibly on
the candidates and their stands on issues increases with
debates"

(p. 342).

The ability of debates to inform viewers has been
supported by several studies.

Desmond and Donohue (1981)

found that after examining the information debated in the
1960 televised debates and viewers'

recall of that

information after the debates that "the [I960] debates were
instrumental in the formation of viewers'

impressions of

both the personality and the expertise of the candidates"
(p. 302).

Miller and MacKuen (1979) examined the amount of

information retained by viewers of the 1976 televised
debates and concluded that "the important effects of
political debates on individual cognition or stored
information about political

[issues]" obtained from viewing

the debates (p. 346).
Even though televised debates may have little effect
in changing the outcome of an election, debates do have a
significant impact upon presidential campaigns by providing
increased exposure for the candidates,

forcing candidate

accountability, and informing voters regarding issues
relevant to the election.
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DEBATE EFFECTS ON VOTING BEHAVIOR
Viewers Do Not Change Minds
Scholars have claimed that televised presidential
debates have been argued to have either no effect upon
voters'

decisions or merely invoke a slight change.

No

research has yet argued that a significant number of voters
have ever changed their candidate preference due to a
televised debate.
After evaluating the effects of the 1960 debates upon
viewers, Kane

(1966) concluded that "the majority of voters

were not influenced by the programs

[debates]

. . . Only a

very few had switched from one candidate to another"
96).

Gallup (1987) echoed this argument:

(p.

"presidential

debates have tended to reinforce the convictions of voters
who were already committed.
change their minds"

They have caused few people to

(p. 34).

Since most debate viewers are information rich,

they

watch the debates with predispositions which tend to
"poison the well" when evaluating debate outcome.
and Chaffee (1979)

Sears

illustrated this problem when they

explained:
the information flow stimulated by debates
tends to be translated by voters into
evaluations that coincide with prior political
dispositions.
They perceive their party's
candidate as having "won" and they discuss
the outcome with like-minded people, (p. 255)
Researchers Sigelman and Sigelman (1984) found the issue of
political predisposition to effect viewer opinion in the
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1980 presidential debates.

After interviewing numerous

voters who had observed the debates, the authors discovered
that :
voter intention was the strongest predictor
of who w on the 1980 presidential debate between
Carter and Reagan among decided voters and that
political ideology among the undecided voters.
(p. 628)
Pfau and Kang

(1989) conducted a similar study with the

1988 televised debates and found similar results:

the

debates served to do little more than to "primarily
reinforce existing attitudes"

(p. 16).

Research on the

effects of televised debates indicates that very few voter
opinions are ever changed by a debate.

This means that if

a voter has already decided to vote for candidate "X" prior
to watching the debate,

then candidate "X" will win the

debate in that voter's opinion.

Furthermore,

if a voter

has not selected a particular candidate yet but is loyal to
a particular party,

then the candidate representing that

party will most likely win the debate in that voter's
opinion.
Slight Changes In Voter Opinion
While a large number of voter's opinions m ay not be
changed by a televised debate, research tends to indicate
that some moderate shifts in voter decisions can take
place.

Swanson and Swanson (1978) revealed that after

watching the first Ford-Carter debate in the 1976 election,
"the debate effected the opinion of college students on
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certain issues"

(p. 353).

During the 1980 televised

debate, Ritter and Henry (1994) discovered that "6% of
those voters who had watched the debates reported a change
in their vote because of the debate"

(p. 8 6 ).

The authors

noted however that the shift reflected undecided voters who
were won over by Ronald Reagan and that no one had really
"changed their mind."

During the same 1980 election

campaign and debates, Ritter and Hellweg (1986) noted that
in one study,

"viewers of the debates had changed the way

in which they thought about a [particular] candidate"

(p.

7) but they were not planning to change how they were going
to vote in the election.
A Debate "Win" May Not Sway Voters
Candidate loyalty and party preference are difficult
to change through the medium of televised debates.

Since

only those voters who are information rich and already
heavily involved in an election campaign tend to be the
ones who watch the televised debates, candidates have
little chance of winning large numbers of new voters by
participating in the debates.

Smith and Smith (1994)

illustrate the difficulty of swaying voters in a debate:
After the first debate in 1984, a Harris Poll
revealed that 61% of the viewers said that
Mondale had won the debate and only 19% said
that Reagan had won the debate.
However,
despite this apparent victory by Mondale,
candidate preference remained virtually
unchanged.
Prior to the debate, 54% of the
voting public planned to vote for Reagan and
only 42% planned to vote for Mondale.
After
Mondale's "victory" in winning the first
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debate by such a large margin, candidate
support remained virtually unchanged.
Post
debate polls found 53% of voters still planned
to vote for Reagan and only 44% now planned
to vote for Mondale. (p. 107)
Effects of Debates On Specific Elections
Since each presidential election involves different
candidates and different issues, each televised debate can
be assured of being different.

Therefore an assessment of

each election debate by year for effects on voters seems
appropriate.
As has been argued previously in this chapter, the
1960 presidential election appears to be the only election
in which there is any scholarly agreement about the
significant impact of televised debates.

Researchers have

offered several explanations for the effect of this
particular debate on the election.
unique in that Kennedy,
devout Catholic,
Windt

The 1960 campaign was

as the challenger,

was young, a

and not as well known as Richard Nixon.

(1994) explained that getting the two candidates to

debate was problematic:
Kennedy as challenger in the campaign had
little to lose by debating, and much to gain.
Kennedy desperately wanted to debate, whatever
the circumstances.
Nixon's decision was more
complex.
Nixon's advisors argued that in the
practical sense there was little to be gained
since he was the better known of the two
candidates, (p. 3)
Knowing that he was the challenger, Kennedy prepared
diligently for the debates.

Powell

(1968) noted that

Kennedy took voice and speaking lessons prior to the
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debates to learn diaphragmatic breathing.

Kennedy also

spent several days prior to the debates in seclusion,
preparing for the debates with his advisors by studying
trunk loads of data and material.

Nixon spent the day of

the first debate on the campaign trail and had given
several speeches.

Nixon arrived exhausted and as Tiemens

(1978) noted, he spoke with a five o'clock shadow and
looked old and tired (p.

5 9 ).

As a result, Kennedy

appeared full of energy and vitality which was reflected in
his delivery style to the television viewing audience
(Highlander & Watkins,

1962, P- 46-47).

The differences in

presentation style have been identified by researchers as
the crucial ingredient affecting voter decisions at the
ballot box.

Researchers Tannenbaum, Greenberg, and

Silverman (1967) argued that due to their images "Kennedy
did not necessarily win the debates, but Nixon lost them"
(p. 286).

Highlander and Watkins

(1962) noted that Kennedy

strengthened his campaign because of his strong physical
appearances in the debates.
"Kennedy picked up support
debates].

The author's claimed that
[from voters during the

But this may not have been so much support taken

away from Nixon as the re-establishment of support that was
wavering from Kennedy"

(p. 47-48).12

12Tradition has argued that there was an extreme
difference in opinion between voters as to who won the
debates based upon whether the voter watched the debates on
television or listened to the debates on the radio.
Arguments have been made that those voters who watched the
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Arguments regarding the effects of the debates upon
voter decisions in the 1976 presidential campaign are
conflicting.

Witcover

(1977) noted that Jimmy Carter felt

he benefited greatly from the debates and it was because of
the debates that he won the election:
Carter himself said . . . 'If it hadn't been
for the debates, I would have lost.
They
established me as competent on foreign and
domestic affairs and gave the viewers reason
to think that Jimmy Carter had something to
offer" (p. 687).
Schram (1977) provided statistical data which indicated
that Carter may have been hurt by the debates more than
helped by them.

Schram explained that "Ford closed

Carter's 30 point lead [in public opinion polls] during the
period of time when the debates were being held, eventually
losing by only 2 percent of the vote"

(p. 436).

If Carter

had performed in the debates as well as he claimed he did,
it is unlikely that voters would have shifted so much
support toward Ford.

While the debates alone cannot be

proven to be solely responsible for the shift in popular
opinion, a cause and effect argument can be made that since

debates on television favored Kennedy as the victor
[possibly influenced by what they "saw" in terms of a
young, energetic Kennedy].
Those voters who listened to
the debates on the radio and could only base their decision
on the content of the debates favored Nixon as the victor
of the debates.
However, after an exhaustive review of all
the available material and research data gathered at the
time, researchers Vancil and Pendell (1987) stated that
"after examining the historical evidence on audience
response to the 1960 televised debates, we conclude that
the alleged viewer-listener disagreement is unsupported"
(P- 16).
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the shift took place during the debates,

that the debates

did play a role in that shift.
In the 1980 presidential campaign,

candidate delivery

style seemed to have the most influence upon voter decision
making.

Carter's pollster, Patrick Caddell,

as vehicles for promoting challenges.

viewed debates

He therefore advised

Carter not to debate Reagan and avoid the risk of appearing
on the defensive (Jordan, 1981, p. 96).

Mayer

(1980)

explained that a further variable which Carter had to
evaluate was independent candidate John Anderson:
The Carter camp was scared to death of Anderson
because he was viewed as taking voter support
away from the Carter campaign.
Therefore, when
Carter did finally did agree to debate Reagan,
he insisted that Anderson not be included
(p. 2 1 )
Reagan,

aware of the support Anderson might pull away from

the Carter campaign,

insisted that out of fairness,

Anderson be included in the debate.

Carter prevailed and

Anderson was not allowed to participate in the debate
(Mayer 1980 p. 21)
Because of his background in radio,

television,

and

films, Reagan had a great deal of experience with
presentation skills.

Reagan was able to present himself to

the television viewing audience with such skill that
critics such as Martel

(1983) were led to claim that "even

his smile communicated all of the necessary ingredients"
(p. 83).
demise.

It would be those skills that lead to C a t e r 's
Ritter and Henry (1994) argued that "Reagan won
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the audience through his superior television presentation
style" and that Reagan's success in the November election
could be directly attributed to his ability to attract
voters with his debating style (p. 70).

Martel

(1983)

noted that Reagan's smile alone contributed significantly
to his strong performances in both the debates and the
election (p. 83).
In the 1984 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan had
little need of a debate to help him win the November
election.

Smith and Smith (1994) noted that pre-debate

polls made it clear that Reagan was preferred by enough
people in states with enough electoral votes to win the
election (p. 105).

However, debates had become expected in

presidential elections by the American public and Reagan
could not refuse to debate and risk the appearance of
trying to hide something.

Public interest in the campaign

was high with 81% of the nation's registered voters
watching all or part of the debates.

Throughout the

debates Reagan was able to maintain his lead and Smith and
Smith (1994) argued that "the presidential debates did not
have a major impact on the [1984] election outcome"

(p.

115).
The 1992 presidential campaign provided a first for
televised presidential debates.

For the first time in the

history of the debates, three candidates would participate
at the same time.

Overall, the debates were the most
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helpful for independent candidate Ross Perot.
Zhu, Milausky,

and Biswas

Researchers

(1994) noted that the first

televised debate proved extremely helpful in providing
voters with information regarding each candidate's position
on issues.

After watching the first debate, the authors

argued that "viewers knew, on average, 34% more about
Bush's issue position, 24% more about Clinton's,
more about Perot's"

(p. 319).

and 39%

The authors also stated that

"the debate helped Perot improve his image considerably"
(p. 325).

The audience learned the most about Perot who

was the least known candidate of the three.

This

information surge may account for why Perot was declared
the winner of the first debate and the loser in the second
debate.

Hahn (1994) noted that when asked who won the

first debate, 47% of the viewers selected Perot,
selected Clinton, and only 16% selected Bush.

30%

However,

after the second debate Perot dropped to last with only 15%
of the viewers declaring him the winner whereas 58%
selected Clinton, and 16% selecting Bush (p. 187).
upon the results from just the first two debates,

Based
the

effects of the debates upon viewer perception could be
attributed to the audience merely learning the most about
an unknown candidate in one debate and then fading in
interest by the second.

However, as Hahn (1994) explained,

in the third debate Perot was again selected the winner of
the debate by 37% of the viewers.

Bush and Clinton tied,
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each being declared the winner by 28% of the viewers
187).

(p.

Voter opinion appeared to have been swayed through

the course of the debates.

The overall effects of the

debates upon the general election can be identified in the
final results.

Clinton won the election but did so by only

receiving 43% of the popular vote, Bush 38%, and Perot
attracting 19% (Prysby & Scavo,

1993, p. 9)13.

With the

tremendous rise and fall in candidate popularity during the
debates and the low vote percentage victory by Clinton in
the overall election,

it appears that there may be numerous

variables involved in televised debates which have yet to
be identified.
The effects of televised debates upon voters is vast
and as of yet, not completely understood.

Debates do

appear to increase voter knowledge of a candidates position
on issues relative to the campaign, but that knowledge
seems to have little effect upon changing voters minds on
election day.

More research is still needed before the

exact role of televised debates upon election outcomes can
be assessed.

11

“ Clinton's victory is tainted when compared to the
1988 presidential campaign where Dukakis lost the election
but still carried 46% of the popular vote.
However, one
positive variable of the 1992 election is that 55% of the
voting age population cast a presidential ballot.
Not only
was this a substantial increase over the 50% turnout in
1988, but represented a reversal of a 30 year decline in
voter turn out at the polls (Pear, 1992, p. B4).
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EFFECTS OF MEDIA COMMENTARY ON DEBATES
Presidential debates are not only "mediated" by
television;

they are also "mediated" by network analysts

and commentators.

Research on the effects of declaration

of winners and losers, criticism and interpretive
commentary by network analysts is still fragmentary and
anecdotal.

However,

it is beginning to emerge as a

coherent area of study.

Studies of post-debate

analysis by media journalists have linked it to voter
perception of debate outcome.

The 1976 televised debates

between President Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter inspired the
first studies of commentator effects.

Lang and Lang (1979)

conducted a study w i t h two different groups of debate
viewers.

One group watched the first debate and was asked

to determine who won the debate immediately after the
debate was over.

The second group also watched the debate

but was not asked to determine a winner of the debate until
several days after the debate.

The first group which

responded immediately after the debate declared Carter the
winner by a 7-4 margin.

The second group which did not

respond until several days later and had access to media
input declared Ford the winner by a 7-4 margin.

The

authors argued that since the media had declared Ford the
winner of the debate in the days following the debate, a
probability existed that intervening media commentary had
changed the judgement of the members of second group.

_____

flgaMBgwGaaK"*"
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In another study of the 1976 televised debates,
and Wald (1979) reported a similar conclusion.

Lupfer

The authors

found that after watching the debates, a group of viewers
found no differences in candidate image immediately
following the debate.

However, one week later,

the same

viewers rated Ford more positively in areas such as
honesty,

fairness, and effectiveness during the debate.

Lupfer and Wald concluded the change was a result of
exposure to post debate commentary from network analysts.
Steeper's

(1978) study identified specific media

influence in viewer perception in the second 1976 televised
debate.

During that debate, President Ford mistakenly

stated that Eastern Europe was not dominated by the USSR.
While the statement was clearly an error, the average
American viewer failed to notice it as such.

Steeper

monitored one group of debate viewers during the actual
debate.

Subjects were asked to rate each candidate

randomly during the debate.

At the time when Ford made his

flawed statement, no one in the sample group noticed the
error and all participants rated Ford as "OK" at that point
in the debate.

In addition,

Steeper monitored a second

group of viewers and tested them immediately following the
debate.

The viewers declared Ford the winner of the debate

by a margin of 44 to 35. Furthermore, when the viewers were
asked to comment on whether or not the candidates performed
well in the debate, most commented that Ford had performed
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well.

The day after the debate, however,

the media flooded

the electorate with information regarding the flawed
comment.

When Steeper tested the second group on the

following night after the debate, the viewers declared
Carter the winner over Ford by a 61 to 19 margin.

When the

group was asked again to comment on whether or not the
candidates performed well, this time 20 % of the viewers
stated that Ford did not do well and cited the flawed
comment as the reason why.

Steeper argued that the extreme

reversal in viewer opinion was a direct result of the media
criticism of Ford's mistake, a mistake most viewers
initially missed.

The author concluded that the "public

did not know that Ford had made an 'error' until they were
told so by the news media during the following day"

(p.

82).
Patterson (1980) provided evidence of the media's
influence in another study of the 1976 debate.

A majority

of viewers who were asked within 12 hours after the debate
to declare a winner selected Ford.

However, viewers who

were asked after the 12 hour time period to declare a
winner consistently selected Carter.

Patterson could find

no credible alternative to media exposure that could
explain the shift in opinion.

After reviewing all three of

the 1976 debates, authors Sears and Chaffee

(1979) asserted

that the media had unduly influenced viewer perception.
The authors noted that judgements about the debaters were
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based on information obtained prior to the event.

Their

research found that viewers did not find the content of the
debates useful in forming a judgement about the winner:
The perception of a winner is determined
mostly by information other than the direct
experience of watching a debate itself.
Prior
preferences seem to have guided immediate
judgements very heavily, and the post-debate
media interpretations subsequently swayed voters
away from this immediate partisan division.
(p. 240)
Chaffee and Dennis

(1979) also linked media statements and

shifts in viewer judgement in yet another study of the 1976
debates.

A t tempting to match the media's statements and

viewer opinion shifts,

they concluded that commentary had a

substantial influence:
It may well be that the press's interpretation
of the debate, based on its initial information
as to the apparent victor, is more important
in determining the impact on the electorate
than is the debate itself.
(p. 85)
In the first 1984 televised debate between Ronald
Reagan and W a lter Mondale, researchers Abrahamson, Aldrich,
and Rohde (1986) argued that post-debate media analysis
directly influenced viewer opinion of who w on the debate.
Polls on the night of the debate found viewers declaring
Mondale a w i nner over Reagan by only 9 p e r c e n t .
days following the debate,

For two

the media contended that Mondale

had indeed w o n the first debate.

When follow-up polls were

taken two days after the debate, viewers now declared
Mondale the winner by over 49 percent.

The authors

concluded that the media was responsible for Mondale's 40

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96
percent in his margin of victory.

Geer

(1988) also found

evidence that the media influenced viewer perception in the
first 1984 televised debate.
after the contest,

He noted that immediately

43 percent of the respondents in a

CBS/New York Times poll thought Mondale had won, while 34
percent thought Reagan emerged victorious.

Yet two days

after the debate, Mondale was perceived by 66 percent of
the respondents as the winner, while Reagan's share
declined to 17 percent.

The author explained that "this

large shift toward Mondale is surely attributable to the
media's verdict that Mondale had bested Reagan"

(p. 488).

Researchers Lowry, Bridges, and Barefield (1990) also
discovered a significant link between media commentary and
viewer perception for the first 1988 televised debate
between Ronald Reagan and George D u k a k i s .

The authors

explained that an experimental examination of different TV
exposure groups following the [first] debate found that
post-debate commentary primarily reinforced voting
predispositions.

A control group that saw and reacted

immediately to the debate was most likely to find the
debate interesting,

to report change in the intensity of

their candidate choice,
highly.

However,

and to judge Bush's performance

the authors explained that "the group

that viewed the results of an instant poll by ABC
indicating that Dukakis had won the debate seemed to be
influenced by the poll results"

(p. 814).
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Lanoue's

(1991) study of the second 1988 televised

debate between Reagan and Dukakis revealed a similar
pattern.

Lanoue explained that "the media portrayals of

the debate did seem to color subjects'
the encounter"

(p. 85).

views about who won

He reported that subjects who

viewed the debate and then completed posttest
questionnaires immediately after the event chose Bush as
the winner over Dukakis by a margin of 44 percent to 30
percent.

The group that filled out the surveys after four

days of exposure to media commentary declared Bush the
winner by a 52 percent to 8 percent margin.
In a similar examination of the 1992 televised debates
researchers Zakahi, Hacker, & Baker (1993) noted that
"participants who viewed [post debate commentary]
immediately following the debate, had significantly
different opinions about who won the debate than those who
did not watch the commentary"

(p. 10).

In summary, although earlier research had established
that televised presidential debates have very little effect
upon voter candidate selection, the studies of media
interpretation of debates has revealed a very different
result.

However, over the past two decades,

sufficient

data has been undertaken to make probable the claim that
media post-debate analysis can have a significant influence
upon viewer opinion of candidate performance in a debate.
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DEBATES NEGATIVE EFFECT UPON POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
The relationship of the debates and their contribution
to political legitimacy is a complex matter and scholars
are divided in their assessment.

My personal judgement is

that debates come close to approximating the agrarian civic
ideal, adapted of course to an urbanized and necessarily
mediated form of mass communication.

Subtract the

soundbites and political knowledge is obtained from
headlines,

fragmented news stories, talk radio, and

sessions on the internet.

Clearly the debates present

candidates in their own words making extended arguments in
paired comparison w i t h other candidates, point by point and
issue by issue.
Communication researchers have been much concerned
with the decline of the quality of civic discourse.

Not a

few have seen presidential debates as symptomatic of this
decline, accordingly several researchers have argued that
debates are unable to accomplish the task they are designed
to do and that televised debates are a negative influence
on the American political system.
Selecting a candidate to serve as the leader of one of
the most powerful nations in the world is a task which
should not be taken lightly.

Voters need to be able to

assess an individual's ability to work within a large
bureaucratic system such as the United States Government.
However, researchers argue that the large array of talents
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and skills needed to accomplish that job cannot be revealed
by a candidate in a debate.

P o l s b y ’s (1979) criticism of

debate as a template of presidential leadership is typical:
The ability to stimulate a bureaucratic
apparatus to bring forth alternatives, while
no doubt related to an ability to imagine
alternatives in the first place, requires a
large panoply of talents and disciplines that
are not so easily revealed by the debate
format.
The capacity to pick correctly among
alternatives, to understand the reasons for
picking one alternative and not another, the
capacity to see whether the selected alternative
is being pursued by a government agency —
these managerial talents are quite inexpressible
through debate, (p. 179)
Jamieson and Birdsell

(1988) have produced similar

criticism at greater length.

Despite their far greater

experience with the arts of rhetoric in general and debate
in particular,

their reaction of debate performance as a

guide to presidential selection is even more thorough
going:
Debates fail to elicit or provide a means of
evaluating some of the skills central to
conduct in office [as President of the United
States] including an ability to ask significant
questions, a talent for securing sound advice,
a disposition to act judiciously, and a capacity
to compromise without violating conscience or
basic social principles, (p. 181)
Other scholars have argued that debates have fallen
short of their early promise of informing voters about
issues and have instead become forums exhibiting
entertainment and production values.
Watkins

Highlander and

(1962) strongly criticized the first televised

debates in 1960 and predicted that the media would
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contaminate the election process.

The authors argued that

televised debates are "better television shows than they
are well developed and significant discussions of vital
issues"

(p. 48).

Berquist and Golden (1981) supported and

extended the Highlander and Watkins criticisms.

They

charged that television shifted the attention of viewers
away from the political process and onto issues such as
each speaker's delivery,
presentation skills —
office of President

appearance, and overall

issues not vital to executing the

(p. 132).

Berquist and Golden

concluded their study by declaring that "televised debate
formats currently in use favor perceived candidate
advantage rather than the public interest"

(p. 135).

From the beginning, evidence of the manipulation of
presidential debates by television to produce a "show"
rather than a true political confrontation has led many
researchers to claim that televised debates are anything
but "real" debates and hurt rather than help the election
process.

W h e n the first televised debates in 1960 were

labeled "The Great Debates"

(Kraus 1964), researchers such

as Kerr (1961), Siepmann (1962), and Auer

(1962) were quick

to argue that the debates were neither "great" nor
"debates."

Sixteen years later when the second televised

debates took place in 1976, Kraus

(1979) once again used

the term "great debates" in a derogatory way when assessing
the debates.

Salant (1979) argued that not only were the
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debates not "debates," but they were more "joint
interviews" than anything else (p. 175).

Bitzer and Rueter

(1980) were so disillusioned by the inadequacies of the
format that they referred to the encounters as "counterfeit
debates."
debate,

In their assessment of the 1980 televised

researchers Tiemens, Hellweg, Kipper, and Phillips

(1985) also argued that, as with previous debates,

the

"debate" was not a "debate" because of the lack of
confrontation between the candidates.

The authors stated

that "There is no question that lack of confrontation in
the debate was attributed in part to the format.

The

debate was highly structured, giving no opportunity for
more direct confrontation"

(p. 41).

Auer (1962) explained w hy televised presidential
debates are not debates:
A true debate is 1)A confrontation 2 ) in
equal and adequate time
3)of matched contestants
4)on a stated proposition
5)to gain an audience
decision . . . Each of these elements is essential
of we are to have true debate.
Insistence upon
their recognition is more than mere pedantry,
for each one has contributed to the vitality
of the debate tradition, (p. 146)
Despite constant revision of the format with each election,
televised presidential debates still possess very few of
Auer's criteria.

In order to make televised debates more

of a show and to maintain the interest of the viewers,
televised debate formats have become highly structured,
focusing upon questions and answers, generally engaging
some type of moderator,

and often involving questions taken
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from guest panelists or audience members.

While this

format may not create a true debate, producers and
political consultants seem to believe that it does help
create a more entertaining television show.

Jamieson and

Birdsell (1988) argued that this highly structured format
contaminates the debates because "the formats do not ask
the right questions,

the question-and-answer format is not

conducive to substantive debate, and the structure places
irreconcilable demands on the candidates"

(p. 165).

An even more serious charge is that the analysis of
the debate may contaminate the entire election as well.
Researchers have argued that the media is more concerned
with identifying a winner and a loser of each debate rather
than be concerned about the content.

Jamieson and Birdsell

(1988) argued that "by focusing on who won and who lost
rather than on the positions revealed and clarified, press
coverage also reinforces the views that elections are
"horse races," not processes of preparing the electorate
for informed decision making"

(p. 171).

While the identification of a winner and a loser may
sell more newspapers or attract more viewers,

it creates a

misguided focus both among the electorate and within the
industry.

When a winner is not clearly present,

the media

may feel it necessary to declare a winner in order to keep
the horse race alive.

Berquist and Golden (1981) explained

how the media attempts to fulfill this role in that "when a
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victor is not at once apparent, television commentators and
analysts fill the vacuum by playing the dual role of
referee and final judge"

(p. 125).

The danger is that

media will preempt public discussion.

As Desmond and

Donohue (1981) pointed out "often, audience members do not
reach final judgement

[of who won] until they have

discussed the debate with others and have observed the
media reaction"
Earlier,

(p. 306).

I reported the existence of studies about the

influence of the media upon voters perceptions.

It has

been argued that media commentary may contaminate the
political process.
listening,

If the electorate is no longer

thinking, and critically assessing issues, but

waiting to be told how to think by the media,
discourse has been impoverished.

then civic

Chaffee and Dennis

(1979)

noted that "a growing body of data suggests that the
voters'

shifting perception of the candidate's success in a

debate is shaped not by actual debate performance but by
the media call of who won or lost"

(p. 171).

Should the

media be at a loss for a winner or loser, Berquist and
Golden (1981) noted how the media may manipulate
circumstances and "attempt to establish public expectations
regarding the probable outcome of a political debate"
125).

Jamieson and Birdsell

(p.

(1988) further noted the

obsession of the media with the outcome of the debates
rather than the content:
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In 1984, both Time and Newsweek delayed
publication by 24 hours to carry accounts of
the final Mondale-Reagan debate.
The headlines
dramatically illustrated the concern analysts
have about press reports of debates.
The
covers read:
"Who Won and Why?" (p. 170)
In a study of the 1976 televised debates, Berquist
(1994) studied the effects of time on viewers'

opinions.

After viewing the debates and selecting a winner on their
own, Berquist discovered that those viewers who were
exposed to input from the media regarding the outcome of
the debate were more prone to change their opinion of who
w on than those viewers who were not exposed to media input
(P. 36).
Other researchers worry about presidential candidates
shaping the form and content of their message to
accommodate media norms.

Zarefsky (1992) argued that

rather then engage in detailed explanations or provide
complete and thorough answers to questions and attacks,
candidates provide dialogue which is more adapted to the
evening n e w s :
We have debased political debate . . . the
debates have been formatted for television
. . . [and as a result] thwart sustained
discussions of serious issues and encourage
one-liners and canned mini-speeches.
The
focus in political debates is on winning by
not losing, or by cleverly scoring a hit
against the opponent, (p. 412)
Candidates need to create one-liners and to score hits
because that is what the media will use in determining a
winner or a loser.

The small shards of information which
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the candidates provide will become the lead-in for the
evening news.

Sigelman (1992) noted that "between 1968 and

1988 the average sound bite on network newscasts shrank
from 43 to 9 seconds"

(p. 407).

Candidates in televised

debates accommodate the media by giving them their "9
seconds worth" of campaign information.

Such practices may

weaken the political process they are alleged to save if
debates fail to promote a true political process,

and the

debate format developed for television not only
contaminates the entire process but turns the debates into
"non-debates."

We must alter the format or revise our

notion of the meaning of political discourse.
DEBATE BENEFITS
While the evidence against debates providing any
significant benefit to televised debates is quite
extensive, some studies indicate redeeming qualities.
of the most extensive,

recent studies,

One

that of Trent and

Friedenberg (1991), argued that there are seven effects of
debates upon a political campaign (pp. 229-236).

While the

proposed seven effects are not necessarily "bad," they are
not all necessarily "good" either.
effects are just that —

"effects" —

Some of the proposed
and should be

evaluated as such.
Effect 1:

Increased Audiences.

attract large au d i e n c e s .

Political debates

Debates generate audiences far

larger than those that are generated by any other
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communication activity during the campaign.

Larger

audiences are good for the overall political process
because the more people who watch, the more likely they
will be to get involved in the campaign at some level.
Effect 2:

Audience Beliefs are Reinforced.

While

debates do not provide substantial shifts in voter
position,

they at least reinforce the positions held by

candidate partisans.

This reinforcement helps to solidify

a voter's support for a candidate and strengthens that
candidate's foothold in an election.
Effect 3:

Shifting Limited Numbers of Voters.

While

political debates do not normally result in massive shifts
of votes, some voters may shift.

In a close election,

the

numbers who shift as a consequence of the debates might be
decisive.

Even if electorates make no shift in votes,

party solidarity

the

obtained from the reaffirmation to a

particular candidate can only help the overall political
p rocess.
Effect 4:

Debates Help Set Voters' Agenda.

Even if

voters succumb to the media's influence and allow the media
to tell them what is important,
agenda has been set.

at least some type of

Voters can now identify with a

particular issue or issues and vote accordingly.
Effect 5:
Issues.

Debates Increase the V o t e r s ’ Knowledge of

Studies have indicated that voters do seem more

knowledgeable as a consequence of watching political
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debates.

Any increase in voter awareness and knowledge of

election issues is good for the political process.
Effect 6:

Debates Modify Candidate's Images.

When a

candidate is not well known, the debate increases the
publics awareness of that candidate.

Voters are also able

to assess the general character, personality attributes,
and general competency of a candidate.

All of these

variables are beneficial to the political process.
Effect 7:

Debates Build Confidence in U.S. Democracy.

Televised presidential debates may be unparalleled in
modern campaigning as an innovation that engages citizens
in the political process.

Debates provide voters w i t h

greater exposure to information about candidates, w h i c h
possibly results in a certain degree of commitment to the
election process.

It is always a positive contribution

whenever the democratic process is nurtured.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has explored the role of televised
debates in the presidential election process.

Televised

debates have become an expected, even mandatory event in
modern presidential campaigning.

Media analysis of debate

was found to have a significant impact upon the election
process.

Further, they provide vastly needed exposure for

candidates and heighten interest in the election.

Numerous

researchers have argued that televised debates are not true
debates and that this hybrid media form has contaminated
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the entire process.

Finally, researchers have argued that

whatever its shortcomings,

the debates provide

several

benefits to presidential elections and to the democratic
process.

H a ving reviewed televised debates from a macro

perspective,

the remainder of this study will concentrate

on a micro perspective —

an examination of the 1992

televised presidential debates.
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CHAPTER 4
HABERMAS AND LEGITIMACY TOPOI
INTRODUCTION
The examination of any rhetorical artifact requires
the appropriate lens.

An examination of the 1992 televised

presidential debates for their relationship to the
legitimacy crisis in the American political system requires
a filter which allows the critic the opportunity to
interpret the debates as both rhetorical and political.
this chapter,

In

I will formulate an appropriate tool for this

study by combining Habermas's notions of political
legitimacy crises and his ideal speech situation.
ORIGINS OF LEGITIMACY CRISIS
Max Weber

(1968) argued that legitimacy can be

guaranteed in two fundamental ways.

First, through

"subjective" means, which may take the form of an emotional
surrender to a charismatic figure, religious belief that
salvation depends on obedience to authority, or belief in
the absolute validity of the social order as an expression
of ultimate values.

Second,

legitimacy may be quaranteed

through the expectation of specific external effects,

that

is, the promise of tangible benefits that will result from
the efficient performance of a political system.

In either

case, rhetoric plays an essential and vital role in order
to articulate political benefits to the people, in
formulating the means to bring about the realization of the

109
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benefits, and in mobilizing the people on behalf of
societal goals.

Rhetoric also,

as Bensman (1979) noted:

"performs a vital socio-political function by bridging the
gap between legitimacy as claimed by those who would
exercise authority and legitimacy as believed by those who
would obey it" (p. 17).
Later, Jurgen Habermas

"democratized" Weber's concept

of emphasizing the participatory and forensics dimension.
Habermas

(1975) defined legitimacy as "An ongoing process

of reason giving, actual and potential,

which forms the

basis of the right to exercise authority as well as the
willingness to defer to authority"

(p. 43).

In 1979,

Habermas offered an extended definition for legitimacy of
political order:

"Legitimacy means a political order's

worthiness to be recognized.

This definition highlights

the fact that legitimacy is a contestable validity claim;
the stability of the order of domination (also) depends on
its (at least) de facto recognition"

(p. 178).

Both

definitions argue that legitimacy must include an implicit
requirement of a rationality of good reasons.

The reason

giving process must involve a value system which has been
socially constructed and which provides meaning by creating
ties between individuals and socio-political orders.
Francesconi

(1982) explained that these ties, or bonds,

create a "justification for the actions taken by
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authorities and the very right to exercise authority [and]
are weighed against the requirement of rationality"

(p.

50).
RHETORIC AND LEGITIMACY CRISIS
Francesconi (1986) argued that Habermas's definition
of legitimacy of political order contained three claims
important for rhetoric

(p. 16).

First,

the legitimacy of

political order can be examined as a rational claim.
Second,

such a claim is contestable and, therefore, capable

of discursive redemption or rejection.

And third, a claim

of legitimacy rests upon a normative evaluation of
worthiness.

From these three claims, Francesconi

(1986)

argued that four crucial terms emerge for understanding the
role of rhetoric in legitimacy.
The first crucial term is "normative evaluations."
Habermas

(1979) explained:

"Legitimation crises are based

upon a discrepancy between the need for motives declared by
the state and motivations percolating up from the normative
framework defining the collective social identity"
180).

(p.

A social body contains norms which are inseparable

from its identity.

These norms contain truth and the

people must be able to inform the political "experts" of
these norms to believe they are being represented.
political order must identify,

The

acknowledge, and appear to

support these norms to maintain legitimacy.
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The second term is "contestable validity claims."
order to believe in legitimacy,

In

there must be some relation

to truth, by which he means a consensual or societal truth.
Habermas

(1973b) argued:

political action,
justification"

"In the realm of social and

truth must find consensus through

(p. 75).

A political system is justified

and maintains legitimacy if it can communicate a social
identity, or represent the norms of the society.
The third term is "discourse."

For Habermas (1970)

discourse is a reflective,

interest free dialogue aimed at

producing social consensus

(p. 373).

Normal communicative

action rests upon fundamental norms of rational speech that
are prerequisites for communicative competence.
concept is reflective of the public good.

This

A legitimate

political system will engage in discourse containing
"interest free dialogue" reflecting the norms of the
culture,

indicating that the political system understands

"truth."
The fourth, and final term,
recognition."

Again,

to the forefront.

is "worthiness of

the notion of public good is thrust

Habermas

(1975) explained:

"the

legitimacy of political order is based upon the norms of
trust and expectation"

(p. 43).

Citizens expect legitimate

order to act in accord with the norms established by social
identity and trust that authority will act in the general
interest.

The political order must earn its legitimacy.
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James Aune (1994) argued that the political order must
select from two rhetorical traditions which reflect the
relationship between rhetoric and politics

(p. 121).

The

political order can select the conception of rhetoric as
m ythmaking for the masses, where the elite inform the
people of what they need.

Or, the order may select the

Sophistic and Ciceronian view of rhetoric wherein all
citizens possess the skills necessary to engage in
discourse which informs the experts of the needs of the
people.

The Ciceronian view is historically associated

with Amer i c a n civic discourse.

Jefferson admired Cicero

both as a style model and as a republican martyr.

The

public believes that they live in a society where they are
able to inform the experts about "their" needs.

However,

as the state intervenes, the political leadership become
members of an administrative elite and are strongly tempted
to consolidate their prerogatives into a permanent
structure of privilege.

Then a dilemma arises between

private and public interests.

While the leadership may

acknowledge a public good, they must also maintain the
stable political order —
conflict.

and the two ideologies often

Consequently, an advanced industrial society is

simultaneously political order and world sphere.

Aune

(1994) explained that this dichotomy leads to the existence
of contradictions.

However, as long as the people believe

that they are able to inform the experts of "their" needs,
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then legitimacy of the political order is upheld.

Should

the administrative actions of the elected officials
indicate a control of information —

the experts shaping or

selecting the social reality of the people —
legitimacy of the system becomes suspect.
puts it:

then the

As Aune (1994)

"One cannot colonize the lifeworld without

exacting a cost"

(p. 122).

The cost is generally a lack of

political participation by the people who no longer believe
that the political order is committed to upholding the
"public good."
IDEAL SPEECH SITUATION
Aune (1994) articulated the limits of Habermas's
theory for the examination of particular specimens of
discourse:
Truth is what we would rationally agree to
in a situation of undistorted communication,
one in which manipulation as well as errors
of fact, wishful thinking, rationalization,
and ideological positioning would not occur.
(P. 124)
To achieve this level of truth, Habermas developed the
concept of an ideal speech situation which is constructed
through three steps:

an analysis of types of speech acts,

a description of the validity claims each act implies, and
a description of the ideal situation in which the claims
could be redeemed (Aune 1994, p. 124).
Habermas described four types of speech acts.

First

is "communicatives," which express the meaning of an
utterance as an utterance.

Second is "constatives" which
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explicate the meaning of a statement with reference to the
external world.

Third,

"representatives," explain the

meaning of the self-representation of the speaker to the
hearer.

And fourth,

"regu l a t i v e s ," which explain the

relationship of the speaker and hearer in reference to
moral and social rules that can be followed or broken (Aune
1994 p. 124).
Once a speech act is identified, the promise, or
validity claim, which each act carries, can be identified.
Given the right set of circumstances,

the promises

contained in each act can be followed through to
completion.

A communicative speech acts validity claim is

comprehensibility.
speech act is truth.

The validity claim of a constative
A representative speech act finds

validity in truthfulness.

A nd rightfulness is the validity

claim of a regulative speech act.
While any one or more of these standards can be
violated in a communication exchange,

by entering into a

communication act, the speaker presupposes a commitment to
abide by these standards.

Aune

(1994) explained that the

social situation which would most likely guarantee the
fulfillment of these values is one in which the following
four standards prevail:

1) Each speaker must have an equal

opportunity to initiate and perpetuate communication;

2)

Each speaker must have an equal opportunity to employ
regulative speech acts, without having to obey one-sidedly
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binding norms;

3) Each speaker must have an equal

opportunity to employ constative speech acts —

no

proposition statements are immune from criticism;

and 4)

Each speaker must have an equal opportunity to employ
representative speech acts —
feelings and attitudes

to be able to express

(pp. 124-125).
DEBATE

No other communication format provides as much
potential for realizing the ideal speech situation than
debate.

Debate,

in the Anglo-American tradition,

provides

an opportunity for the confrontation of ideals wherein each
speaker has equal opportunity to initiate the types of
speech acts which Habermas presented.

In a debate,

the

validity of Habermas's speech acts can be cross-examined
and tested for comprehensibility,

truthfulness,

and

ri g h tfulness.
A debate format such as a televised presidential
debate can also serve as a litmus test for the legitimacy
of a political system.

By polling the public and seeking

decisions as to a winner and loser of a televised
presidential debate,

an audience decision is achieved.

This process allows the public to inform the [political]
experts of what they think and ultimately of what they
want.

By employing this type of feedback the debate

contributes to determining the legitimacy of the political
order.
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METHOD:

RHETORICIZING HABERMAS

Although Habermas privileged communication in his
social theory, he has not developed a rhetoric.

He has not

adopted his scheme of ideal communication for the analysis
of particular discourse.
vision of community.

He has provided criteria for a

He has not yet developed norms for

judging a situated debate.
In order to move from a universal theory of
communication to the rhetorical analysis of actual
legitimation appeals, we must "methodize" Habermas.
rhetoric

(as opposed to a theory of ideal communication)

presupposes an opponent and an audience.

Second, rhetoric

is agonistic and governed by social conventions.
debate,

First,

In a

issues are frequently argued in terms of their

rhetorical status.

That is to say, opponents marshal their

claims and evidence in terms of an established sequence.
This sequence is a series of struggles over the facts,
definitions, qualities, and procedures associated with an
issue (i.e. what are the facts about a policy or action?
What nature, kind or category of act is it?
evil?

Is it good or

What procedures or implementations are being

followed?).
The presidential debates of 1992 will not be analyzed
for their overt positions or stock issues but for their
embedded legitimate appeals.

For example, two candidates

might both want similar welfare reform,

but one would
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consign the solution to government "experts" whereas
another wou l d advocate a return to neighborhood decision
making.

Thus, both might express the same fiscal and

humanitarian goals, but the means of attaining these goals
might suggest differing orientations toward legitimacy.
One might express faith in government expertise and reform
from the "top" whereas the other candidate might appeal for
a return to direct participation by the people.
THE TOPOI OF LEGITIMACY
In the spirit of Habermas,

filtered through the lens

of American ideology, three legitimation themes have been
selected:
D Citizenship:

Restoring Citizen Participation.

Both

Habermas and American civic humanism posit a basic human
need for participation in community affairs.

The citizen,

not the expert or the interest group, must be the primary
actor.
2)Virtue:

The Public G o o d .

This topos addresses the

restoration of the concept of a public good, a moral
community.

The government should seek to promote respect

for virtues in its people (defined as education,
order, family, property, and piety).

civil

Virtue becomes the

conception of a larger public good compatible with
individual rights.
3)Authority:

The Role of the Government.

topos is to restore accountability.

The goal of this

Governments must be
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made accountable to the people.

The source of its

legitimacy is the will of the people.
My selection of topoi is not arbitrary.
stock expressions of commonplace beliefs,

Topoi are

general political

recipes for an ideal order.

Their relationship to myth is

that of a moral to a story.

Thus,

the Jeffersonian myth

narratizes the "ideas" of agrarian virtue and the
centrality of the yeoman.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Three themes,

long hallowed as axioms of legitimate

civic culture, figured prominently in the discourse of the
presidential elections.

They did not appear as direct

overt statements so much as what Kenneth Burke
called representative anecdotes:

(1945) has

statements of warning or

admonition that thread across a whole body of discourse,
acting as a synecdoche for the whole and giving many
disparate statements a larger coherence and meaning.

These

themes are seldom stated nakedly and literally, rather they
undergird whole issues and sets of issues as a general
imperative or orientation.

They make implicit sense of

diverse and seemingly conflicting statements.
My order of procedure will be to review the debaters
in a sequential fashion throughout.

I will chart the three

legitimacy themes as they are used as strategic rhetorical
appeals during the discussion of the contested issues.
Next I will attempt a summary statement for each candidate
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detailing his apparent position on these themes and his
skillful use of them in the debates.

Finally,

I will

attempt to evaluate the impact of the legitimacy theme on
the campaign in particular, and presidential discourse in
general.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter,

the origin of a legitimacy crisis has

been identified as the byproduct of the existence of
contradictions arising from an advanced industrialized
society.

When the notion of the public good is questioned

or threatened,

a legitimacy crisis emerges and the

authority of a political system is questioned.

A

Ciceronian style of rhetoric has been identified as the
appropriate rhetorical response for a system experiencing a
legitimacy crisis.

Habermas's ideal speech situation has

been shown as the best rhetorical tool for achieving the
values outlined by Habermas and the debate format was
argued as the most appropriate method for executing
Habermas's theory.

Finally, Habermas's ideal speech

situation was translated into a series of thematic appeals.
The following chapter will examine the strategic use of
these appeals w i t h i n the presidential debates of 1992.
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C HAPTER 5
LEGITIMACY CRISIS RHETORIC
IN THE 1992 TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will begin w i t h a description of the
debates,

detailing their general procedures and their

particular settings and differences in format.

Then the

chapter will proceed to a sequential analysis of each
debate using the legitimation topoi identified in Chapter
Four.
THE COMMUNICATION E C O L O G Y OF THE DEBATES
The 1992 televised presidential debates were staged
over a nine day period beginning on Sunday October 11, 1992
and concluding on Monday October 19, 1992.

Their impact

upon the overall election has been documented.

CBS

election coverage on November 3, 1992 reported that of all
the possible influences on voters decisions,

the

presidential debates were the most important element
(Crawford, 1993).

Sandell, Mattley, E v a r t s , Langel, and

Ziyati (1993) also observed that when asked what influenced
their decision in selecting a candidate, voters most often
cited the economy (the central focus of all three of the
debates);
debates.
notoriety.

the second most m e n t i o n e d influence was the
Only the 1960 televised debates attracted similar
Neither the 1976,

1980,

1984, nor the 1988

televised debates were determined to have as much influence
upon the outcome of the elections.
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The 1992 debates were unique in that they placed three
presidential candidates together on the same stage.
Although the effect of this unique format has yet to be
ascertained, Prysby and Scavo (1993) speculated that the
presence of three candidates changed the dynamics of the
election campaign and the debates in favor of a particular
candidate.

The authors opined:

"Perot's focus on the

deficit and the economy meant that there were two
candidates criticizing Bush's performance, and the three
candidate debate format may have prevented Bush from
focusing more heavily on Clinton's personal
characteristics"

(p. 9).

Several different debate formats were employed.
Debate one consisted of a series of direct questions from a
panel of journalists with specific amounts of time
designated for each candidate's answer and response time.
Debate two was a town hall meeting with the audience
members —

average citizens —

questions of any candidate.
two parts.

being allowed to ask
Debate three was split into

For the first half of the debate,

a single

moderator was allowed to ask any candidate any question he
desired.

For the second half, a panel of journalists were

introduced and allowed to ask the candidates questions of
their choice.

For the last half, the debates returned to

the structured time formulas of the first debate.
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Debate One
The first televised presidential debate, held Sunday
October 11, 1995,

took place on the campus of Washington

University in St. Louis, Missouri.

The debate was

moderated by Jim Lehrer and consisted of a series of
questions asked of the candidates by three journalists:
John Mashek of the Boston Globe, Ann Compton of ABC News,
and Sandy Vanocur,

a freelance journalist.

When a

candidate was asked a question, he would have two minutes
to answer.

Following his answer, the other two candidates

would each have one minute to respond.

All three debaters

were fairly reserved in the first debate with no
significant or memorable exchanges taking place between
them.
Ross Perot was declared the winner of the first
televised debate by 47 percent of the viewers polled.

Many

critics attributed his victory to the fact that he was
relatively unknown and provided the most "new" information
of the three candidates.

Bill Clinton placed second,

carrying 30 percent of the viewers polled, while George
Bush finished a very distant third, carrying only 16
percent of the vote

(Hahn 1994, p. 194).

Debate Two
The second televised presidential debate was held
Thursday October 15, 1992 at the University of Richmond in
Richmond, Virginia.

The debate was moderated by Carole
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Simpson and the debate formate consisted of a town hall
meeting where members of the audience were permitted to ask
the questions.

While the moderator attempted to allow each

candidate equal answer and response time, since several of
the audience's questions were directed specifically toward
a single candidate,

equal time was not always possible.

This was the only debate in which Perot was not declared
the winner.
the votes.

He finished last carrying only 15 percent of
George Bush was able to finish in second place

but only by one percentage point over Perot, gathering just
sixteen percent of the viewers polled.

Bill Clinton was

the runaway winner of the second debate with a whopping 58
percent of the public vote (Hahn 1994, p. 201).

Clinton's

victory in the second debate is particularly noteworthy
because he lobbied heavily for, and insisted upon,
of the town hall format for the televised debates
1992).

the use
(Fouhy

When the public response to the second debate was

extremely favorable, Clinton made sure that the public knew
the format was his idea.
The town hall format allowed the citizens to confront
the candidates with some very tough questions.

Many of the

questions forced the candidates to have to provide hard,
truthful answers for the audience.

Of particular note was

President Bush stumbling and searching for an answer to a
question of how had the national debt affected him
personally.
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Debate Three
The third debate was held on Monday October 19, 1992
at Michigan State University in East Lansing, Michigan.
The debate was moderated again by Jim Lehrer and the format
consisted of two parts.

In the first half of the debate,

moderator Lehrer would ask the candidates questions with
follow-up answers allowed by each candidate.

The second

half of the debate consisted of a panel of three
journalists —

Susan Rook of CNN, Gene Gibbons of Reuters,

and Helen Thomas of United Press International —
ask the questions.

who would

Time constraints of two minutes for an

answer to a question and one minute for a rebuttal were
used for the second half of the debate.
The format of the third debate produced some very
heated exchanges between the candidates.

Of interest was

Ross Perot's challenge to President Bush to provide for the
American public papers containing his exact orders to U.S.
Ambassador Glaspie on the Eve of the Gulf War.

Bush took

exception to the question and a heated debate ensued.
Governor Clinton capitalized on Perot's attack and used the
opportunity to challenge Bush's integrity.
After scoring poorly in the second debate, Perot
rebounded and was declared the winner of the third and
final debate by 37 percent of the viewers.
number was not particularly high,

While this

it was enough to propel

Perot past both Bush and Clinton who tied for second with

i
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28 percent each.
for

The scores represented a significant drop

Clinton from his 58 percent victory

a significant increase for Bush

in debate two, and

who had scored only 16

percent in both debates one and two.
ANALYSIS:

THE DEBATES

Debate One
The first debate began with each candidate being asked
by Jim Lehrer to provide an opening statement in which they
would explain what separated them from the other candidates
in the presidential race.
drawing,

spoke first.

of leader,

Ross Perot,

as determined by a

He defined himself as a unique sort

the true people's candidate.

Perot explained:

I think the principle that separates me is
that 5 million people came together on their
own and put me on the ballot.
I was not put
on the ballot by either of the two parties.
I was not put on the ballot by any PAC money,
by any foreign lobbyist money, by any special
interest money.
This is a movement that came
from the people.
This is the way the framers
of the Constitution intended our government
to be, a government that comes from the people.
Over time we have developed a government that
comes at the people, that comes from the top
down, where the people are more or less treated
as objects to be programmed during the campaign
. . . I go into this race as their servant,
and I belong to them.
So this comes from the
people.14
From the very beginning, Perot set his keynote;

he

placed himself squarely within the Jeffersonian myth.

4A11 excerpts from the debates in this dissertation
are taken from transcripts of the debates received through
Prodigy Services Company, Prodigy Interactive Personal
Services, 1992, downloaded the day following each debate.
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Perot argued that his candidacy would place government back
in the hands of the people,

that his presidency wou l d be

accountable to the people for their actions,

that the needs

of citizens would set the agenda, and that his campaign
would be clear of "interests."
legitimacy,

citizenship,

All three of the topoi of

accountability, and virtue,

are

touched upon in Perot's opening statement.
Bill Clinton was second to speak in the debate, being
the

first to respond to Perot.

of P e r o t 1s comments and

Clinton did

not address any

stayed with his prepared text

which he used the word "change" five times.

in

Despite this

word, Clinton never indicted the system to the extent that
Perot had done.
idioms.

Instead,

Clinton used reformer's stock

It was just "time for a change" and he wo u l d be

the competent agent of change for the American people:
The most important distinction in this
campaign is that I represent real hope
for
change, a departure from trickle-down
economics, I must challenge the American
people to change and they must decide . . .
Its time to change.
I want to bring that
change to the American people, but we must
all decide first we have the courage to
change for hope and a better tomorrow.
Except for the partisan attack against "trickle-down
economics," Clinton never defined what he meant by change.
However, he did refer to the topos of citizenship by
claiming that "we must all decide."

Citizens had a

participatory role as agents of the change.
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President Bush's opening statement also responded to
the question of what separated him from the other
candidates:

"I think the one thing that dramatically

distinguishes is experience.
changed the world

. . . and the changes are mindboggling

for world peace."
difficult,

I think we've dramatically

Bush cast himself as an expert in a

frightening and mysterious world.

was the key to national survival,

Experience

and the more experience a

person had working within the expert system, the more
qualified he was to be president.

Of the three candidates,

Bush believed that he was the only person to possess this
type of experience in full measure.

Ironically,

the

experience he praised was within a system which Perot had
already identified as corrupt and self serving.
In the same opening statement,

Bush indicated that the

present political system, despite questions about its
effectiveness,

size, and scope, could be fine-tuned given

the best personnel.

Bush used the word "change" seven

times in his opening statement.

However, he was not

referring to the type of change which the other candidates
wanted.

For Bush,

"change" meant placing new people in the

same old jobs and changing the dominant party affiliation
of the Congress.

He explained:

"And the way we are going

to get it done is we're going to have a brand new Congress.
. .I'll sit down with them and work for my agenda..."
According to Bush,

the old system was not fundamentally
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flawed,
players.

it just needed to be given a chance with some new
Bush's position ignored the legitimacy topoi with

the exception of accountability.

Bush identified the

expert as the primary actor rather than the citizen.

He

appeared to believe that the role of the government was to
lead from above;

his public virtue consisted of efficiency

and effectiveness.
To ensure equal time throughout the debates, Clinton
was given two minutes to address the same opening question
while Bush and Perot then received one minute for response
statements.

Clinton used his opening statement to respond

to Bush's claim that his administration was essentially
sound.

He made a significant attack against the old

"expert" system.

Clinton told the audience "My wife gave

me a book in which the author defined

'insanity' as just

doing the same old thing over and over again and expecting
a different result."

The direct argument was never made,

but Clinton implied that the old system was insane because
it never got anything done.

An insane system, by

extension, cannot be reformed,

it must be smashed.

Clinton

also attacked expert political insiders when he declared
that what worked in the new world order was not "government
for the benefit of the privileged few."

This statement

exemplified the topos of accountability and virtue:
Government of the people and a broad sphere of public good.

.
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After Clinton completed his opening statement, Bush
interrupted and stated that he had something else to add to
what he felt distinguished him from the other candidates.
He noted that earlier in the campaign, Clinton had made a
reference to America "falling apart at the seams" and
needed to be overhauled:
I think he said that the country is coming
apart at the seams.
Now I know that the only
way he can w in is to make everybody believe
the economy is worse than it is, but this
country's not coming apart at the seams, for
heaven's sakes.
We are the U.S. of America.
In spite of the economic problems, we're the
most respected economy around the world.
Many
would trade for it . . . I would hate to be
running for president and think that the only
way I could win would be to convince everybody
how horrible things are.
This statement presented Bush as a defender of the
legitimacy of the present system and condemned the use of
de-legitimizing rhetoric as strategic and insincere.

He

hinted that the perception of economic woes had been
manufactured.

Bush indicated he believed complaints were

largely illusory, placing him above and away from the
experience of ordinary people.
At the close of his statement, Bush would again make a
reference to the essential soundness of the system and that
a mere change in party hegemony would redeem it.
exclaimed:

"I believe we can get it done now.

Bush
You're

going to have a whole brand new bunch of people in Congress
that are going to have to listen to the same American
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people I'm listening to."

This gesture to the primacy of

the citizen was rather pale.
When allowed an opportunity to respond to the other
candidates'

opening statements,

Perot humorously reiterated

his outsider status, he was one of the people, not a member
of the corrupt political system which the public had come
to distrust.

Perot declared:

"Well they've got a point.

I don't have any experience in running up a $4 trillion
debt.

I don't have any experience in gridlock government

. . ."

•

Thus, Perot discredited the experience arguments

which the other candidates had made by identifying the
consequence of their experience.

Perot portrayed himself

as a non "expert" and as an advocate for the topoi of
legitimacy.
During the volley of opening statements about
candidate character (an issue played upon very heavily by
George Bush), Perot seized the opportunity to dramatize his
citizen status.

He was not a part of the typical dirty

politics of character defamation which members of the
system usually get caught up in.

Perot supported his

promise of putting political decision making back into the
hands of the public by asserting:

"I think the American

people make their own decisions on character . . . "

Thus,

Perot showed that he trusted the competence and moral
authority of the people.

They,

not the candidates, would
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judge who was a good person and who was a bad person.

This

comment exemplified the topos of citizenship.
During the series of statements and responses
regarding candidate character,

Clinton made a statement

whi c h contradicted his previous criticism of the political
system.

He responded to an attack by Bush regarding his

patriotism and military service:
serve our country,

"I honor all those who

including Admiral Crowe who was your

chairman of the Joint Chiefs and who's supporting me."

The

system might be insane and in need of change, but Clinton
now claimed to have ties with experts who supported him.
While seemingly contradictory,

this statement

supported the nation and its survival (public good) rather
than the particular policies of the present administration.
However, Clinton m ay have weakened his citizenship
theme in his discussion of his plan to reduce the deficit.
Clinton declared:
500 others,

"Nine Nobel Prize w inning economists and

including numerous Republican and Democratic

business executives have endorsed [my plan] because it
offers the best hope."

Clinton implied that he was not

just offering vain promises to the people, but he had the
approval of experts who knew about economic issues.
Clinton cast himself as well connected with political
experts.
In discussing deficit reduction proposals, Bush
criticized a gas tax proposed by Perot and declared that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133
his plan was better.

Bush argued that even though his

plans may not have worked in the past, they would now.

He

would go through the proper channels and get his ideas
passed through Congress.

The reason Bush would be able to

do this was because of the new officials who would be
elected to Congress.

Bush explained:

"And with this new

Congress coming in, gridlock will be gone, and I'll sit
down with them and say let's get this done."

While Bush

offered no explanations other than superior partisan
competence,

as to why the new Congress would be any better

than the old, he continued to support the system and
claimed that even though it had failed to work in the past,
it would w o r k now, we just had to believe in the system.
For Bush,

there was no need to restore citizen

participation or government accountability.
John Mashek asked the next question which concerned
converting military jobs to private industry.

Mashek made

reference to an article in that day's St. Louis PostDispatch in which a woman had written a letter and inquired
if she could ask the candidates about the lack of a plan to
convert defense-oriented industries to other purposes, an
issue she was very concerned about.

Bush returned to his

previous statements regarding the state of the economy and
stated:

"But we are not coming apart at the seams.

tell her [the woman]

it's not all that gloomy;

United States of America!"

. .But

we're the

Bush relied on national pride
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and rebukes to console a person afraid of losing their job.
By not addressing the voter as an individual, Bush violated
the topoi of citizenship and accountability.
While Clinton h a d formerly attempted to demonstrate
his ties with the experts, his response to the problem of
converting military jobs now criticized the current system
as slipshod and unresponsive.

Clinton complained:

"This

administration may say they have a plan, but the truth is
they have not even released all the money, the paltry sum
of money,

that Congress appropriated."

The attack was

meant to be directed as discrediting the Bush
administration, but he also attacked Congress in the
process as lacking accountability.
The next question came from Ann Compton who asked
Perot how he would use the powers of the presidency to get
more people back into good jobs?

Perot began his answer

with a statement designed to frame him as a tribute of the
people rather than a professional politician.
"Step one,
..."

Perot began:

the American people send me up there

The only w ay Ross Perot was going to be president

was if the people sent him —
"sent" him.

not "elected" him —

but

The topos of citizenship was supported because

the people were making the decisions and the choices, not
the experts.
When addressing the issue of job creation, Clinton
presented an uncharacteristically conventional plan by
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working within the current political system.

Clinton

stated:

I would meet

"On the first day I was inaugurated,

with the leaders of the Congress,

and we would present a

jobs program."

that had previously

The same Congress

allotted a "paltry sum of money" would now sit down with
him and work on a jobs program.

This statement could

potentially identify Clinton as an expert whose presence
was crucial to success.

If that was the case, then Clinton

had affirmed the legitimacy of the system he had just
finished bashing.
When Bush responded to a question regarding how he
would use the office of the presidency to create jobs, he
explained:

"What I ’m going to do

this campaign is over,

all right,

is say to Jim Baker when
you do in domestic

affairs what you've done in foreign affairs."

Bush was

going to hire the appropriate technician to do the job
which the public perceived to be his responsibility.

This

type of action would remind the public of their perception
of wealthy people who hire others to do their work for
them.

Bush continued to cast himself as a wealthy elite

insider.
At the end of his answer regarding the hiring of
Baker, Bush once again made a reference to how well the
system would function with a new Congress in place.
stated:

Bush

" W e ’re going to have a new Congress, and we're

going to say to them, you've listened to the voters the way

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

136
we have.

Nobody wants gridlock anymore, and so let's get

the program through."
The focus of the debate turned next to foreign
affairs.

Bush seized the opportunity to list all of his

accomplishments.

He felt that his experience in this area

was what qualified him to be president.
question regarding what the U.S.

In responding to a

should do in the post cold

war world, Bush exclaimed:
Well, we are still the envy of the world in
terms of our military . . . I worked out a
deal with Boris Yeltsin to eliminate — get
rid of entirely — the most destabalizing
weapons of all, the SS-18 . . .so, we've got
a good military . . . But we're so — turned
inward we don't understand the global picture.
Bush's identification of his personal relationship with
Yeltsin and his discourse scolding the American public for
focusing too much upon domestic affairs indicated that he
was not just an expert, but Bush knew what was better for
the country then the people did.

Bush failed to identify

with any of the topoi.
Next, Ann Compton asked the candidates what they
thought America should do to address problems in Somalia
and Bosnia.

In particular,

she wanted to know if we should

engage in military action to preserve human rights.

Bush

spoke first

and stated that he would act based upon what

the experts

told him, not based upon

wanted.

Bush explained:

what the people

"I am not going to commit US

force until I know what the mission is, till the military
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tell me that it can be completed, and till I know how they
can come out."

Bush seemed consumed with experts, not the

fighting spirit of America as Reagan might have been.

The

role of citizen input in government affairs and the
citizen-soldier in combat seemed a distant reality to him.
Perot responded with a statement demonstrating that he
would never act outside the will of the people and
recognized h ow military action hits the working middle
class the hardest:
If we learned anything in Vietnam is you first
commit this nation before you commit the troops
to the battlefield.
We cannot send our people
all over the world to solve every problem that
comes up . . . our all-volunteer armed force
is not made up of the sons and daughters of
the beautiful people;
it's the working folks
who send their sons and daughters to war.
While not implicit, Perot did imply that the experts, or
insiders, had the ability to protect their children while
the hard w orking middle class did not.

Perot was promising

to protect those children because he would never send them
to a war which the people had not agreed to.

Once again,

Psrot indicated that the public would dictate what the
government would do.
At this point,

the panel of journalists asking

questions turned the focus of the debate to domestic
affairs.

Clinton seized this opportunity to shift

direction again and attempted to now identify with the
common citizen.
family values.

Clinton declared:

"I know a lot about

I was born to a widowed mother who gave me
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family values, and grandparents.
values of my people in Arkansas

I've seen the family
..."

Clinton did not

come from a family of means but worked his way to the top
just like every other hard working American.

He was one of

the people, not an elite insider born into means.

He

seemed to imply that political virtue was located in the
typical American.
Bush responded to the question by attempting to
emphasize the need for a good strong family unit and
criticized the high divorce rate in the country.
scolded the public:

"I'm appalled at the highest

outrageous numbers of divorces —
gotten too much."

Bush

it happens

. . . but it's

This statement cast Bush as seeing

himself as superior to a large majority of people in the
country who had experienced divorce.

His family intact and

a good healthy family unit appeared to be the golden
standard.

While his response did uphold virtue,

it implied

that the people were wanting and had to be lectured to by a
politician.
Next, Sandy Vanocur asked the candidates a question
regarding the legalization of drugs in the United States.
Perot used this opportunity to criticize the poor job that
the past "insiders," the political experts, had been doing
about the problem:
Now, let's look at priorities.
You know we
went on the Libyan raid . . . because we
were worried to death that Gaddafi might be
building up chemical weapons.
We've got
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chemical warfare conducted against our
children on the streets in this country all
day every day, and we don't have the will to
stamp it out.
Perot indicated that when the insiders could do something
that was simple and would make them look good and get re
elected,

they did.

However, when they needed to do

something really hard and tough,

they did not.

Perot cast

the experts as not being committed to upholding any type of
virtue for this country at all, but merely personal
success.
Perot also used the drug question to extend his theme
of putting people in charge again:
there,

if you send me

. . ."

"Now,

if I get up

Perot does not state that he

would "win" the election, or he would even be "elected."
He communicated that if he went to Washington it would be
because the people had spoken and had sent him.
Clinton responded to the legalization of drugs
question by extending his "I am one of the people" claim.
Clinton stated:

"I know more about this [drugs],

I think,

than anybody else up here because I have a brother w h o 1s a
recovering drug addict.
he'd be alive today."

If drugs were legal,

I don't think

Clinton indicated that he had

suffered with many of the same problems and many of the
same pains which the average person had.
The next question was from John Mashek and addressed
the problems of racial division in this country.

Perot

used his answer to criticize the old expert system and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140
promote his new system controlled by the people:
The first thing I'd do is, during political
campaigns, I would urge everybody to stop
trying to split this country into fragments
and appeal to the differences between us
. . . We are all in this together.
We ought
to love one another because united teams win
and divided teams lose . . . Our diversity is
our strength . . . W e have got to unite and
pull together.
Perot advocated that the government needed to be more
accountable to the people for their actions and should
strive for a more moral community.
When Clinton was asked to address the issue of racial
strife in the country, he responded:
segregated South,

"I grew up in the

thankfully raised by a grandfather with

almost no formal education but with a heart of gold who
taught me early that all people were created equal in the
eyes of God."

Clinton tried to show that he had strong

ties to grassroots America and that he came from a moral
environment and community.

With these words, he endorsed

the virtue of ordinary people.
Following the racial division question, Bush was asked
why he felt his administration was being criticized for not
doing enough about AIDS.

In his answer, Bush openly

criticized a sports hero and a gay rights group.

Regarding

Magic Johnson's decision to resign from the President's
AIDS Commission, Bush exclaimed:
disappointed in Magic

..."

"I was a little

Considering Magic Johnson's

enormous following of sports fans and the sympathy he had
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received since his public announcement regarding being HIV
positive,

criticizing Johnson cast Bush as divisive,

immoral and not committed to the public good.

Following

his comment about Magic Johnson, Bush further alienated
another segment of the

public by declaring that AIDS was a

result of immoral behavior and that ACT-UP, a gay rights
movement, was wrong to engage in some of the efforts they
did:
A nd the other thing is part of AIDS — it's
one of the few diseases where behavior matters.
And once I called somebody, "Well, change your
behavior.
Is the behavior you're using prone
to cause AIDS?
Change the behavior . . . You
can't talk about it rationally.
The extremes
are hurting the AIDS cause.
To go to a
Catholic mass in a beautiful cathedral in New
York under the cause of helping in AIDS and
start throwing condoms around in the mass,
I'm sorry, I think it sets back the cause.
If Bush was attempting to be virtuous, his attempt excites
partisan comparisons between segments of the community
rather than a vision of a moral community.
Perot responded to the AIDS question by indicating how
the system was flawed and not helping the people.

Perot

expressed compassion in his answer and identified with the
sentiments of many of the members of the electorate:
If you're going to die, you don't have to go
through this ten-year cycle that FDA goes
through on new drugs.
Believe me, people with
AIDS are more than willing to take that risk.
We could be moving out to the human population
a whole lot faster then we are on some to
these new d r u g s .
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Thus, Perot envisioned a society in which citizens would be
empowered to take direct action.
In his response to the question about AIDS research,
Clinton appeared to abandon his previous grassroots
solution in favor of a top down general staff solution, one
run by experts who placed citizens in the position of
clients or participants.

Clinton outlined several plans

which he felt should be implemented, but all of them would
be executed under federal a u s p i c e s :
We need to put one person in charge of the
battle against AIDS to cut across all the
agencies that deal with it.
We need to
accelerate the drug approval process.
We
need to fully fund the act named for that
wonderful boy Ryan White to make sure we're
doing everything we can on research and
treatment.
The model was clearly Sgt. Shriver and the War on Poverty,
the results of which Clinton had earlier criticized.
The next question came from Ann Compton who asked Ross
Perot how he intended to execute the many controversial
changes he had proposed during his campaign.

Perot

reversed the conventional wisdom of consultants who speak
in terms of constituency and interest.

Perot spoke of a

public or people who existed as a coherent force.

Thus he

invoked a concept dear to the hearts of believers in the
tradition of civic discourse:

If I get there it will be because the people,
not the special interests, put me there . . .
w e ’re going to inform the people in detail on
the issues through an electronic town hall so
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that they really k n o w w h a t 1s going on . . .
the lobbyists, the PAC guys, the foreign
lobbyists, and what have you, they'll be over
at there in the Smithsonian . . . because we
are going to get rid of them.
And then the
Congress will listen to the people.
Thus, Perot described a binary tension of good and evil
terms.

On one side were the interests and on the other,

"the people."
W. J. Bryan's

His rhetorical formation was reminiscent of
"masses vs.

classes" dichotomies.

Later in

his answer on the same question, Perot attacked the
government's lack of accountability to "the people:"

"This

is a town where the White House says, Congress did it;
Congress s a y s , the White House did it . . . Then when they
get off by themselves,

they say nobody did it."

Perot's

formula for attaining a legitimate political system will
follow from his restoration of a public sphere.

The

authentic voice of the people will run the government and
the government will be accountable to the people for what
they do.
In responding to Perot's answer, Bush did not pursue
systematic attacks.
Democratic party.

He used his time to attack the
Bush stated:

"Every 4 years, the

Democrats go around and say, Republicans are going to cut
Social Security and Medicare.

They started it again . . .

whether it's Mondale, Dukakis, whoever else it is."

In

other words,

legitimacy is threatened by diverse

strategies.

Bush did not rise to the opportunity to affirm
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the transcendent theme of the public good and the virtue of
a reinstated citizenry.
When the candidates were asked to provide their
closing statements, Perot spoke first and concluded the
debate by reinforcing his platform of servanthood to the
people and the need to clean out the failed experts:
I love this country.
I love the principle
it's founded on.
I love the people here
. . . We just have a bad system . . . I'm
doing this for your children . . . I owe you
this, and I'm doing it for you . . . I'll
give you everything I have, if you want me
to do it.
Perot endorsed patriotism and piety as public virtue.
Although he had spent a great deal of time in the
first debate identifying himself as one w i t h the people,
Clinton's closing statement concerned his actual political
practice, strategies,

and tactics.

These resembled those

of a policy wonk who would "fix things" rather than one who
would energize and inspire the people:
I'd like to thank the computer executives
and the electronics executives, 2/3 of whom
are Republicans, who said they wanted to sign
on to a change in America.
I'd like to thank
the hundreds of executives who came to Chicago,
1/3 of them republicans, who said they wanted
a change.
While rising out of the people, Clinton argued that he had
the support of many of the leaders of industry,
and high technology.

His message was mixed.

commerce,

His discourse

in the first debate indicated that he was both well
connected with the experts, yet his heart belonged to the
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people.

His call for the restoration of legitimacy (re-

invention of government) sounded a note of virtue, but
lacked a strong element of civic participation,

and too

often it addressed constituent needs as opposed to a
transcendent public good.
Bush was the final candidate to speak and in his
closing comments he returned to his accomplishments in
foreign affairs as having given him the experience needed
over the other candidates to be president.

Bush made

several references to his past four years as President with
an air of an insider, an uncommon man whose vision was
international.

It did not include the local and immediate

human concerns of the citizenry:
Let me tell you a little what it's like to
be president . . . you need a philosophical
underpinning.
Mine for foreign affairs is
democracy and freedom, and look at the
dramatic changes around the world.
The Cold
War is over.
The Soviet Union is no more
and we're working with a democratic country.
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Baltics
are free.
Take a look at the Middle East.
We had to stand up to a tyrant.
Bush appeared to set his claim upon foreign policy, an
issue in which the citizenry had least input and control.
Casting himself as an historic personality, Bush also took
a great deal of credit for success abroad with little
acknowledgement of the role of the people.

With so much

attention in the debates focused on how the political
system of experts had failed the people, Bush's arguments
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seemed a paradigm case of one who was out of touch with the
system.
Debate Two
The second televised debate began with a question from
an audience member directed specifically to Ross Perot.
The audience member asked:

"What will you do as president

to open foreign markets to fair competition from American
business?"

Perot indicted the expert political system and

reminded the people that they would control the system in
his political order:
That's right at the top of my agenda.
We've
shipped millions of jobs overseas and we have
a strange situation because we have a process
in W a shington where after you've served for
awhile, y ou cash in, become a foreign lobbyist,
make $30,000 a month, then take a leave, work
on presidential campaigns, make sure you've
got good contacts and then go back out . . .
If the people send me to Washington the first
thing I'll do is study that 2000-page agreement
[NAFTA] and make sure its a two-way street.
Perot appealed to the topos of authority by attacking the
experts system which was corrupt.

A by-product of his

indictment was to implicate his opponents as being a part
of that system.

Additionally, Perot included the topos of

citizenship in his answer when he reminded the people that
they would have to decide to send him to Washington.

The

public would have to take charge and decide which political
system they wanted.
President Bush responded to the audience member's
question about foreign markets and American jobs by using
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the jargon of the political insiders.

He stated:

I have just negotiated with the president of
Mexico the North American Free Trade Agreement
— and the Prime Minister of Canada . . . I
believe in free trade . . . so I will keep on
as president trying to get a successful
conclusion to the GATT Round, the big Uruguay
Round of trade . . . I want to get one with
Eastern Europe, Chile . . .
Only experts would be familiar with these terms and
understand the full impact whi c h these issues had upon a
global market.

Also, only a true insider could claim to

have ties with other world leaders.

As a result of his

answer, Bush began the second debate by reminding the
audience that he was a political expert, an insider, and
the role of the citizen was deferred to the experts in his
political order.
The next question was directed at Governor Clinton and
an audience member asked:
In the real world, that is, outside of
Washington DC, compensation and achievement
are based on goals defined and achieved.
My
question is about the deficit.
Would you
define in specific dollar goals how much you
would reduce the deficit in each of the 4
years of a Clinton administration and then
enter into a legally binding contract with
the American people, that if you did not
achieve those goals that you would not seek
a second term? Answer yes or no and then
comment on your answer.
Governor Clinton's first response to the question was "no,"
he would not make such an agreement and then he proceeded
to explain why.

In his answer,

Clinton returned to the

tactic he employed in the first debate of name dropping
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experts who supported his plans and his candidacy.
reminded the people:

"Nine Nobel prize winners and over

500 economists and hundreds of business people,
lot of Republicans said, this
got to go."

Clinton

including a

[his plan] is the way you've

Clinton demonstrated that he was well

connected and supported by experts.
In addressing the reduction of the deficit, Perot
asserted that he would assume direct responsibility
(accountability).

He further noted that he had been

"drafted" by the people because others had failed:
just a businessman

"I'm

. . . The American people asked me to

get into it [the race]

. . . Now it's not the republicans'

fault, and it's not the democrats', and what I'm looking
for is who did it?

. . . Somebody somewhere has to take

responsibility for this."
Bush responded to the deficit question with a
technical-legal solution, the passage of a balanced budget
amendment:
Give us a balanced budget amendment.
He
[Clinton] always talks about Arkansas having
a balanced budget, but he has a balanced
budget amendment.
I'd like to have what 43
governors have - the line item veto, so if
Congress can't cut, let the president have a
shot at it.
Bush attributed Clinton's success to legal compliance.

He

argued that passage of a similar law would produce a
similar result.

Legal coercion rather than voluntary and

creative action was the order of the day.

The answer
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appeared to indicate that Bush did not believe that the
government could not be accountable to the people unless
forced to by law.

The topos of moral authority was not

upheld.
Bush further muddied the government accountability
issue when during his answer to the budget deficit
question, he proposed an additional solution to balancing
the budget.

Bush indicated that he would like to offer the

American public the chance to pay off the debt by checking
a box on their income tax forms which would force Congress
to put a specified amount of money toward the debt.

This

proposal made Bush appear as if he was trying to pass his
responsibility off on the public perhaps already cynical
about the "off-budget" financing of Congress.

The audience

was left wondering in what w a y Bush saw himself and the
government accountable beyond legal necessity and technical
fixes.
The next question came from an audience member who
urged the candidates to stop attacking one another's
character and stick to issues.

The audience member asked:

The amount of time the candidates have spent
in this campaign trashing their o p p o n e n t s '
character and their program is depressingly
large.
Why can't your discussions and
proposals reflect the genuine complexity and
the difficulty of the issues to try to build
a consensus around the best aspect of all
proposals?
While Perot promised that he would not mud sling and stick
to the issues, he did incorporate an attack message which
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seemed to diminish the others while praising his candidacy
and bashing the present system.

Perot stated:

I couldn't agree with you more.
Let's get
off mud wrestling, let's get off personalities
and l e t ’s talk about jobs, health care, crime,
the things that concern the American people.
I'm spending my money, not PAC money, not
foreign money my money to take this message
to the people."
Bush had a difficult time handling the request from
the audience member asking each candidate to stop the
character assassinations and mud slinging and to just stick
to the issues of the campaign.

Rather than agree to the

request or acknowledge any wrong doing on his part, Bush
defended his actions.
the first place,
being president."

He began his answer by saying "In

I believe that character is a part of
This statement implied that if he could

prove that he was the only candidate with the appropriate
character required to be president,

then his negative

campaign attack messages would be justified.

Bush then

pointed his finger at Clinton as having started the
exchanges of negative attacks in the first place.
explained:

He

"I think the first negative campaign run in

this election was by governor Clinton, and I'm not going to
sit here and be a punching bag;
say, hey,

I'm going to stand up and

listen, here's my side of it."

Bush seemed

unable to manage the transcendent gesture.
Clinton u s e d his response to the request to stop the
negative campaigning to demonstrate how he had spent the
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past year offering town hall meetings and thus engaged in
offering issues rather than images to the people.

He might

be well connected with leading experts, but he was still
one of the people.
format tonight.

Clinton explained:

"I suggested this

I started doing these formats a year ago

in New Hampshire and I found that we had huge crowds
because all I did was let the people ask questions and I
tried to give very specific answers."

Thus, Clinton

endorsed the topos of citizenship, placing the citizens at
the heart of the political process.

He had sought their

ideas and shared in their deliberations.
Unsatisfied with the candidate's answers, a second
audience member stood and pressed the candidates to make an
even stronger commitment of just sticking to the issues.
The audience member exclaimed:

"Could we cross our hearts?

It sounds silly here but could we make a commitment?

You

know, we're not under any oath at this point but could you
make a commitment to the citizens of the US to meet our
needs, and not yours.

Its a real need that I think we all

h a v e ."
President Bush was the first to respond to the pledge
request and stated:
it."

"I think it depends how you define

Bush appeared to quibble over definitions before a

weary electorate.
topos of virtue.

In so doing, he completely violated the
His needs and his agenda were more

important than what was good for the people.
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When Perot was pressed to take the pledge he quickly
affirmed a portrait of the public as a long suffering body,
tired of bickering and demanding serious action:
hedges, no ifs, ands or b u t s .

"Just no

I'll take the pledge because

I know the American people want to talk about issues and
not tabloid journalism.
stay on the issues."

So I'll take the pledge and will

Perot was the only candidate to step

forward and make such a pledge.
Perot did, however,

follow up his statement by noting

that he could remain more virtuous than his r i v a l s :
Now just for the record, I don't have any
spin doctors.
I don't have any speech writers
. . . but you don't have to wonder if its me
talking . . . I don't have any foreign money
. . . no foreign lobbyists . . . no PAC money
. . . I've got 5.5 million hard-working people
who put me on the ballot and I belong to them."
And he was, after all,

only running for president because

the people had asked him to.
The next question from the audience regarded the
infrastructure of the nation.

The audience member asked:

"What are your plans to improve the physical infrastructure
of this nation, which includes the water systems,
systems, our transportation systems, etc?"

the sewer

The question

indicated that the citizen believed there to be a problem.
President Bush preferred to accept the implicit indictment
of the question:

"We passed the most furthest looking

transportation bill in the history of this country - $150
billion for improving the infrastructure."

The failure of
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other infrastructure bills were blamed on a bad Congress.
Bush declared:
We go to Washington and its very difficult
to get it [bills] through Congress.
But
t h e r e ’s going to be a new Congress.
No one
likes gridlock.
There's going to be a new
Congress because the old one [was full of
scandals].
You're going to have a lot of
new members of C o n g r e s s . And then you can
say, help me pass these programs.
Bush invalidated the citizen's concerns by implying that
the indictment was exaggerated.
fault;

Inadequacies were not his

the blame rested with Congress.

Bush came closer

to attacking the legitimacy of the system, but minimized
his own accountability in the process.
Clinton used his response to the infrastructure
question to attack the "experts" who had corrupted the
political system.

Clinton referred to an infrastructure

bill being presented to Congress at that time which
addressed an issue referred to as enterprise zones.
Clinton declared:

"That bill pays for these urban

enterprise zones by asking the wealthiest American to pay a
little more.

And that's why he wants to veto it, just like

he vetoed an earlier bill this year."

The relationship of

this response to legitimation is complex.

On the one hand

it attacked prevailing practices as ignoring the public
good;

on the other hand it played the old class card,

acknowledging that Americans are deeply divided by income,
residence,

and interest.

No transcendent or consensual

note is sounded.
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The candidates w e r e next asked to state their position
on gun control.

The audience member queried:

As you are aware, crime is rampant in our
cities.
And in the Richmond area — and I'm
sure it's happened elsewhere —
12-year-olds
are carrying guns to school.
And I'm sure
when our Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution
they did not mean for the right to bear arms
to apply to 12-year-olds.
So I'm asking:
Where do you stand on gun control, and what
do you plan to do about it?
Clinton used his response to endorse civil order and
condemn partisanship.

Clinton explained:

"There is a

crime bill which would put more police on the street, which
was killed this session by a filibuster in the Senate,
mostly by Republican Senators,
didn t pass.

and I think i t 's a shame it

With his answer, Clinton appeared to be

advocating a basic coalition of community:

civil order and

safety while placing republicans on the side of special
interests.

He could not, however, resist an attack which

may have sounded too fluent and professional to the
disaffiliated millions outside of either party and to the
Perot loyalists who were beginning a new world.
In his response to the question of gun control, Perot
referred to his platform for letting the people decide.
According to Perot:

"This is going to take, first,

building a consensus at grassroots America.

Right from the

bottom up, the American people have got to say they want it
. . . take it to the people."

For Perot,

the citizens

would have to decide first, then he [the government] would
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be accountable to execute the will of the people.

Citizen

wisdom and virtue would set the agenda, force the issue,
and sit in judgement on their execution.
Next,

an audience member stood and asked:

state your position on term limits, and,

"Please

if you are in

favor of them, how will you get them enacted?"

Bush

responded first and provided a very interesting response.
He began by stating that he strongly supported term limits
for members of Congress.

Bush then explained his answer.

Placing term limits on Congress was a way of getting the
Democrats out of the House of Representatives and filling
it with Republicans.

If that would happen then Bush could

accomplish all sorts of plans.

Bush stated:

"For 38 years

one party has controlled the House of Representatives, and
the result,

a sorry little post office that can't do

anything right and a bank that has more overdrafts than all
the Chase Bank and Citibank put together."

While Bush

appeared to be in support of the will of the people, he had
framed his answer in terms of partisan advantage.
Clinton's response to the question of term limits
provided one of the best examples of his platform of an
essentially "fix-it-up" attitude toward the system.
Clinton explained that small changes might be effective:
I'm against them [term limits] . . . N ow let
me tell you what I favor instead.
I favor
strict controls on how much you can spend
running for Congress, strict limits on
political action committees, requirements that
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people running for Congress appear in open
public debates like we're doing now.
Clinton's remedy did not match his earlier critique of
government, but it was uttered in a style that sounded bold
and reminded this writer that legitimacy is a feeling, not
wholly rational or consistently definable.
remedy,

Under Clinton's

career politicians could stay in office as long as

they wanted or could get elected, but the people could rest
comfortably knowing that all of the elections would be fair
and honest because the candidates would always debate the
issues publicly.

Legitimacy appeared to be an uneven

affair for Clinton.

On one issue it was irretrievable,

on

another easily recoverable.
In his response to the issue of term limits, Perot was
very clear and straightforward in his answer stating that
he would set an example of how a true servant of the people
should act.

Perot declared:

me up to do this job,

"If the American people send

I intend to be there one term.

I do

not intend to spend one minute thinking about re-election
. . . I would take absolutely no compensation;
their servant."

I go as

He concluded his answer by pointing out

that the people in Washington were basically good people,
they were just "in a bad system.
any villains, but, boy,

I don't think there are

is the system rotten."

Perot took

a firm stand regarding h ow he viewed the government's
accountability to the people.

The government was to serve

the people, and he would go to Washington as the ultimate
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example of a true servant,
just one term.
people.

taking no pay and serving for

Perot consistently separated system from

People equaled good, virtue, wisdom, and

competence.

The system equaled evil, corruption,

short

sightedness, and foolishness.
The next question in the debate came from an audience
member who wanted to know:

"Do you attribute the rising

costs of health care to the medical profession itself, or
do you think the problem lies elsewhere?

And what specific

proposals do you have to tackle this problem?"
In Perot's response, he cleverly noted that the
question itself was symptomatic of citizen alienation:
You own this country but you have no voice in
it the way it's organized now.
You have a
government that comes at you.
You're supposed
to have a government that comes from you .
Now, you've got to have a government that
comes from you.
You've got to reassert your
ownership in this country and you've got to
completely reform our government.
Perot used his answer to remind the audience that the
present system did not conform to a Jeffersonian ideal
type, and he proposed they reclaim it.
At this point in the debate an audience member stood
and asked each of the candidates:

"How has the national

debt personally affected each of your lives?

And if it

hasn t, how can you honestly find a cure for the economic
problems of the common people if you have no experience in
what's ailing them?"

Perot responded that the size of the

national debt had acted as a call,

it had caused him to
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leave his private life and get involved in the campaign.
Evoking the old Roman ideal of Cincinnatus, who had left
the plough to save his country and then returned to his
farm, Perot had left his affairs to save his country from
danger too.

Perot appeared selfless,

truly committed to

the pubic good.
Bush had difficulty framing the question and his
answer was nearly incoherent.

The questioner and Bush

engaged in a tense exchange:
Bush:

Well, I think the national debt affects
everybody.
Audience Participant:
You personally.
Bush:
Obviously it has a lot to do with interest
rates . . .
Simpson (Moderator):
She's saying, You personally.
Participant:
You, on a personal basis - how has it
affected you?
Simpson:
Has it affected you personally?
Bush:
I'm sure it has.
I love m y grandchildren...
Participant:
How?
Bush:
I want to think that they're going to be able
to afford an education.
I think that's an
important part of being a parent.
If the
question — maybe I — get it wrong.
Are
you suggesting that if somebody has means
that the national debt doesn't affect them?
Participant:
What I'm saying is . . .
Bush: I'm not sure I get - help
me with the question
and I'll try to answer it.
Participant:
Well, I've had friends that have been
laid off from jobs.
Bush:
Yeah.
Participant:
I know people who cannot afford to pay
the mortgage on their homes, their car
payment.
I have personal problems with the
national debt.
But how has it affected you
and if you have no experience in it,
how can you help us, if you don't know what
we're feeling?
Bush:
Well, listen, you ought to be in the White
House for a day and hear what I hear and see
what I see and read the mail I read . . .
But I don't think it's fair to say, you
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haven't had cancer.
Therefore you don't
know w h a t ’s it like.
I don't think it's
fair to say that if you haven't been hit by
it personally . . .
Bush responded as if he were under personal attack.

In his

clumsiness, he lost an opportunity to identify his own fate
with that of ordinary citizens and to make their struggle
one with his struggle.
Clinton used his response to the question to attack
the incompetence of past a dministrations:
I'll tell you how it's affected me.
Every
year Congress and the president sign
laws
that make us do more things and gives us less
money to do it with.
I see people in my
state, their taxes have gone up in Washington
and their services have gone down while the
w ealthy have gotten tax c u t s .
Clinton's response depicted an institution fundamentally
illegitimate in the sense that it was no longer doing the
job it had been licensed to do.

With more money,

it

provided fewer services to the average person while making
more laws to protect their own economic interests.
The candidates were next questioned about the future
of

social security and pension funds.

stated:

The audience member

"I would like from each of you a specific

response

as to what you intend to do for retirees relative to these
issues

[social security and pension funds], not

generalities but specifics because I think they're very
disturbing issues."

President Bush used the question to

affirm the solvency of present arrangements.
response, Bush made such statements as:

In his

"The Social
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Security system was fixed about 5 years ago, and I think
it's projected out to be sound beyond that
faith and credit of the United States,
difficulties,

is still pretty good."

. . . .

The full

in spite of our
Bush indicated that

the experts had already fixed the problem and everything
was under control.

Citizen input was not sought.

The candidates were next asked by an audience member:
"We've come to a position where we're in the new world
order, and I'd like to know what the candidates feel our
position is in this new world order, and what our
responsibilities are as a superpower?"

President Bush

seized the opportunity to remind the audience that he had
been conspicuously active in creating the new order.

Bush

informed the audience that "Since I became president, 43,
44 countries have gone democratic, no longer totalitarian .
. . NATO has kept the peace for many."

While his

experience in foreign policy was much stronger than the
other two candidates, Bush's answer celebrated past
achievement rather than envisioning the future role of the
US in the new order.

Nor did his remarks indicate a place

for youthful adventure or endeavor as Kennedy had
articulated in 1960 or Reagan's vision of a beacon of hope
in the 1 9 8 0 's.
Yet an audience member stood and asked "How can we
create high paying jobs with the education system we have
and what would you do to change it?"

In his response,
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Perot emphasized the need to do the best for the children
and that meant that education reform should not be a
Federal job, but a matter for committees, even
neighborhoods to decide.

Perot declared:

it [reform] should be local —

"By and large,

the more local the better

. . You need small schools, not big schools."

.

Perot

celebrated the tradition of parent participation and local
school governance.

By allowing schools to be governed

locally, Perot demonstrated one of the ways in which he
intended to return the prerogatives of government back to
the people.
Each of the candidates was then asked:

"When do you

estimate your party will both nominate and elect an AfroAmerican and female ticket to the presidency of the US?"
President Bush appeared uncomfortable and his non-verbal
cues suggested he regarded the question as an unjust
accusation.

After struggling awkwardly to provide names of

minorities or women whom he felt could be on a presidential
ticket in 1996, Bush observed:
year of the woman in the Senate.

"This is supposed to be the
Let's see how they do."

While Bush may not have intended this statement to be
flippant, viewers of the debate might easily have
interpreted it that way.
Perot's closing statement for the second debate was
less coherent than his closing remarks in the first debate.
In the second debate he used his closing statement to
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address several loose ends regarding policies and plans
which he apparently had not been able to complete during
the debate.

His characteristic Jeffersonian appeal

celebrated the amateur ideal of the citizen-statesman:

"If

the American people want to do it and not talk about it,
then they ought to —
to consider

...

create this mess.

you know, I'm the person they ought

I am action oriented

. . .

I didn't

I ’ve been paying taxes just like you."

Perot attempted to identify himself as a regular citizen
who wanted to give the government back to the people.

His

energetic demeanor recalled "Mr. Smith Goes to Washington,"
a no-nonsense tribute of the people confident he could
overhaul the system.
In his closing statement, Governor Clinton began by
taking credit for suggesting the format for the evening,
hoping the people now felt more in touch with the
candidates and reminding them that they already had a
little more say in their government.

This allowed Clinton

to demonstrate respect for the people by facilitating their
role as questioner and judge.

Clinton spent the reminder

of his closing statement detailing his experience as
Governor of Arkansas.

Clinton highlighted such

accomplishments as better schools, ranking first in the
country in job growth, fourth in the country in income
growth, and having balanced twelve consecutive budgets.
Clinton was banking on his political experience in Arkansas
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to convince the public that he had the experience needed to
be president because he knew how to work within political
systems.

Clinton also added that "we've had 24 retired

generals and admirals,
them republican,

hundreds of business people, many of

support my campaign."

His experience in

politics had left him well connected with the experts
across a broad range of domains and b a c k g r o u n d s .
marshall the experts on our behalf.

He could

Clinton appeared to

present himself as both favoring and opposing the expert,
while addressing the ordinary citizen alternately as
partner and client.
Debate Three
The third debate began with moderator Jim Lehrer
asking Governor Clinton about his budget deficit plans.
Lehrer's question seemed phrased in a way that would force
the governor to deal in specific terms:
You are promising to create jobs, reduce the
deficit, reform the health care system,
rebuild the infrastructure, guarantee college
education for everyone who is qualified, among
many other things, all with financial pain
only for the very rich.
Some people are having
trouble apparently believing that is possible.
Should they have that concern?
Clinton began his response by criticizing the present tax
structure as unequal and unjust:
Middle-class Americans are basically the only
group of Americans who've been taxed more in
the 1980's and during the last twelve years,
even though their incomes have gone down.
The wealthiest Americans have been taxed much
less, even though their incomes have gone up
. . . My plan is a departure from trickle-
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down economics . . . it's also a departure
from tax-and-spend . . . my plan proposes
that we invest and grow.
Clinton argued that the present system had been run by and
for the wealthy, while it hurt the average middle-class
taxpayer.

He also attempted to define himself as a new

type of Democrat,

not associated with past Democratic

presidencies which had supported a tax-and-spend mentality,
a philosophy w h i c h Bush had tried to associate Clinton with
all through the campaign.
Bush was provided one minute to respond to Clinton's
opening comments and used the time to engage in negative
attacks against Clinton.

Bush attempted to associate

Clinton with past Democratic presidencies:

"Remember what

it was like under Jimmy Carter and inflation was 15
percent?"

Bush then criticized Clinton's record in

Arkansas.

His direct assault on the governor's record

appeared gratuitous in the generally positive debate:

"I

think its time I start putting things in perspective.

It's

not dirty campaigning because h e 's been talking about my
record for a half a year, so we've got to do it.

I gotta

get in a perspective."
Finally, Ross Perot was provided an opportunity for
his opening statement,

and responded to what Clinton and

Bush had said in their opening comments.

Perot simply

noted that he did not think that the other c a n d i d a t e s '
plans would balance the budget and then used the rest of
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his time to

remind the audience that his own plan would

develop as a result of public deliberation.

Referring to

his several infomercials he had sponsored, Perot stated:
The one thing I have done is lay it squarely
on the table in front of the American people.
You've had a number of occasions to see in
detail what the plan is, and at least you'll
understand it.
I think that's fundamental
in our country, that you know what y o u ’re
getting into.
Perot continued to identify the present government with
exclusivity and arrogance,

characteristics inimical to

institutional legitimacy.
The next question in the debate came from moderator
Jim Lehrer who asked President Bush to respond to criticism
regarding Bush's character.

Lehrer explained:

"You have

been criticized to have begun focussing on the economy, or
health care, or racial division in this country, only after
they became crises.

Is that a fair criticism?"

Bush

responded that it was not fair and explained why it was
not.

After Bush responded,

Lehrer turned to Ross Perot and

said "Do you think that's true Mr. Perot?"

Perot

immediately responded "I'd like to just talk about the
issues."

Mr. Leher rephrased the question,

still goading

Perot to seize the opportunity to attack Bush.
responded a second time,

Perot

"I will let the American people

decide that.

I would rather not critique the two

candidates."

Citing his pledge in the second debate not to
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attack the other candidates, Perot appeared serious and
statesmanlike.
Perot was next challenged with a question regarding
his dedication and commitment.

Having walked away from

General Motors when he could not get his way, and having
withdrawn from the presidential race in mid-July,
re-enter in late September,

only to

Perot was asked to explain if

those actions indicated how he would act as a President.
After providing a long list of services he had rendered to
the United States as examples of his commitment to the
Nation, Perot managed to use his withdrawal and return to
the presidential campaign as a way to further his argument
as a response to the call of the people:
I never quit supporting you as you put me on
the ballot in the other 26 states;
and when
you asked me to come back in, I came back in.
And talk about not quitting, I'm spending my
money on this campaign;
the two parties are
spending your money, taxpayer money.
I put
my wallet on the table for you and your
children.
The next question in the debate regarded the auto
industry and CAFE standards.
"Just for the record,

Jim Lehrer asked Ross Perot

I take it you do not have a position

on whether or not enforcing CAFE standards will cost jobs
in the auto industry?"
it would cost jobs.

Perot quickly responded that yes,

President Bush spoke after Perot and

led the debate topic from CAFE standards to NAFTA.

When

Bush completed his statements, Lehrer turned to Governor
Clinton and sought his response to the topic.

Clinton
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indicated that he thought NAFTA was a good idea but he
could make it better.

Bush re-entered the conversation at

this point and tried to use Clinton's answer to suggest
Clinton lacked vital experience to negotiate the agreement.
Bush's past experience as president
to know what the system required.
"See, he made my case.

(expert),

qualified him

As Bush described it:

On the one hand its a good deal but

on the other hand I'd make it better.

You can't do that as

president, you have to take clear positions on one side or
the other."

President Bush attempted to reaffirm public

identification with one of his on-going administrative
goals.
Responding to an attack on his character, Clinton
attempted to justify his apparent fluidity on positions as
a deep respect for the American people and a concern for
the complexity of difficult regulations:
That's what's wrong with Mr. Bush.
His whole
deal is you've gotta be for it or against it,
you can't make it better.
I believe we can
be better.
I think the American people are
sick and tired of either/or solutions, people
being pushed in the corner, polarized to
e x t r e m e s . I think they want somebody with
common sense who can do what's best for the
American people . . . this election ought to
be about the American people.
Clinton framed his reputed uncertainty as willingness to
seek out and ascertain the will of the people.

Clinton

defined the public as unsure of the future of NAF T A and
indicated that their uncertainty required respect.
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Following the exchange between Governor Clinton and
President Bush, Perot was given an opportunity to respond
to the volley of arguments.

Perot spent a majority of his

response arguing that the other c a n d i d a t e s 1 pro-NAFTA
positions were motivated by hidden agendas created by
influence from foreign lobbyists:
Our country has sold out to foreign lobbyists.
We don't have free trade.
Both parties have
foreign lobbyists on leaves in key roles in
their c a m p a i g n s . And if there is anything
more unwise than that, I don't know what it
is.
I would like for them to look you in the
eye and tell you why they have people
representing foreign countries working on
their campaigns . . . One country spent $400
million lobbying in 1988, our country.
And
it goes on and on.
And you look at a who's
who in these campaigns around the two
candidates.
They're foreign lobbyists.
Perot implied that the other candidates did not have the
interest of the American people as their first priority,
but were influenced by secret insider deals.

This implicit

attack seemed an ironic counterpoint to Perot's pledge to
forgo explicit attacks of his competitors.
Moderator Lehrer then turned to Bush and asked:
President, how do y ou respond to that?
that charge several times.

"Mr.

Mr. Perot's made

The fact that you have people

working in your campaign who are paid foreign lobbyists."
Bush responded:

"Most people that are lobbying are

lobbying Congress.

A n d I don't think there's anything

wrong with an honest person who happens to represent an
interest of another country for making his case.

T h a t ’s
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the American way."

Bush openly defended lobbyists, a group

who had been presented as a symbol of corrupt government.
Bush defended lobbyists as a part of the system, which
despite the attacks had long been a part of the "American
way."

If Perot had raised any suspicion regarding

lobbyists in the minds of the audience with his constant
attacks against them, Bush may have fed those suspicions
with his comments and alienated many voters.

Bush's

position could easily be interpreted as a violation of the
topos of accountability and fairness in striking contrast
to Perot's rejection of floating careerists as the
antithesis of accountability.
Assuming a reformer's stance on the issue of
lobbyists, Governor Clinton took a position representing
the apparent middle ground:
I think we need more restrictions on
lobbyists.
We ought to make them disclose
the people they've given money to when
they're testifying before congressional
committees;
we ought to close the lawyers'
loopholes;
they ought to have to disclose
when they're really lobbying.
By requiring lobbyists to be more accountable,

Clinton

appeared to attempt to make professional and citizen
politics seem compatible.

The current system would remain

the same with lobbyists influencing decisions,

but the

public need not be afraid because lobbyists would practice
full disclosure.

His position smacked more of the

information society than Jeffersonian America.
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At the midpoint of the third debate,

the format

switched from a moderator asking questions to a set of
questions proposed by a panel of journalists.

While the

moderator was trying to move to the second format, Perot
quickly interrupted to respond to a final statement Bush
had just made regarding domestic affairs.
interjected:

Perot

"I was put on the ballot by the people, not

special interests,

so I have to stand up for myself . . . "

Perot claimed that even though he should not interrupt, the
people's interests transcended polite format and expedient
a gre ements.
The second half of the debate began with UPI writer
Helen Thomas who asked the candidates to comment on
Governor Clinton's military record and his behavior during
the Vietnam War.
their views,

After Bush and Clinton had expressed

Perot was given one minute to respond.

simply stated:

"I look on this as history.

He

I don't look

on it personally as relevant, and I consider it really a
waste of time tonight, when you consider the issues that
face our country right now."
presidential,

Perot cast himself as

future oriented and focussed on issues rather

than personalities.

Apparently his mission was to listen

to and obey the will of the people.
The next question in the debate regarded President
Bush's reversal on the tax increases of 1991.

Perot used

his answer to launch a systematic indictment:
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Leadership is to be accountable for what you
do - . . Nobody ever told the American people
that we increased spending $1.83 for every
dollar of taxes raised.
That's absolutely
unconscionable.
Both parties carry a huge
blame for that on their shoulders.
This is
not a way to pay down the deficit.
This was
a trick on the American people . . . Nobody
takes responsibility for anything.
We've
gotta change that.
Perot vilified the government as mendacious and even
d a n gerous.

His words amount to a promise to restore

legitimacy.
Perot was then confronted by CNN Correspondent Susan
Rook who asked him how he would lead if he was forever
seeking consensus before he acted.

In fact she came close

to questioning the existence of a coherent and careful
public opinion.

Perot responded that his presidency wou l d

clean out the old corrupt system and all of the negative
influences which presently prohibited the government from
getting anything done.

The government would then be placed

back into the hands of the people and that would stimulate
action.

Perot explained:

How do y ou get anything done when you've got
all of these political action committees, all
of these thousands of registered lobbyists —
40,000 registered lobbyists, 23,000 special
interest groups . . . and the average citizen
out here is just working hard every day.
You've got to go to the people . . . The
public goes bonkers over town hall meetings
. . . they'll decide what to think . . .
because they w a n t the details . . . that's
going back to where we started.
That's having
a government from the people.
Throughout the debate, P e r o t ’s rhetorical construction of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

172
"the people" was that of a long suffering citizenry,
unified in their disgust,

and ready to mobilize around

common sense objectives.
Bush appeared annoyed by the next question asked of
him regarding why there were so few women in key positions
in his administration and his campaign.

Rather than

provide a list of names of women who were very influential
in his administration, Bush appeared to become defensive
and stated:
Susan,

"This is a little defensive on your part,

to be honest with you.

We've got a very good record

appointing women to high positions of trust."

Bush

appeared to feel threatened, as if he were demeaned by
having to undergo examination in a public forum.
When asked about w o m e n and minorities in his campaign,
Clinton politely and courteously provided the names of
women in key positions in his administration and various
awards he had received from women's groups for his
sensitivity and involvement of wo m e n in high levels of
government.

By listing the names of women involved in his

campaign and awards he had won, Clinton appeared to
demonstrate his deep compassion for, and sensitivity
towards the needs of the people.
Perot used part of his response time to the "women in
your campaign" question to make various claims regarding
how the Bush administration had handled Saddam Hussein.
Perot accused the Bush administration of creating Hussein
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and covering up their actions by refusing to release papers
w h i c h contained orders sent to Ambassador Glaspie on the
eve of the Persian Gulf war.

Bush interrupted and said

Perot had attacked national honor and he had to reply.

The

exchange went as follows:
Bush:

We did not say to Saddam Hussein you can take
the northern part of Kuwait.
Perot:
Well, where are the papers?
Bush:
That is absolutely absurd.
Perot:
Where are the papers?
Bush:
Glaspie has testified, let's be factual.
Perot:
Talk to any head of any of those key
committees in the senate.
They will not let
them see the written instructions given to
Ambassador Glaspie.
A n d I suspect that
in a free society owned by the people,
the American people ought to know what we
told Ambassador Glaspie to tell Saddam
Hussein . . . I ' d like to see those written
instructions.
The verbal exchange was followed by very loud applause and
cheers from the audience indicating that the people did
indeed want to know what went on behind closed doors.
Perot appeared to dramatize the suspicion of "the people"
toward their leader.
During his next response time to a question, Perot
returned briefly to his clash with Bush and stated:
say whose country is this?

This is ours.

hurt if we lay the papers on the table?

"Now I

Who will get
I just object to

the fact that we cover up and hide things."

This statement

further indicated Perot's commitment to an informed and
participative electorate.
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Clinton capitalized on Perot's attacks regarding Bush
and Hussein by emphasizing the incumbent president's status
as an elite insider, an effective leader who nonetheless
made secret deals without informing the American public:
But in late 1989 the president signed a secret
policy saying we were going to continue to try
to improve relations with him [Hussein], and
we sent him some sort of communication on the
eve of his invasion of Kuwait that we still
wanted better relations . . . It was wrong
to coddle Saddam Hussein when there was no
reason to do it and when people at high levels
in our government knew he was trying to do
things that were outrageous.
Clinton's description separated Bush from the tradition of
the open society while tarnishing his image as a stainless
leader.
In defending his actions with Hussein, Bush responded:
Yes, we tried, and, yes, we failed to bring
him into the family of nations;
he had the
4th largest army.
But then when he moved
against Kuwait, I said this will not stand.
And i t 's hard to build a consensus. We went
to the UN . . . Congress was dragging its
feet . . . A president can't always vote
with the majority.
Sometimes he has to act.
Bush appeared to endorse the idea that a president must act
without the consensus or support of the people.

Indeed, a

president had enjoyed a crisis mandate, but the end of the
Cold War had weakened their mandate.

It must now be

"argued for" to an extent that would have seemed not
necessary a few years previous.

Thus his reply seemed more

defensive than magisterial.
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The next question asked Ross Perot what policies he
would change?

He seized this opportunity to preach the

Jeffersonian ideology in nearly undiluted form:
In a nutshell, we've got to reform our
government or we won't get anything done.
We have a government that doesn't work.
It's supposed to come from the people, it
comes at the people.
The people need to
take their government back.
You've got to
reform Congress, they've got to be the servants
of the people again . . . but very specifically
the key thing is to turn the government back to
the people and take it away from the special
interests and have people go to Washington to
serve . . . The American people have had enough.
If I get up there, we're going to clean that up.
You say, h ow can I get Congress to do that?
I'll have millions of people at my shoulder.
Perot argued a legitimate government would return power to
the people.
In his final response of the night prior to his
closing statement, Clinton engaged in the harshest attack
against Bush w h i c h he had made in all three d e b a t e s .
Clinton criticized Bush for ad hominem attacks noting that
Bush had made the Arkansas Governor's character and trust
the central focus of his campaign:
I really can't believe Mr. Bush is still
trying to make trust an issue after "read
my lips" . . . He still doesn't get it
. . . they d o n 't want us talking about each
other.
They want us to talk about the
problems of this country . . . Look at the
Republicans that have endorsed me.
High tech
executives in Northern California.
Look at
the 24 generals and admirals, retired, that
have endorsed me, including the deputy
commander of Desert Storm . . . w e ' v e got a
broad based coalition that goes beyond party
because I am going to change this country and
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make it better, w i t h the help of the American
people.
Clinton used his attack to construct a legitimacy so
powerful that it transcended party.
Ironically, Perot, who gave the first opening
statement in

the first debate, provided the final

statement of

the final debate.

closing

In his closing remarks,

Perot exclaimed:
To the millions of fine decent people who
did the unthinkable and took their country
back in their own hands and put me on the
ballot, let me pledge to you that tonight is
just the beginning.
These next two weeks we
will be going full steam ahead to make sure
that you get a voice and that you get your
country back . . . Then the question is, can
we govern?
I love that one.
The "we" is you
and me.
You bet your hat we can govern . . .
you won't tolerate gridlock, you won't tolerate
endless meandering and wandering around, and
you won't tolerate non-performance . . . I ' m
doing this for you:
I want you to have the
American dream.
I'm doing this because I love
you.
Thank you very much.
Just as he had begun the debates, Perot ended them with
statements advocating a people run government.

Perot

argued that the people of the United States deserved a
legitimate government, one in which the citizens were the
primary actors, virtue and public good motivated every
decision, and the government was clearly accountable to the
people.

Ross Perot was going to give that type of

government to the people of the United States.
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DISCUSSION
Ross Perot
Throughout the debates, Ross Perot stood steadfastly
by his platform of restoring the control of the government
to the people.

In so doing he hoped to restore political

legitimacy to the American political system.

He planned to

rid Washington of special interest groups and lobbyists and
do only that which the public instructed him to do.
Perot's vision was to establish a political order in which
all elected officials were true public servants, executing
only the desires of the people.
was simplistic but coherent.

His concept of the people

When "the people" took the

government back into their own hands they would rid the
system of all of the corrupt influences, articulate a moral
and common sense political agenda,

and support a leader who

served that agenda or reject one who did not.

By

developing discourse which highlighted the topoi of
legitimacy, Perot argued that under his leadership the
political order would restore citizen participation,
restore the concept of a public good and nurture a moral
community,

and the government would be completely

accountable to the people for everything they did.
The televised debates provided Perot with an
opportunity to expose his political orientation to the many
members of the electorate who were largely unaware of his
position.

Zhu, Milausky,

& Biswas

(1994) noted:

"The
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audience learned the most about the least known candidate,
Perot

. . . and that helped him improve his image

considerably"

(p. 325).

The authors further reported that

the debates not only informed the viewers about Perot,
"it substantially changed the viewers' minds"
Perot's success at attracting viewers'

but

(p. 326).

attention may

have come from his unique approach to the election.

Hahn

(1994) explained that Perot's consistent theme throughout
the debates was "I'm not a politician, but I want to be
president —
president"

rather —
(p. 192).

you the people want me to be
This ideological approach might have

seemed primitive or ingenuous in previous elections, but
the perception of weakened legitimacy of American
institutions gave his approach saliency and bite.

His

outsider stance appealed to roughly one-fifth of the
electorate on election day.
Perhaps an additional reason for Perot's success was
stylistic.

Leon (1993) suggested that "Perot's language

[usage] was the strongest
illustration of character.

[of the three candidates]

in its

Perot's language revealed the

greatest indication of human interest and slightly more
powerful words"

(p. 99).

Regardless of whether it was what he said, or how he
said it, Ross Perot was the dominant candidate in the 1992
televised debates winning two of the three debates.

These

victories were significant, but could not overcome the
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handicap of his third party status.
win a single Electoral College vote.

Perot also failed to
While the public may

have liked what Perot said, they appeared hesitant to trust
his ideas enough to give him the opportunity to put them
into practice.
George Bush
Throughout the debates, Bush largely supported the
system, and tried to show that not only was the system
good, but that it worked.

For Bush, the system was

exhausted by the limits essential to a representative
democracy.

"The people" were untrained in governance and

should accept the decisions made for them by their
representatives.

Bush appeared to believe that if a

legitimacy crisis existed,

its origins were not embedded in

the deep structure of the system, but in technical failure
and aberrations.
Bush attempted to capitalize upon his twelve years of
experience in the White House.

He attempted to make

experience and character the central theme of the debates
and the campaign.

Bush reminded the audience that he had

the most experience in political office of the three
candidates and that his experience in foreign policy was
central to his superior qualifications.

Viewers did not

respond well to the image which Bush attempted to create as
indicated by the post debate polls.

Bush finished last, or

next to last in every debate.
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Bush made few
televised debates.

legitimacy appeals during

the 1992

If a legitimation crisis existed in

the

American political system, he seemed only marginally aware
of it.

The system was good and worked.

The system was run

by experts who know what was best for the public.

Bush was

proud that he was a member of the expert insider group and
used his past experience as an insider as the factor which
best qualified him to be president over the other
candidates.

Even if the system had flaws,

those flaws are

a small price for the people to have to pay in order to
partake of all of the benefits derived from the system.
Leon (1993) noted that Bush's language choice only
undermined his cause.

According to Leon,

was markedly weaker than his opponents

"Bush's language

[in the debate];

particular, B u s h used less person centered language —
indicator of human

interest;

greater uses of hesitations"

and his speech

in
an

reflected

(p. 99).B u s h apparently

used

less person-centered language as he expressed his political
ideology of government by experienced professional.
Whatever the specific reasons were for his demise,
Bush clearly lost both the debates.
percent of the viewers'

He garnered only 16

vote in the first two debates and

moved up to just 28 percent in the third debate.

In the

general election, Bush attracted only 38 percent of the
popular vote.

After a landslide victory over Dukakis in

the 1988 presidential election, Bush's 38 percent
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represented a tremendous decline in both party and general
support^.
Governor Clinton
Clinton expressed both support for, and opposition to
legitimacy topoi throughout all three debates.

Clinton's

discourse identified him as being on both sides of the
fence.

He would boast of his political experience and

argued that he knew how to work within the system, yet at
the same time argued that he was one of the people and had
suffered right along with them.

Whereas Perot wanted to

completely clean house, and Bush felt the system worked
fine just as it was, Clinton appeared to want to do both.
The system was good and could work, but it just needed to
be modified,

to be changed.

The ideology of "change" would

become a buzz word for his campaign and he used it
extensively throughout the debates.
Ironically, Clinton's attempt to both affirm and deny
institutional legitimacy was strategically sound.

He

seemed to argue that declining legitimacy in the American
government could be reversed,

and that he could restore

legitimacy to the political system by serving as a strong
advocate for the people when placed as the expert into the
middle of that system.

15A s noted in Chapter One of this dissertation, based
upon post-election polls, if Perot had not been in the
race, Clinton still would have won the election with 53
percent of the vote and Bush only managing 47 percent
(Prysby & Scavo 1993, p. 9).
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Clinton asked the American public to invest a great
deal of trust in him.

Clinton had to convince the people

that he was both an expert and an advocate of a peoplecentered legitimate political order.

Like Ronald Reagan he

was able to play the strings of rural nostalgia and modern
technology.

By making the necessary changes, Clinton

believed the two worlds could be united.
had to trust him,

The electorate

that he would not betray them by becoming

a complete insider and abandoning his mission of healing
and restoration.
Even in his language choice, Clinton tried to find a
middle ground.

Leon (1993) explained that "Clinton used

much more personal language than Bush, but not as much as
Perot.

While he was more certain than Bush in his style .

. . he was never as certain as Perot, nor as oriented
toward activity"

(p. 100).

The electorate appeared uncertain as to how to respond
to Clinton's political ideology.
candidates'

While all of the

scores in post-debate polls were very volatile,

Clinton's scores displayed the greatest range of change.
He went from 30 percent in debate one,

to 58 percent in

debate two, and crashed to 28 percent in debate three.
the general election,

In

Clinton won the election, but only

received 43 percent of the popular vote.

This number could

be considered quite low when compared to the 1988
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presidential election where Dukakis carried 46 percent of
the popular vote but lost the election to Bush.
While the questions about institutional legitimacy
crises m ay have soured the public on expert politicians
such as Bush,

they may not yet be ready for someone as

radical as Ross Perot.

As a result, while the public may

have been relatively vague about Clinton's position on
issues in the 1992 election, he eventually emerged as the
most acceptable, or tolerable, option for addressing the
legitimacy crisis in the American political order.
CONCLUSION
The televised debates provided an opportunity for the
three candidates to present their basic positions and to
address their perception of weakened legitimacy and
remedies for it.

Three distinct and very different

candidates emerged.

Ross Perot would promise to reform the

entire political system radically and place the government
back into the hands of the people, restore virtue,
insist on accountability.

and

George Bush provided a

technocratic piece meal approach claiming that the
political order was essentially sound.

Bill Clinton

offered radical vilification and rather traditional
solutions.

Whatever the impact of their orientation,

from

these three options, the electorate chose Clinton.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The 1992 televised presidential debates were a unique
combination of both media spectacle and ideological
soapbox.

All three presidential candidates used the

debates to gain exposure to the electorate as well as
convey their political platforms.

In recent years scholars

of political c o m munication have decried a crisis of
political legitimacy in Western, and particularly American
political institutions.

First coined by Jurgen Habermas,

the term "legitimacy crisis" has become almost a shibboleth
in recent years.

In brief, scholars such as Kathleen

Jamieson, Karlyn Campbell and Michael McGee have argued
that the "citizen" has been largely transformed into a
consumer of images a nd ideographs.

They argue further that

because the public no longer participates in the wor l d of
civic discourse it has withdrawn its psychic and moral
support from state a nd national politics.
scandals,

Numerous

evidence of resource mismanagement,

and blatant

deception by politicians have violated the long held
Jeffersonian ideal of service and further weakened the
social contract w h i c h has existed between the voter and the
candidates.

As a symptom of citizen withdrawal,

a

shrinking percentage of the electorate has been showing up
on election day to cast ballots.

The restoration of the

184
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citizen role and the broadening of civic dialogue has
become a theme in presidential politics:
call-in radio show appearances,

open forums,

town meetings, and other

citizen oriented formats during the past campaigns have
shown that candidates understand the symbolic staging of
legitimacy.

This dissertation has studied the theme of

legitimacy as it appeared in the 1996 presidential debates.
R E V I E W OF STUDY
The televised debates proved to be an ideal forum for
a rhetorical study.

In televised debates, the candidates

have the opportunity to address an extremely large portion
of the electorate at a point in the campaign when they are
able to present a matured,

fully crafted and encapsulated

version of their program.
Habermas'

ideal speech situation outlines the needed

components for achieving a rhetoric which properly
addressed the legitimacy crisis in the American political
order.

However,

since Habermas did not concern himself

with concrete discourse situations,
needed to be developed.
created from Habermas'

rhetorical criteria

The topoi of legitimacy were
ideology to be used as critical

categories for this study.

Presidential candidates'

attempt to restore or simply to comment upon legitimacy of
the political order were identified through the topoi of
citizenship,

virtue,

and authority.
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STUDY RESULTS
Ross Perot's discourse was strongly marked by
condemnations of the present political order and promised
to restore legitimacy.

Perot consistently condemned

professional politicians and expressed a desire to return
the functions of the government back to the people.

In a

tradition as old as Cicero, Perot outlined a narrative of
the decline of republican virtue.

A system had evolved in

which the government ruled over the people rather than from
the people.

Plans for citizen participation,

execution of

only those functions which encouraged the public good, and
complete government accountability to the people pervaded
Perot's rhetoric.

In his opening statement of the first

debate, Perot exemplified his position when he declared "I
represent a movement which has come from the people.
have put me on the ballot."

You

Nearly every sentence Perot

uttered was framed either as a lament for the loss of
legitimacy or as a promise to execute his office in a way
that would recapture it.
The rhetoric of George Bush in the debates contained
the fewest legitimacy appeals.

As an incumbent,

the

president had few systematic criticisms of the present
political order;

change must be prudently managed.

On

several occasions, he even seemed to offer weak
endorsements for two of Perot's major anti-legitimacy
targets:

Lobbyists and Political A c tion Committees.

Bush
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also indicated that he believed the president had the right
to act independently of the will of the people in major
undertakings.

If the electorate was uneasy about the

political order's legitimacy,

the president offered very

little to restore legitimacy.

His rhetorical strategies

were those of a manager rather than a moral leader and
could only serve to distance him from the electorate.
Governor Clinton appeared to ride two horses at once.
He offered rhetorical appeals which appeared to
simultaneously support the political status quo and place
control of government functions back into the hands of the
people.

Clinton attempted to identify himself as a

populist candidate,

a person who had arisen from the most

humble circumstances and had remained one of them
psychologically despite studies at Oxford and Yale,

long

considered bastions of privilege by the plain people of
America.

Despite his validation of the citizen, Clinton

indicated that he was an experienced politician who could
translate the inchoate desires of the American people into
a coherent program.

He was a political expert, but he was

the people's political expert.
spirit.

He had internalized their

Clinton's attempt to restore legitimacy to the

political order straddled both sides of the political
legitimacy fence.
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STUDY PEDAGOGY
This examination of the 1992 televised presidential
debates provided insight into political campaigning in
several different ways.

First, a better understanding of

the contemporary meaning and experience of political
legitimacy was determined.

Ross Perot's success in both

the debates and the election may well be connected to the
persistent drumfire of his legitimacy restoration rhetoric.
Members of a contemporary electorate appear receptive to
messages regarding the restoration of the functions of
government back into the hands of the people.

Whether

voters believe in the possibility and effectiveness of a
citizen driven polity is another matter.

Perhaps it is

mere Jeffersonian nostalgia in a Hamiltonian world.
Perhaps the electorate may just feel restless and not
understand or know the source of their restlessness.

If a

candidate such as Perot is able to articulate a reason for
that restlessness,

then a certain percentage of the

electorate may respond positively to the candidate who has
given a name to their unease and frustration.
Second,

this study provided an understanding of the

clash between expert and Jeffersonian dialogue.

Candidate

comments in the debates can be easily identified as
subscribing to a particular political ideology.

America

appears suspended between its reality as a modern power
state characterized by electronically mediated discourse
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and a ghostly memory of our agrarian past.

Perhaps this

latest "crisis" is in a long tradition of cyclical
populism,

progressivism,

and good government movements.

But perhaps the magnitude of alienation is greater than
before.

If this is so, then the exigence from this tension

will have to be resolved.

Political experts will either

need to reform their w a y s , or the electorate may seek a way
to regain control of the political system, whether by
ballot box or revolution.

Proposition 13 in California,

w h i c h brought fiscal chaos for a decade,

is an example of

an armed citizenry taking back its prerogative and
w ithdrawing physical as well as psychological support.
Third, this study indicated a chaotic n ew direction in
A merican politics.

When a virtually unknown candidate,

such as Ross Perot, can engage in symbolic political
suicide by withdrawing from the race in mid summer,

return

in early fall, score extremely well in every debate and
attract a significant portion of the vote in the general
election,

conventional wisdom falters.

It m a y indicate

that a large portion of the American public are so
discontented with current political options,

that they will

respond to appeals for a radical restoration of the power
arrangements in the world's leading democracy.

Clinton

found a radical Jeffersonian ideology worth incorporating
into his campaign rhetoric and used it successfully during
the election.

Bush used citizen appeals rarely.

He seemed
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unconcerned with the apparent obsession to empower citizens
and may have suffered defeat because of his insensitivity
in this arena.
Fourth,

this study provided additional tools for the

rhetorical and political critic for the examination of
future political endeavors.

The proposed topoi of

legitimacy may provide a useful set of analytical
categories which researchers can use to isolate and
critique variables unique to a specific study.
Finally, by articulating the rhetorical components of
legitimacy appeals, an electorate might be better informed
about political messages and then able to make more
informed decisions.

By inoculating the electorate

regarding candidate strategies,

greater listener

discernment is possible when participating in political
campaigns,

rallies or debates.
FUTURE RESEARCH

This study provides the political communication critic
with numerous opportunities for future research.

First,

the topoi of legitimacy can be applied to future debates.
In particular,
and Perot

the rhetorical messages of President Clinton

(should he decide to run again) can be examined

in the 1996 campaign for possible consistencies or changes.
The critic m ay explore questions such as:
continue to use mixed appeals successfully?

Might Clinton
Or, as an
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incumbent, will legitimacy appeals be more or less salient
in the coming campaign?
Further areas of future research might include
examining the roots of legitimacy rhetoric.

Has this

rhetorical style slowly evolved over the past several
decades or are its roots in the Cromwellian revolution or
at some earlier crisis?

A further research question might

explore the use of the "expert" as an appeal in
presidential rhetoric.

In addition to televised debates,

other forms of campaign rhetoric could be examined for the
presence of the legitimacy topoi.

Are they situational or

are they an enduring feature of contemporary discourse.
Finally,

legitimacy topoi of particular genres could be

identified.

Generic forms such as crisis rhetoric and

apologia might be examined.

Even extreme situations must

contain legitimacy functions and rituals for leaders.
Additional study questions might include:
politicians, not just presidents,
topoi into their rhetoric;

How might

incorporate legitimacy

Do rhetorical manifestos such

as the Republican P a r t y ’s "Contract With America" use the
topoi as a stock of heuristic forms for their indictment of
present leaders?
In closing,

do these additional forms of attempts at

legitimacy crisis restoration reflect a growing trend in
American politics as a whole or is it merely temporary?
Finally, can legitimacy crisis be reduced to a verbal tick,
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a mere traditional gloss like the laments of the Elder Cato
for the loss of Roman piety and discipline?
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